Mobile Networks and Cyber Operations Enabling Drone Warfare in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict
Threat Actor Intelligence · 2 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Feb 21, 2026

Ukrainian hacktivists linked to the Fenix cyber analytics center, supported by InformNapalm, reported compromising accounts belonging to dozens of Russian military personnel and gaining access to monitoring systems used by Russian attack-drone operators. The operation allegedly enabled covert, near real-time surveillance of drone-operator activity and the transfer of collected data to Ukrainian Defense Forces, and it was cited in reporting around Ukraine’s decision to sanction Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka over Belarus’s role in enabling Russia’s use of repeater infrastructure on Belarusian territory to extend UAV control and expand strike reach into northern Ukraine, including against energy and rail targets.
Separately, Dutch intelligence services (AIVD/MIVD) warned that Russia is intensifying a broader hybrid warfare campaign across Europe—combining cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation, covert influence, and espionage—to undermine public trust and weaken support for Ukraine while staying below the threshold of open war. In parallel, telecom-focused research highlighted how public mobile networks are increasingly being used as command/telemetry links for combat drones, citing examples from the Russia–Ukraine war and describing how 4G/5G standards work (e.g., 3GPP enhancements in Releases 15–18) has made cellular-connected UAV operations more feasible—raising infrastructure-security concerns for mobile operators and national critical infrastructure.


