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Security researchers reported an npm supply-chain compromise involving a malicious package, polymarket-clob, that targeted cryptocurrency users by exfiltrating sensitive local files (including .env, wallets.json, and keys/*.json) to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The package was published in the npm registry, downloaded at least 189 times (lower bound), and later removed and replaced with a security placeholder; analysis of the code and infrastructure pivoting linked the campaign to broader activity consistent with wallet-drainer operations and Vidar stealer-related infrastructure, including reuse of SSH fingerprints and consistent hosting patterns.
Separately, researchers disclosed six JavaScript “zero-day” bypass issues across multiple package managers—npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun—that undermine common defensive controls used to reduce supply-chain risk, including disabling lifecycle scripts and relying on lockfile integrity. The issues (dubbed “PackageGate”) reportedly enable paths to regain install-time code execution or weaken integrity guarantees via mechanisms such as Git dependency handling, tar extraction behaviors, and incomplete integrity coverage for URL-based tarballs; pnpm, vlt, and Bun were reported as patched, while npm characterized the behavior as “works as expected,” raising concern that package-manager-level weaknesses could enable large-scale compromise even in hardened environments.
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8 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
A Panther report publicly attributed the malicious npm activity targeting Polymarket traders to DPRK-linked tradecraft, tagged as Famous Chollima. The report also said the package stole wallet keys and installed an SSH backdoor, adding new technical and attribution details to the incident.
npm, owned by Microsoft, told researchers that the reported behavior "works as expected" rather than issuing a patch. The response drew criticism that significant package-manager security gaps remained unaddressed.
Following Koi's reporting, pnpm, vlt, and Bun patched the disclosed PackageGate vulnerabilities. The fixes addressed weaknesses including Git dependency handling, incomplete integrity coverage for URL-based tarballs, tar extraction path traversal, and allow-list spoofing.
Researchers at Koi disclosed "PackageGate," a set of six zero-day vulnerabilities affecting npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun. The flaws could bypass common supply-chain defenses such as disabling lifecycle scripts and relying on lockfile integrity hashes, potentially restoring install-time code execution for attackers.
After its malicious behavior was identified, the "polymarket-clob" package was later removed from the npm registry. The removal followed discovery that it was stealing sensitive data and wallet-related material from users.
The npm package "polymarket-clob" was used to exfiltrate sensitive local files, including environment variables and wallet or key material, from Polymarket users to attacker-controlled infrastructure. On-chain evidence from a reported victim showed a small ETH transfer to an address assessed as attacker-controlled.
Historical telemetry showed one IP in the identified infrastructure cluster overlapping with Vidar Stealer detections during the same timeframe. This indicated the infrastructure had also been used in other malware activity, though not conclusively by the same operator.
An older "Monad testnet" GitHub-script wallet drainer was used to harvest Ethereum private keys from wallet.txt files and send them to infrastructure later linked to other malicious activity. Subsequent analysis connected this infrastructure to domains impersonating blockchain testnet services.
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Open-source software supply chain risk continued to escalate, with reporting citing **454,600+** newly identified malicious packages across major repositories (including **PyPI, npm, Maven Central, NuGet, and Hugging Face**) and tactics ranging from **credential theft** to **multi-stage attacks** and even early **self-replicating** package malware. The activity reportedly concentrated heavily in **npm**, including high-volume “ecosystem flooding” (e.g., single accounts publishing **150,000+** malicious packages in days) and **hijacking of trusted projects**, exploiting developer reliance on superficial trust signals such as package names, READMEs, and download counts. Separately, researchers disclosed **“PackageGate”** vulnerabilities in JavaScript package managers (**npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun**) that can bypass common post-incident defenses—namely `--ignore-scripts` and lockfile integrity—enabling malicious code execution via compromised dependencies. Koi Security reported six issues; **pnpm, vlt, and Bun** shipped fixes, while **npm** reportedly treated the behavior as expected. In parallel, threat actors abused **GitHub’s fork architecture** to distribute a spoofed *GitHub Desktop* installer promoted via search ads; execution deployed **HijackLoader** and established persistence via a **scheduled task**, underscoring that supply chain threats extend beyond package registries into developer tooling distribution channels.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported two distinct software supply-chain abuse paths that can make malicious code appear to originate from trusted sources. GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae described an active campaign dubbed **“repo squatting”** that abuses how GitHub renders and links commits from forks: a commit made in an attacker-controlled fork can be viewed under the upstream project’s URL structure, enabling convincing links like `github.com/<official-org>/<repo>/commit/<hash>` that appear to belong to the official repository. The campaign targeted the *GitHub Desktop* project by distributing a trojanized installer carrying **HijackLoader**, with the malicious download link presented in a way that could mislead users and some security tooling into believing it came from the official repo. Separately, Koi researchers disclosed **PackageGate** weaknesses in JavaScript dependency tooling that allow bypassing npm’s post–**Shai-Hulud** mitigations when installing **Git-based dependencies**. They reported that a malicious `.npmrc` in a Git dependency can override the `git` binary path, enabling **code execution even when lifecycle scripts are disabled** (e.g., `--ignore-scripts=true`), affecting multiple tools (including *pnpm*, *vlt*, *Bun*, and *npm*). Vendors reportedly addressed the issue in the non-npm tools, while npm closed the report as “works as expected,” and researchers cited evidence of prior proof-of-concept abuse (e.g., reverse shell) indicating practical exploitation risk for organizations relying on Git dependencies in CI/CD and developer environments.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors are using **malicious npm packages** to steal developer credentials and CI/CD secrets, enabling rapid escalation into cloud environments. Google reported that **UNC6426** leveraged keys stolen during the earlier compromise of the *nx* npm ecosystem to pivot from a stolen developer GitHub token into **AWS administrative access within 72 hours**, abusing **GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect (OIDC) trust** to create a new admin role. The actor then used that access to **exfiltrate data from AWS S3** and conduct **destructive actions** in production cloud environments; the initial *nx* compromise involved a GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflow abuse (“**Pwn Request**”) that enabled publishing trojanized packages containing a `postinstall` chain that executed the **QUIETVAULT** JavaScript credential stealer and uploaded stolen data to a public GitHub repo (`/s1ngularity-repository-1`). Separately, researchers reported new waves of the **PhantomRaven** npm supply-chain campaign distributing **88 additional malicious packages** (via ~50 disposable accounts) that target JavaScript developers by exfiltrating secrets from files like `.gitconfig` and `.npmrc`, environment variables, and CI/CD tokens (e.g., GitHub/GitLab/Jenkins/CircleCI). The campaign uses **slopsquatting** (LLM-suggested lookalike package names) and a stealth technique called **Remote Dynamic Dependencies (RDD)**, where `package.json` pulls a dependency from an external URL so the malicious payload is fetched at install time (`npm install`) and can evade static package inspection; researchers indicated many of these packages remained available in the npm registry at the time of reporting.
Jun 29, 2026