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Dragos’ annual review of cyberattacks targeting operational technology (OT) warns of a “silent epidemic” of ransomware impacting commercial OT environments that is frequently mischaracterized as an IT-only incident, obscuring operational impact and hindering effective response. Dragos CEO Rob Lee attributed this to gaps in OT understanding within IT security teams and to insufficient collection of OT network telemetry needed to perform reliable root-cause analysis and accurately scope incidents.
The report also highlights concerning evolution in nation-state OT threat activity, describing a shift from basic initial-access efforts toward OT-focused reconnaissance and pre-positioning intended to enable future disruptive or real-world effects. Overall, Dragos frames the combination of limited OT visibility, misclassification of incidents, and increasingly purposeful nation-state operations as key risk drivers for organizations running industrial and other OT systems.
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According to Dragos data cited in the new reference, the industrial sector experienced 1,020 ransomware incidents in Q1 2026. The reporting says manufacturing accounted for most victims and that engineering firms, integrators, and OT equipment vendors were also heavily targeted, underscoring supply-chain risk to ICS environments.
On publication of its 2025 annual review, Dragos warned of a 'silent epidemic' of ransomware affecting commercial OT, widespread lack of OT telemetry, and common use of identity abuse to compromise systems supporting OT continuity. The report also said regulatory improvements such as CIRCIA and bulk electric system requirements may help, but will take years to fully mature.
During 2025, Dragos observed nation-state OT intrusions evolving from initial access activity toward reconnaissance of OT systems and pre-positioning for disruptive or destructive effects inside industrial control environments. The report highlights this as a significant escalation in attacker intent and tradecraft.
Dragos' 2025 annual review says ransomware activity against industrial organizations increased sharply during 2025. The report argues many of these incidents likely affected operational technology environments but were often characterized publicly as IT-only events.
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Reporting highlighted growing concern that **state-affiliated and state-linked actors** are positioning for disruptive attacks against **operational technology (OT)** and critical infrastructure, with activity that may be difficult for operators to detect. A Codific analysis described five common pathways seen in disruptive grid-focused intrusions—often beginning with **human error or exposed perimeter services**, then escalating through **credential theft**, **remote access exploitation** (e.g., VPNs/gateways), **ransomware**, and misuse of **legitimate industrial commands** that can delay operations and complicate detection and recovery; it also warned that attacks on virtualized environments can hinder restoration efforts and that cascading impacts could be severe (e.g., Lloyd’s “Business Blackout” scenario estimating losses up to **$1T**). Recommended mitigations emphasized proven controls such as **phishing-resistant MFA** and **IT/OT segmentation**, rather than novel defenses. Separate commentary and media content also pointed to OT becoming a frontline in geopolitical escalation, including claims of a coordinated campaign tied to Iran-linked hacktivist activity targeting OT devices such as **Unitronics PLCs** used in water and industrial facilities, alongside psychological operations and SMS spoofing. Other items in the set were leadership/career/podcast-style content without specific incident or vulnerability detail and do not materially add to the OT/power-grid threat reporting.
Jun 29, 2026
Security reporting and expert commentary warn that **operational technology (OT)** environments remain highly exposed due to fragile access controls and that attacker capability is trending toward more dangerous, process-aware operations. Lessons drawn from the 2015 **Ukraine power grid** disruption emphasize that remote connectivity, vendor access, and broad VPN permissions can become the “soft underbelly” of critical infrastructure, with recurring real-world examples of disruption tied to **misused remote access and stolen credentials** (including the **Colonial Pipeline** shutdown following a compromised password). The core takeaway is that OT systems are no longer “too specialized” to be targeted, and that common enterprise intrusion paths—credential compromise and remote access abuse—continue to translate into operational impact when they bridge into industrial environments. Separately, OT-focused threat analysis highlights early signs that attackers are gaining the “process comprehension” historically missing from many intrusions into industrial systems. A forthcoming RSA Conference 2026 presentation is expected to demonstrate **“living-off-the-plant”** techniques—analogous to living-off-the-land in IT—where adversaries leverage native industrial tooling and legitimate functions inside plants to blend in and potentially manipulate physical processes. The reporting argues that “security by obscurity” (attackers’ unfamiliarity with bespoke/legacy OT) has limited the severity of many incidents so far, but that this advantage is eroding as adversaries become more comfortable operating within industrial environments, increasing the risk of more consequential OT attacks.
Jun 29, 2026
Palo Alto Networks’ **Unit 42** reported that **identity abuse** has become the dominant initial access vector in incident response engagements, with identity-based techniques accounting for **nearly two-thirds** of initial intrusions and an identity-related element present in **nearly 90%** of cases across the attack lifecycle. The report highlights **social engineering** as the leading entry method (about **one-third** of cases), alongside compromised credentials, brute force, overly permissive identity policies, and insider threats; it also notes that growth in **machine identities** and **AI agents** is expanding the identity attack surface and complicating detection because malicious use of valid identities can blend into normal telemetry. Dragos’ 2026 OT/ICS Year in Review described industrial threat actors increasingly moving beyond opportunistic access toward **control-loop mapping**—identifying engineering workstations and collecting configuration/alarm files to understand how processes behave and enable physical impact. Dragos tracked **26** OT-targeting threat groups and identified new groups (**AZURITE, PYROXENE, SYLVANITE**), emphasizing specialization and a division of labor where initial-access activity (including targeting **internet-facing systems**) feeds more OT-capable operators; it also warned that **ransomware** is driving operational disruption and multi-day outages that require OT-specific recovery and is often underestimated as “just IT.”
Jun 29, 2026