Researchers reported an active campaign distributing Amatera Stealer by using fake “human verification”/CAPTCHA pages (often described as ClickFix) to trick users into manually pasting and running a command via the Windows Run dialog. Instead of launching PowerShell directly, the command abuses the signed Microsoft App-V script SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy PowerShell execution through trusted Windows components (e.g., wscript.exe), helping the activity blend in with legitimate tooling and evade some defenses.
On suitable targets—systems where Application Virtualization (App-V) is present and enabled (notably Windows 10/11 Enterprise/Education and modern Windows Server)—the infection chain performs anti-analysis checks to hinder sandbox detonation, then pulls staging/configuration data from a public Google Calendar (.ics) resource. Additional stages are retrieved using steganography, including encrypted payloads embedded in PNG images hosted on public infrastructure/CDNs, which are then decrypted and executed in memory to deliver Amatera (described as based on ACR Stealer and offered as malware-as-a-service). Recommended mitigations highlighted include tightening controls around Run-dialog execution, disabling unnecessary App-V components, increasing PowerShell/script logging visibility, and monitoring for anomalous outbound retrievals to calendar/image-hosting services.

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Technical analysis showed the campaign retrieves configuration data from a public Google Calendar .ics file and then downloads PNG images containing an encrypted and compressed payload. The final stages execute in memory and deliver the Amatera Stealer infostealer while using anti-analysis gates to frustrate sandbox detonation.
Blackpoint researchers reported a malware delivery campaign that tricks users into pasting a command into the Windows Run dialog, then abuses the signed Microsoft App-V script SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs via wscript.exe to stealthily launch the infection chain. The campaign is designed to evade enterprise defenses and researcher analysis, with execution succeeding mainly on systems where App-V is present and enabled.
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