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A coalition of Western and Indo-Pacific governments launched the Global Coalition on Telecoms (GCOT) and published voluntary security and resilience principles intended to shape next-generation 6G mobile networks before technical standards are finalized. Announced at Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, the effort includes the US, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia, Sweden, and Finland and is positioned as a “secure by design” approach informed by lessons from the 5G rollout, when governments moved late to address dependencies on high-risk vendors and other systemic risks.
The non-binding guidance emphasizes building security and resilience into 6G architectures that are expected to expand attack surface through disaggregated designs, increased software layers, deeper AI integration, and new capabilities such as integrated sensing and tighter satellite-terrestrial convergence. Key recommendations include stronger authentication, data integrity and confidentiality protections, improved breach containment and threat isolation, supply-chain controls/diversification, safeguards for AI functions embedded in networks, and early planning for quantum-resistant cryptography to mitigate future cryptographic break risks. The initiative aims to influence researchers, vendors, operators, and international standards bodies during the research and standardization phase, amid broader strategic competition in advanced telecoms (with China accelerating 6G R&D and standards participation).
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The Global Coalition on Telecoms, comprising seven Western and Indo-Pacific countries, launched voluntary 6G Security and Resilience Principles at Mobile World Congress in Barcelona. The guidance is intended to shape future 6G standards and vendor development early, emphasizing secure-by-design architecture, supply-chain resilience, stronger authentication, data confidentiality and integrity, breach containment, AI safeguards, and planning for quantum-resistant cryptography.
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The telecom industry is preparing for 6G standards by 2029, focusing on secure-by-design principles and anticipating new attack vectors. Key risks include expanded attack surfaces from increased connectivity, AI integration, and the threat of quantum-enabled adversaries. The proposed Intelligent Trusted Network (ITN) model aims to embed zero trust, AI-driven security, and quantum-resistant cryptography from the outset.
Jun 29, 2026
A virtual briefing hosted by the Institute for Critical Infrastructure Technology (ICIT) argued that **telecom networks’ “crown jewels”**—including signaling pathways and subscriber identity/metadata—remain high-value targets, and that traditional perimeter defenses are insufficient against advanced adversaries. The session cited activity associated with China-linked threat actors **Salt Typhoon** and **Volt Typhoon** as illustrative of systemic telecom weaknesses, and promoted *privacy-first mobile-carrier* design choices (e.g., minimizing exposed identifiers and reducing the long-term value of compromised data) as concrete controls to reduce attack surface and limit blast radius. Separately, the U.K. **National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)**, working with **CISA**, the **FBI**, and other international partners, released guidance titled **“Secure Connectivity Principles for Operational Technology”** aimed at reducing exposed and insecure connectivity in OT environments, including nuclear-sector contexts. The guidance outlines **eight foundational principles** intended to help organizations protect OT networks from highly capable and opportunistic actors, including **nation-state** threats, against a backdrop of accelerating IT/OT convergence and increasing rates of OT/ICS-impacting incidents reported across critical infrastructure.
Jul 12, 2026
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) warned that fragmented European policies on technology suppliers leave critical infrastructure exposed to security and economic dependency risks, particularly from Chinese vendors such as Huawei and ZTE. Only **10 of 27 EU member states** have fully implemented the voluntary EU Toolbox for 5G Security, and Germany and Spain retain substantial Chinese equipment in their 5G radio-access networks. RUSI said Chinese legal requirements enabling state access to company data and vulnerability information could give intelligence services privileged early access to exploitable flaws. RUSI urged the EU to establish a harmonized, clearly defined framework for assessing high-risk vendors while preserving national-security autonomy and accounting for sector-specific risks. Proposed Cybersecurity Act amendments would identify untrusted vendors across **18 critical sectors** and could require operators to remove their equipment within **36 months**. The institute called for security-led procurement, but cautioned that blanket country or vendor bans do not eliminate product vulnerabilities and that dependency and surveillance risks can also apply to US suppliers.
Oct 2, 2026