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A research paper on fault-tolerant neutral-atom quantum computing estimates that cryptographically relevant executions of Shor’s algorithm may require far fewer physical qubits than earlier surface-code-based projections. Combining reconfigurable atom arrays, high-rate qLDPC codes, improved decoding, low-overhead logical operations, and optimized compilation, the authors estimate that solving the discrete logarithm problem for ECC P-256 could require roughly 10,000–26,000 physical qubits; RSA-2048 would need comparable or larger systems and longer execution times. Under a 1 ms stabilizer-cycle assumption, projections range from about 10 days for a parallel ECC-256 attack to roughly 97 days for RSA-2048 using approximately 102,000 qubits.
The estimates reinforce warnings that organizations should accelerate post-quantum cryptography migration before capable fault-tolerant systems emerge. Enterprises remain exposed to harvest-now, decrypt-later collection of data protected by RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, while cryptographic migrations can take years. Security leaders should inventory cryptographic dependencies, prioritize high-value and internet-facing systems, establish multiyear PQC roadmaps, and build crypto-agility so algorithms and implementations can be replaced progressively rather than through a disruptive wholesale migration.
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Google Quantum AI published research estimating that fewer than 500,000 physical qubits could crack the encryption underpinning Bitcoin.
Peter Shor published research describing quantum algorithms relevant to breaking public-key cryptography.
Google accelerated its cryptographic migration timeline from the 2030s to 2029 in response to the projected quantum-computing threat.
A study of reconfigurable neutral-atom fault-tolerant architectures estimated that cryptographically relevant implementations of Shor's algorithm could require as few as roughly 10,000 physical qubits. It projected ECC/P-256 discrete logarithms could be solved in about 10 days with approximately 26,000 qubits, while RSA-2048 factoring could take about 97 days with roughly 102,000 qubits in a parallelized architecture.
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New quantum-computing research has significantly reduced the estimated resources needed to break widely used public-key cryptography, increasing pressure on organizations still relying on **RSA-2048** and **256-bit elliptic-curve cryptography**. A 2025 Google Quantum AI preprint reported that RSA-2048 factoring could, in theory, be achieved in less than a week with fewer than **1 million noisy qubits**, down roughly **20×** from earlier estimates, by combining techniques such as approximate residue arithmetic, yoked surface-code storage, and magic state cultivation. Separate reporting also described architectural work that could cut the hardware needed for RSA-2048 attacks by about **tenfold**, reinforcing the trend that algorithmic and engineering advances are shrinking the gap between theory and practical cryptanalytic capability. A 2026 paper on the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm problem similarly reduced the logical-qubit footprint for Shor-based attacks, estimating that a **256-bit prime-field curve** could be targeted with about **1,333 logical qubits**, down from **2,124** in a prior low-width design. Commentary on the new results highlighted an additional Caltech advance in lower-overhead fault tolerance and argued that, taken together, these developments could bring quantum attacks against systems such as **Bitcoin signatures** closer than previously expected, with some estimates dropping from millions of physical qubits to around **25,000** under favorable assumptions. While the work remains theoretical and depends on future fault-tolerant hardware, the direction of travel is clear: advances in quantum algorithms and error correction are accelerating the case for migration to **post-quantum cryptography**.
Jun 29, 2026
A multi-institutional roadmap has outlined how **neutral-atom quantum computing** could reach practical quantum advantage within a decade if current scaling trends continue, arguing that recent gains in qubit counts and gate fidelity are beginning to converge with falling theoretical resource estimates for fault-tolerant workloads. The roadmap maps application regimes by computational scale and places cryptanalysis tasks such as `RSA-2048` factoring and `ECC-256` discrete logarithms in the highest resource band, while highlighting **qLDPC** error-correction codes as a potential advantage for neutral-atom systems because their reconfigurable connectivity may reduce physical-qubit overhead compared with surface-code approaches. A related *Nature* paper also reports a fault-tolerant neutral-atom architecture for universal quantum computation, reinforcing the platform’s technical momentum. At the same time, the reporting stresses that cryptanalytically relevant quantum capability is **not imminent**. Major engineering gaps remain in integrating scale, fidelity, decoding, readout, and sustained fault-tolerant operation into a single system, and some roadmap claims still rely on preprints rather than fully matured results. Separate industry analysis argues that while quantum computing often appears to be a "perpetual five-year technology," concrete thresholds such as machines capable of breaking `RSA-2048` are already definable enough for enterprise planning, and that organizations should not use uncertainty over timelines or winning architectures as a reason to delay **post-quantum cryptography** migration.
Aug 2, 2026
Google Quantum AI reported that breaking the `secp256k1` elliptic-curve cryptography used by Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other cryptocurrencies may require far fewer quantum resources than previously estimated. In a new whitepaper co-authored with researchers from the Ethereum Foundation, Stanford, and UC Berkeley, the team said an attack could need fewer than 500,000 physical qubits rather than the millions often cited, with optimized circuits using roughly 1,200 to 1,450 high-quality logical qubits. Under idealized conditions, the research suggests a primed attacker could recover a private key in about nine minutes, making an on-spend attack against a Bitcoin transaction theoretically possible within the network’s typical 10-minute confirmation window. The paper warns that Bitcoin’s 2021 **Taproot** upgrade may have increased long-term quantum exposure by making public keys visible on-chain by default, and estimates that about **6.9 million bitcoin** are already held in wallets with exposed public keys. Google said it did not publish the attack circuits, instead releasing a zero-knowledge proof using **SP1 zkVM** and **Groth16** so the results could be validated without providing weaponizable details, and said it notified the U.S. government before publication. While the researchers stressed that no cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists today, they argued that the engineering threshold for attacking ECC-based blockchain systems is materially lower than expected and called for migration toward post-quantum cryptography across cryptocurrency ecosystems.
Jun 29, 2026