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Silver Dragon, an emerging China-linked threat actor assessed as part of the APT41 ecosystem, has conducted cyberespionage operations against government entities in Europe and Southeast Asia since at least mid-2024. Reporting based on Check Point research says the group gains initial access through a mix of exploitation of public-facing servers and phishing emails with malicious attachments, then blends into normal activity by hijacking legitimate Windows services for persistence and command-and-control (C2).
The activity includes a toolchain that uses heavily obfuscated loaders (including MonikerLoader and BamboLoader) to decrypt and inject payloads in memory, with Cobalt Strike beacons commonly deployed as a final-stage payload. Check Point also observed Google Drive-based C2 as an evasion technique, alongside Cobalt Strike configurations that can use DNS tunneling, HTTP via Cloudflare, or SMB for internal communications; additional custom post-exploitation tooling (e.g., screenshot capture utilities) was also reported, and artifacts suggested an automated framework for generating per-target attack packages (e.g., consistent file timestamps and recovered configuration logs with paths, service names, keys, and injected processes).
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Check Point Research disclosed the Silver Dragon activity cluster, detailing its infection chains, custom tools including SilverScreen and SSHcmd, and assessing that the operation is tied to the China-linked APT41 ecosystem based on tradecraft overlaps.
The group used a custom .NET backdoor called GearDoor that communicated through a dedicated Google Drive account, alongside other C2 methods such as DNS tunneling, HTTP via Cloudflare, and SMB to blend malicious traffic with trusted services.
After access, the actor used AppDomain hijacking and malicious service DLL deployment to abuse legitimate Windows services for persistence and stealth, while delivering obfuscated loaders such as MonikerLoader and BamboLoader that ultimately installed Cobalt Strike.
Across observed campaigns, the group gained entry through phishing emails with malicious attachments, including weaponized LNK files, and by exploiting vulnerable public-facing servers.
A China-linked espionage cluster dubbed Silver Dragon, assessed as tied to the broader APT41 nexus, has been active since at least mid-2024 against government and public sector entities in Europe and Southeast Asia.
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Researchers uncovered **Operation Dragon Weave**, a spearphishing espionage campaign targeting officials and citizens in **Taiwan** and the **Czech Republic** with region-specific lures. Victims received ZIP archives that triggered one of two infection chains: a malicious `.lnk` file launching a VBScript-and-PowerShell sequence, or a Rust-based dropper that unpacked components directly. Both paths led to DLL sideloading of a malicious `UnityPlayer.dll`, a Rust loader dubbed **RUSTCLOAK** that decrypted and executed the next-stage payload entirely in memory. The final payload, **AZUREVEIL**, was identified as an Adaptix C2 agent that used **Microsoft Azure Blob Storage** as a dead-drop command-and-control channel over HTTPS, allowing encrypted tasking, data exfiltration, and in-memory BOF execution while blending into legitimate cloud traffic. Seqrite reported anti-analysis checks, multilayer payload encryption, and a hardcoded Azure SAS token valid for a year, indicating an effort to preserve stealth and persistence. Based on the targeting, tooling, and tradecraft, researchers assessed with moderate confidence that the operation is linked to a **China-based threat actor**, though no specific group was named.
Jun 29, 2026
Reporting across multiple research teams described a surge of distinct, ongoing intrusion campaigns rather than a single unified incident. **Check Point** reported on **Silver Dragon**, a Chinese-aligned activity cluster assessed as operating under the broader **APT41** umbrella, targeting organizations in **Southeast Asia and Europe** (notably government) via exploitation of public-facing servers and phishing, then deploying **Cobalt Strike**, **DNS tunneling**, and a new Google Drive–based backdoor (**GearDoor**) alongside custom tools (**SSHcmd** and **SliverScreen**) for remote access and screen capture. **Microsoft** detailed separate February 2026 phishing campaigns by an unknown actor that used meeting/invoice-style lures and **EV code-signed** malware (certificate issued to **TrustConnect Software PTY LTD**) masquerading as common workplace apps (e.g., `msteams.exe`, `adobereader.exe`, `zoomworkspace.clientsetup.exe`) to install legitimate **RMM** tooling (**ScreenConnect**, **Tactical RMM**, **Mesh Agent**) for persistent access and lateral movement. Other reporting highlighted additional, unrelated campaigns and tradecraft: **ClearSky** described a Russian-aligned operation targeting **Ukraine** using a phishing-delivered ZIP/HTA chain that drops a .NET loader (**BadPaw**) and backdoor (**MeowMeow**) with **.NET Reactor** obfuscation, parameter-gated execution, and sandbox/tooling checks (with low-confidence linkage to **APT28**). **Cofense**-reported activity (via SC Media) showed phishing that weaponizes **Windows File Explorer + WebDAV** using URL/LNK shortcuts to pull payloads (notably **AsyncRAT**, **XWorm**, **DcRAT**) and infrastructure including **Cloudflare Tunnel** domains hosting WebDAV servers. **Cisco Talos**-reported **Dohdoor** activity (UAT-10027) targeted US **education and healthcare**, using PowerShell→batch→DLL sideloading via legitimate executables (e.g., `Fondue.exe`, `mblctr.exe`, `ScreenClippingHost.exe`) and **DNS-over-HTTPS** to Cloudflare for C2 discovery and tunneling. Separately, **Zscaler** reported **ScarCruft**’s *Ruby Jumper* campaign using **Zoho WorkDrive** for C2 and removable media components to reach air-gapped systems, while another Zscaler report analyzed **Dust Specter** targeting Iraqi government officials with password-protected RAR delivery and modular implants. **Qianxin XLab** assessed sanctioned infrastructure provider **Funnull** resurfacing to support scam/criminal supply chains and potential **MacCMS**-related supply-chain activity, and **F5 Labs** summarized **APT42**’s **TAMECAT** PowerShell backdoor focused on Edge/Chrome credential theft with C2 over Telegram/Discord/HTTPS and specific file/hash indicators. (A separate Help Net Security item on a Microsoft Defender onboarding tool is product/administrative news and not part of the threat-campaign reporting.)
Jun 29, 2026
Check Point Research attributed a set of tightly scoped cyber-espionage campaigns against **government and law enforcement** organizations in Southeast Asia to a China-linked activity cluster it tracks as **Amaranth-Dragon**, assessed as connected to the broader **APT41** ecosystem. Targeting was reported across **Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines**, with lures aligned to local geopolitical events and infrastructure configured for stealth, including **geofencing** so command-and-control only interacted with victims in specific countries. The intrusion chain evolved over 2025, and—shortly after public disclosure—began weaponizing the WinRAR vulnerability **CVE-2025-8088** via malicious RAR archives to achieve code execution and persistence. Reporting describes Amaranth-Dragon using a custom **Amaranth Loader** to deliver encrypted payloads, with C2 infrastructure shielded behind **Cloudflare** and use of legitimate services (e.g., *Dropbox*) to stage content; Check Point also documented deployment of the **Havoc C2 framework** and a newly tracked **TGAmaranth RAT** that uses **Telegram bot-based C2** and includes anti-EDR/anti-AV features. Separate coverage notes CVE-2025-8088’s exploitation mechanics (including abuse of Windows **Alternate Data Streams (ADS)** to write to arbitrary locations such as Startup paths) and that multiple other threat groups have also exploited the flaw, underscoring ongoing operational risk beyond this single actor.
Jun 29, 2026