Windows Active Directory Relay Attacks via SMB NTLM Reflection and Kerberos DNS CNAME Abuse
Vulnerability Disclosure · 3 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Jan 19, 2026

Two separate Windows authentication weaknesses were highlighted as enabling high-impact Active Directory compromise via relay-style attacks. One issue, CVE-2025-33073, affects Windows SMB client authentication and enables NTLM reflection: attackers can coerce lsass.exe (running as SYSTEM) to authenticate to attacker-controlled infrastructure using techniques such as PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, and Printerbug, then relay/reflect that authentication to gain SYSTEM-level access and potentially full domain compromise. Reporting emphasized that despite a June 2025 patch, the condition remains widely present in enterprise environments due to incomplete patch adoption, and exploitation can be enabled with relatively low prerequisites such as the ability to register a malicious AD DNS record (often permitted to Authenticated Users by default) or to perform local DNS poisoning.
A second technique described a Kerberos relay vector that abuses how Windows clients process DNS CNAME responses when building the SPN for TGS requests, allowing an on-path attacker (e.g., via ARP poisoning or DHCPv6/mitm6) to redirect victims to attacker-controlled services and obtain service tickets usable for relays and lateral movement. The write-up claims default configurations across Windows 10/11 and Windows Server 2022/2025 are susceptible, with potential impact including cross-protocol relays (e.g., HTTP→SMB/LDAP) and paths to RCE in some environments (e.g., via ADCS web enrollment scenarios). A separate Metasploit weekly wrap-up noted new and updated offensive modules (including AD privilege-escalation content), but it did not specifically tie to either of the two relay issues above.


