Loading story…
Anthropic released an update that lets Claude interact with third-party workplace applications inside the chat interface using the open Model Context Protocol (MCP), reducing the need to switch between separate app tabs. The capability supports interactive embedded experiences (e.g., project boards, dashboards, design canvases, messaging) so users can view and edit content from services such as Slack, Asana, Box, Canva, Figma, Hex, and monday.com directly within Claude, including workflows like drafting incident communications or updating task timelines.
The implementation is powered by an MCP extension described as MCP Apps, which allows an MCP server to provide an interactive UI that can render and accept user actions within an AI product. ZDNET characterized the move as part of Anthropic’s broader push to make Claude a primary work interface, building on earlier “connector” approaches that primarily moved data via prompts; the new approach enables more direct, app-native style interaction within the Claude conversation. A separate ZDNET piece offering general “IT playbook” guidance for the AI era does not provide substantive details about this specific Claude/MCP integration update.
Mallory correlates global threat intelligence with your attack surface — know if you’re exposed before adversaries strike.
2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
At launch, Anthropic made the new in-chat app integrations available on Claude web and desktop for paid tiers including Pro, Team, Enterprise, and in some reporting Max, while also broadening access to the Claude Cowork research preview for Team and Enterprise users. Anthropic said additional integrations, including Salesforce, are planned.
On January 26, 2026, Anthropic introduced interactive tool support in Claude, allowing users to open and work with external applications directly inside Claude chats instead of relying only on text-based connectors. The feature is powered by the Model Context Protocol and its MCP Apps extension, with initial support for apps including Slack, Asana, Figma, Amplitude, Box, Canva, Clay, Hex, and monday.com.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
3 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
cio.com
Open sourcehelpnetsecurity.com
Open sourcezdnet.com
Open sourceMap indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Anthropic rolled out expanded *Claude Cowork* capabilities, adding **enterprise workflow plugins** intended to push agentic AI beyond software development into functions such as marketing, HR, legal, and finance, positioning Claude as a broader automation layer inside organizations. Coverage characterized the move as part of a wider shift toward AI-driven workflows in the enterprise, with implications for CIO governance, adoption patterns, and how teams operationalize AI outside engineering. Separately but related to the same product-direction narrative, commentary highlighted Anthropic formalizing **security-oriented features inside Claude**—including a prominent “**suggest fix**” capability aimed at moving from vulnerability detection to automated or semi-automated remediation—prompting market speculation about pressure on certain security-tool segments (particularly code-vulnerability discovery and remediation tooling). Other items in the set were not incident- or vulnerability-driven: one was generic SAST remediation guidance, and several were general-interest or business-trend pieces (e.g., an AI model blogging, AI-native software market dynamics, and an AI-agent governance/AX article) without specific, actionable cybersecurity event details.
Jun 29, 2026
Anthropic released a **“Remote Control”** capability for *Claude Code* that lets developers start an agentic terminal session locally and then continue interacting with it from a phone, tablet, or web browser. The feature is rolling out as a research preview for Max users and can be initiated via `claude rc` / `claude remote-control`, with an option to enable it by default for all sessions; access is provided through a session URL, QR code in the mobile app, or via *claude.ai* session selection. From a security and architecture standpoint, the remote interface acts as a front-end while execution remains on the user’s machine, retaining access to the local filesystem, environment variables, and local *Model Context Protocol (MCP)* servers. Both write-ups state the local agent makes **outbound HTTPS** connections only (no inbound ports opened), registers/polls via the Anthropic API, and routes traffic over **TLS** using short-lived tokens; each *Claude Code* instance supports **one active remote session** to reduce conflicts and limit exposure.
Jun 29, 2026
Anthropic announced **Claude Code Security**, an embedded capability in *Claude Code* that scans customer codebases for vulnerabilities and suggests patches, initially rolling out to a limited set of enterprise/team customers for testing. The company said the feature was stress-tested via internal red-teaming, Capture-the-Flag exercises, and collaboration with **Pacific Northwest National Laboratory**, and positioned it as a way to reduce reliance on manual security reviews as AI-assisted “vibe coding” increases and attackers also use AI to accelerate weakness discovery. In parallel, Anthropic released **Claude Sonnet 4.6**, emphasizing improved coding performance, stronger “computer use” capabilities, and expanded developer tooling (e.g., adaptive/extended thinking modes, beta context compaction, and API tools for web search/fetch and code execution). Separate commentary highlighted the security risk of **agentic coding assistants** (e.g., *Claude Code*, *Cursor*, *GitHub Copilot*) operating with broad privileges—file access, shell execution, and secret handling—and argued that the emerging **Model Context Protocol (MCP)** ecosystem needs stronger, future-proof identity controls; additional industry guidance promoted **MLSecOps** as a way to integrate security into AI/ML development lifecycles, though it did not report a specific incident or vulnerability.
Jun 29, 2026