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A joint U.S. government advisory said Iranian-affiliated cyber actors are actively exploiting internet-facing operational technology devices across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, with a particular focus on Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The activity has affected organizations in Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy, where attackers maliciously interacted with project files and manipulated data displayed on HMI and SCADA systems, causing operational disruption and financial losses for some victims.
The campaign has been observed since at least March 2026 and shows similarities to prior CyberAv3ngers activity linked to the IRGC Cyber Electronic Command. According to the advisory, the actors used overseas IP infrastructure, Rockwell Studio 5000 Logix Designer, OT-related ports including 44818, 2222, 102, 22, and 502, and Dropbear SSH for remote access. U.S. authorities urged operators to remove PLCs from direct internet exposure, harden remote access, enable logging, place controllers in run mode where appropriate, and review published indicators of compromise and ATT&CK-mapped TTPs alongside Rockwell Automation security guidance.
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3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On April 7, 2026, CISA and partner agencies warned that Iranian-affiliated actors were actively exploiting internet-facing PLCs, disrupting operations by manipulating project files and altering data shown on HMI and SCADA displays. The advisory also shared technical details, observed ports and tooling, indicators of compromise, and mitigation guidance for defenders.
Rockwell Automation published security advisory SD1771 addressing the PLC-focused threat activity referenced in later government reporting. The advisory was released on March 20, 2026.
Since at least March 2026, Iranian-affiliated cyber actors have targeted internet-exposed operational technology devices across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, especially Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley PLCs. The activity affected sectors including Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy.
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blog.polyswarm.io
Open sourcecybersecuritynews.com
Open sourcesecurityaffairs.com
Open sourcescworld.com
Open sourcerockwellautomation.com
Open sourceinfosec.pub
Open sourceic3.gov
Open sourcecisa.gov
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**Iran-linked CyberAv3ngers** activity targeting **Unitronics Vision PLCs** in internet-exposed operational technology environments is the clearest common security event in the provided material. The reporting describes campaigns against critical infrastructure, especially **water and wastewater systems**, with attackers exploiting **default credentials**, weak segmentation, and exposed OT assets to gain access and potentially disrupt operations or manipulate industrial processes. The activity is framed as part of broader Iranian state-linked cyber operations aligned with regional geopolitical tensions, with emphasis on U.S. and allied infrastructure at risk of operational and possible physical consequences. One reference provides technical and threat-context detail on the **CyberAv3ngers/IRGC-linked** targeting of Unitronics devices, while another discusses the wider cyber dimension of conflict involving Iranian groups pre-positioning in U.S. networks and threatening sectors such as water, hospitals, finance, and power. That second piece is relevant as contextual support for the same Iran-linked critical infrastructure threat environment, though it is broader and less specific to the **Unitronics PLC** intrusion pattern. The remaining references cover unrelated topics including malicious npm packages, GitHub repository compromise, Ivanti EPMM exploitation, a Ukraine-focused backdoor campaign, AI security commentary, and vendor detection updates, and do not describe the same incident or disclosure.
Jun 29, 2026
A cyberattack on the Municipal Water Authority of Aliquippa in Pennsylvania exposed a broader campaign targeting **Unitronics Vision Series PLCs** used in water and wastewater operations. Attackers linked to the pro-Iran **Cyber Av3ngers** group reportedly defaced facility screens and disrupted a remote water pressure station, prompting operators to take affected equipment offline and switch to manual or backup processes; officials said drinking water quality and core service were not affected because the compromised system was isolated from the main treatment plant. Reporting also cited a separate incident at a North Texas utility, underscoring concern that internet-exposed industrial control systems are being actively targeted across the sector. U.S. and Irish authorities later tied similar activity to exploitation of weakly secured or internet-accessible Unitronics controllers, including default or poor password practices and the vulnerability tracked as `CVE-2023-6448`, which was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. In Ireland, attackers disrupted water service to about 160 households in County Mayo after compromising a PLC at a private group water scheme. CISA warned water operators to remove PLCs from direct internet exposure, change default credentials, enforce multifactor authentication where possible, and back up device configurations as officials and experts warned that undersecured operational technology poses an ongoing risk to critical infrastructure.
Jun 29, 2026
CISA republished multiple Rockwell Automation advisories covering vulnerabilities across **FactoryTalk Analytics PavilionX**, **RSLinx Classic**, **CompactLogix 5370**, **Logix 5370/5570 controllers**, and **FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP Adapters** used in critical manufacturing environments worldwide. The issues include an authorization bypass in PavilionX (`CVE-2025-14272`) that could let an unauthenticated attacker perform privileged administrative actions, and a third-party flaw in RSLinx Classic (`CVE-2020-13573`) tied to out-of-bounds read and stack-based buffer overflow conditions that could cause denial of service or enable remote arbitrary code execution. Additional advisories detail multiple **CIP-related denial-of-service weaknesses** in CompactLogix and Logix controllers, including `CVE-2026-11317`, where crafted CIP messages can trigger major nonrecoverable faults requiring a program download, as well as sequence-number, source-IP, and connection-ID issues that can induce controller faults. CISA also warned that FLEX I/O EtherNet/IP Adapters version `2.012` are affected by `CVE-2026-0646`, which can fault devices through malformed CIP requests, and `CVE-2026-0647`, a critical authentication bypass in the embedded web server that allows password changes through a crafted HTTP GET request, potentially leading to account takeover and loss of availability; CISA said no known public exploitation had been reported and urged operators to isolate control networks, reduce internet exposure, and secure remote access with firewalls and updated VPNs.
Jul 12, 2026