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Infoblox researchers reported a widespread DNS hijacking campaign targeting outdated consumer/home routers across more than three dozen countries, where attackers compromise devices and change router-level DNS settings to silently redirect all connected users’ traffic. The manipulated DNS queries are sent to malicious resolvers hosted by Aeza International, a Russian bulletproof hosting provider that the US sanctioned in July 2025, allowing threat actors to control where victims are routed while keeping common destinations working to reduce suspicion.
The infrastructure reportedly uses a two-stage redirection chain: DNS traffic is forwarded into an HTTP-based Traffic Distribution System (TDS) that first verifies the request originates from a compromised router and then fingerprints/filters victims before sending them onward—often into advertising/affiliate networks that can lead to scams or malicious sites. Analysts also described an evasion behavior where the rogue resolvers may only respond under specific query conditions (e.g., when EDNS0 is disabled), complicating reproduction and detection; user-visible symptoms included selective site failures and persistent redirects that victims often misattributed to endpoints rather than the router.
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The UK National Cyber Security Centre warned that the Russian state-linked group APT28 had been compromising vulnerable SOHO routers since 2024, manipulating DNS and DHCP settings to redirect traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure for adversary-in-the-middle spying and credential theft. The advisory said the activity affected devices including TP-Link and MikroTik routers and appeared initially opportunistic before focusing on selected targets, including some in Ukraine.
Infoblox analysts correlated user complaints about abnormal browsing with anomalous DNS patterns and revealed that the campaign used Aeza-hosted resolvers, an HTTP-based traffic distribution system, and EDNS0 evasion to avoid detection. Researchers recommended auditing router DNS settings, updating firmware, and replacing unsupported hardware.
In a long-running global campaign, attackers compromised vulnerable end-of-life home routers and changed their DNS settings, affecting users in more than three dozen countries. The altered settings redirected all devices behind the routers through malicious resolvers while often leaving normal browsing behavior seemingly unchanged.
The U.S. government sanctioned Aeza International, a Russian bulletproof hosting provider later linked to malicious DNS resolvers used in the router hijacking campaign.
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The FBI disrupted an **APT28** operation that compromised internet-connected routers to enable **DNS hijacking**, according to reporting citing U.S. and UK government findings. The campaign abused vulnerable edge devices to alter DNS settings and redirect traffic, giving the Russian state-linked group a way to intercept victim communications, harvest credentials, and support follow-on espionage activity. The activity was significant enough to prompt public warnings from the FBI and the UK **NCSC**, which described router exploitation as a key enabler for the hijacking operations. Government guidance tied the operation to exploitation of routers exposed to the internet and urged organizations to harden perimeter infrastructure by patching devices, restricting remote administration, rotating credentials, and reviewing DNS configurations for unauthorized changes. The disclosures underscore how Russian espionage actors continue to rely on stealthy network-level tradecraft—using compromised infrastructure rather than malware alone—to persist in victim environments and covertly redirect or monitor traffic.
Jun 29, 2026
Microsoft said the Russian military-linked threat actor **Forest Blizzard** (`APT28`/`Strontium`) has compromised vulnerable home and small-office routers since at least August 2025, changing DNS settings to route traffic through attacker-controlled resolvers. The campaign affected more than **200 organizations** and **5,000 consumer devices** across government, IT, telecommunications, and energy, turning edge devices into covert infrastructure and giving the actor passive visibility into victims’ DNS traffic. For selected high-value targets, the operation escalated into **adversary-in-the-middle** attacks in which spoofed DNS responses redirected users to systems presenting invalid TLS certificates for legitimate services, including **Microsoft Outlook on the web** and government servers. Microsoft said confirmed AiTM activity included non-Microsoft government targets in at least three African countries, while stressing that no Microsoft-owned assets or services were compromised; the company urged defenders to patch and harden routers, replace default credentials, audit DNS settings, and train users not to bypass certificate warnings.
Jun 29, 2026
A **GRU-linked espionage campaign** attributed to **Forest Blizzard** is targeting small office and home office (SOHO) routers by changing DNS settings on poorly protected devices. The altered DNS redirects users trying to reach legitimate services to adversary-in-the-middle infrastructure, where victims are presented with fake login pages that capture **credentials** and **session tokens** before silently forwarding them to the real destination. The activity poses a particular risk to **remote workers** because it abuses unmanaged home-network infrastructure rather than compromising corporate endpoints directly, allowing attackers to intercept identity and business traffic from outside traditional enterprise defenses. Reported mitigations include enforcing **MFA**, routing traffic through **VPNs**, using centralized and monitored DNS, applying traffic filtering, and improving hardening, management, and monitoring of routers and other edge devices.
Jul 16, 2026