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Bitwarden launched ‘Cupid Vault’, a feature aimed at safer credential sharing by letting free-tier users create a two-person shared vault as an Organization and invite a trusted person via email. The shared vault is isolated from the user’s personal vault, supports revocation of access, and includes a fingerprint phrase verification step intended to reduce adversary-in-the-middle enrollment risks; both members can edit or delete items in the shared collection.
LastPass’s CEO described the company’s ongoing effort to rebuild trust and security culture following the 2022 intrusions, which began with access to parts of the development environment via a compromised developer account and theft of source code/technical data. LastPass said information from that initial compromise enabled subsequent access to customer-related data, including customer account metadata (e.g., names, billing addresses, emails, phone numbers, IP addresses) and a backup copy of encrypted customer vault data, framing the incident as a catalyst for significant security program changes.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On February 12, 2026, Bitwarden introduced 'Cupid Vault,' a free two-person shared vault feature for securely sharing passwords via email invitation. The launch included fingerprint-phrase verification to reduce adversary-in-the-middle risks during onboarding.
In a February 2026 interview, LastPass CEO Karim Toubba said the 2022 breach had driven broad changes to people, processes, and technology, and that the company now operates security standards beyond normal expectations as part of its trust-rebuilding effort.
In response to the breach, LastPass invested heavily in rebuilding its security program, including locked-down employee devices, hardware-based authentication, revamped training, a dedicated security team, and ongoing third-party audits and penetration testing.
Following the initial 2022 intrusion, the attacker obtained customer account information and metadata and accessed an encrypted backup of customer vault data. LastPass said this occurred after the intruder acquired a master password stolen from a senior engineer's home computer.
In August 2022, an unauthorized party accessed parts of LastPass's development environment using a compromised developer account and stole source code and technical data.
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LastPass disclosed that attackers expanded an initial August 2022 development-environment breach into a broader compromise that reached customer vault backups and account data. According to the company and subsequent reporting, the intruders used source code and technical information stolen in the first intrusion, combined with intelligence from a separate third-party breach, to target a DevOps engineer with access to decryption keys and AWS resources. The attackers compromised the engineer’s home computer through a vulnerable media software package, installed a keylogger, captured the employee’s master password after MFA, and then accessed the engineer’s corporate vault and shared folders. The stolen material included encrypted secure notes containing credentials and decryption keys for AWS S3 production backups, other cloud storage resources, and related database backups, allowing access to a separate cloud storage environment. LastPass said the attackers copied customer account information and metadata, plus backups of customer vault data containing unencrypted website URLs and **AES-256**-encrypted usernames, passwords, secure notes, and form data; later guidance urged users with weak master passwords to change stored credentials. The fallout triggered lawsuits, regulatory scrutiny including action by the UK ICO, and ongoing concern that weak master passwords could allow criminals to crack vault contents offline.
Jul 12, 2026
Researchers from **ETH Zurich** and the **Università della Svizzera italiana**, led by **Prof. Kenneth Paterson**, published findings demonstrating **27 successful attacks** against major password managers **Bitwarden**, **LastPass**, and **Dashlane** under a *malicious server* model, where an attacker has compromised the provider’s server. The work challenges the practical guarantees implied by “**zero-knowledge encryption**,” showing that if the server can tamper with what the client receives, some clients may fail to adequately verify integrity and binding between encrypted vault data and associated metadata, enabling vault contents to be exposed or misdirected. The reported techniques include issues described as missing **ciphertext integrity** and insufficient **cryptographic binding** of fields (e.g., URL metadata not being tightly bound to the encrypted secret), enabling attacks such as **field-swap** scenarios where a decrypted password could be sent to an attacker-controlled domain during normal client behavior (e.g., fetching a site icon). Additional attack paths discussed target password-manager features beyond basic storage—such as **account recovery**, **sharing**, and **auto-enrolment** into organizations—reinforcing that password-manager security depends not only on encryption at rest but also on robust client-side validation and threat models that account for server compromise; broader commentary also notes recent, compounding weaknesses in the password ecosystem, including password-manager design assumptions and other emerging password-related risks.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors have launched a sophisticated phishing campaign targeting users of the password managers LastPass and Bitwarden. The attackers send well-crafted emails that falsely claim LastPass or Bitwarden has suffered a security breach, urging recipients to download a new, supposedly more secure desktop version of the password manager. These emails are designed to create a sense of urgency and exploit social engineering tactics, with the goal of tricking users into downloading a malicious binary. Upon execution, the binary silently installs Syncro, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool commonly used by managed service providers. Once Syncro is installed, the attackers use it to deploy ScreenConnect, a remote support and access software, enabling them to further compromise the victim's system. This access allows the threat actors to deliver additional malware, steal data, and potentially compromise password vaults stored on the affected machines. The phishing emails are sent from addresses such as ‘hello@lastpasspulse[.]blog’ and ‘hello@lastpasjournal[.]blog’, and they mimic official security alerts from LastPass and Bitwarden. The messages claim that older .exe installations of the password managers are vulnerable and that users must upgrade to a new MSI installer to protect their vault data. LastPass has publicly denied any breach of its systems, clarifying that the emails are fraudulent and part of a social engineering scheme. The campaign began over a weekend, likely to take advantage of reduced staffing and slower detection during the holiday period. Bitwarden users have also been targeted with similar phishing emails, indicating a broad scope for the campaign. The attackers' use of legitimate remote access tools like Syncro and ScreenConnect makes detection and remediation more challenging for victims. The campaign follows a similar pattern to previous phishing attacks against users of other password managers, such as 1Password. Security experts warn that the use of trusted brand names and plausible security narratives increases the likelihood of user compromise. Organizations are advised to educate users about the risks of unsolicited security alerts and to verify any requests for software updates directly with the vendor. The incident highlights the ongoing threat posed by phishing campaigns that leverage trusted brands and remote access tools to gain control over user systems and sensitive data. Both LastPass and Bitwarden have issued statements to reassure users and provide guidance on identifying and avoiding these phishing attempts. The campaign demonstrates the evolving tactics of cybercriminals in targeting password manager users, who often have access to highly sensitive credentials. Security teams should monitor for unauthorized installations of RMM tools and implement controls to prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration. The incident underscores the importance of layered security defenses and user awareness training in mitigating the impact of phishing attacks.
Jul 12, 2026