Multiple n8n Vulnerabilities Enable RCE, Sandbox Escapes, and Stored XSS
Active Exploitation · 11 sources · Updated 4mo ago · First seen Feb 27, 2026

Security researchers and CVE disclosures reported multiple vulnerabilities in the n8n workflow automation platform that can enable remote code execution (RCE), sandbox escapes, and stored XSS under various conditions. Akamai highlighted exploitation interest from Zerobot targeting n8n via CVE-2025-68613, a critical expression-evaluation sandboxing failure affecting versions 0.211.0 through 1.20.4 (and 1.21.1/1.22.0), where a logged-in (non-admin) user could break out of the expression context to execute arbitrary code, read/write server files, steal environment variables (e.g., API keys), and establish persistence; a public PoC was noted as available.
Subsequent advisories describe additional n8n flaws patched after the earlier expression-sandbox issue, generally requiring an authenticated user who can create/modify workflows, except where noted. CVE-2026-27577 covers further expression-evaluation abuse leading to host command execution; CVE-2026-27495 describes a JavaScript Task Runner sandbox escape that can lead to full host compromise when internal runners are used (enabled via N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED=true), with external runner mode (N8N_RUNNERS_MODE=external) reducing blast radius; CVE-2026-27497 describes potential RCE and arbitrary file write via the Merge node in SQL query mode; and CVE-2026-27578 describes stored XSS across multiple nodes (e.g., Webhook/Form/Chat-related nodes) enabling session hijacking/account takeover when victims view affected pages. CVE-2026-27493 adds a second-order, potentially unauthenticated expression injection path via Form nodes (triggered by crafted input beginning with = under specific workflow configurations) that can escalate to RCE only when chained with a separate sandbox escape. Fixes are reported in n8n 2.10.1 (and, depending on branch, 2.9.3 / 1.123.22), with interim mitigations including restricting workflow edit permissions and disabling specific nodes via NODES_EXCLUDE (e.g., n8n-nodes-base.webhook, n8n-nodes-base.merge, n8n-nodes-base.form, n8n-nodes-base.formTrigger).


