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Researchers reported multiple ClickFix campaigns using fake CAPTCHA or reCAPTCHA prompts to trick users into manually running malicious commands, with payloads tailored by platform and victim profile. On Windows, one campaign delivered a modular NodeJS-based RAT and infostealer through a malicious MSI installer, loading key capabilities only in memory after command-and-control was established and using gRPC over Tor for persistent communications. An operational security failure exposed the malware’s backend protocol definitions and admin panel API, revealing a malware-as-a-service operation with multi-operator support, Telegram alerts, automation rules, and cryptocurrency wallet tracking. The malware also fingerprinted victims extensively and established persistence through the Windows Run registry key as LogicOptimizer.
A separate ClickFix chain attributed with high confidence to Grandoreiro targeted users of eight Brazilian banks by luring victims through a fake reCAPTCHA page and launching a malicious PowerShell sequence that sideloaded a Delphi banking trojan with legitimate GoToMeeting and Nero binaries. The malware deployed banking overlays, intercepted PIX QR-code payments, added Microsoft Defender exclusions, and stole credentials, device information, signatures, and payment confirmation codes. Netskope also documented a macOS variant that used AppleScript and a persistent fake password dialog to harvest Keychain data, browser cookies, saved credentials, extension storage, and cryptocurrency wallet data; the theft of live session cookies can enable attackers to bypass MFA by hijacking authenticated sessions.
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11 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Huntress reported a ClickFix-style campaign in which victims searching for background-removal tools were lured to malicious 'BackgroundFix' sites that copied a command for execution via the Windows Run dialog. The chain abused finger.exe to fetch a batch payload, downloaded Python-based stages, and ultimately deployed CastleLoader, which was observed delivering NetSupport RAT and an in-memory stealer dubbed CastleStealer.
Netskope noted that macOS Tahoe 26.4 and macOS Sequoia introduced Terminal warnings intended to disrupt ClickFix social-engineering attacks that rely on users manually pasting malicious commands.
Netskope described a cross-platform ClickFix campaign delivering an AppleScript-based infostealer to macOS users through a fake CAPTCHA flow and repeated password prompts. The stealer collected Keychain data, browser credentials, cookies, extension storage, and cryptocurrency wallet data before exfiltrating it to 172.94.9.250.
Researchers observed a Grandoreiro-family banking trojan campaign using a fake reCAPTCHA ClickFix/ClearFake-style lure on canalmodup.com to trick victims into running malicious PowerShell. The operation used GoToMeeting and Nero WiFi+Transfer DLL sideloading and targeted eight major Brazilian banks with overlays and PIX QR-code interception.
Netskope Threat Labs reported a ClickFix campaign delivering a NodeJS-based modular Windows RAT/infostealer through a malicious MSI installer. The malware used gRPC over Tor, in-memory modules, and persistence via the LogicOptimizer Run key, while an operational security failure exposed protocol definitions and an admin panel API showing a mature multi-operator malware-as-a-service platform.
Breakglass reported that attackers were abusing a legitimately EV-signed NetSupport Manager v14.12 binary as a RAT in two active delivery chains, including fake Cloudflare Turnstile/reCAPTCHA ClickFix pages that tricked users into pasting PowerShell. The report tied the activity to likely Russian-speaking MaaS operators, noted the infrastructure was still active, and published IOCs, hashes, domains, IPs, and detection guidance.
Breakglass disclosed a campaign distributing weaponized NetSupport Manager v14.10 via fake CAPTCHA or verification pages that tricked victims into pasting a PowerShell command. The operation targeted Italian users through spam emails and used signed NetSupport binaries with malicious config and license files, alongside multiple landing, delivery, and C2 domains.
Breakglass reported that from March 7 to March 9, 2026, attackers ran a ClickFix campaign that used 42 newly registered .in.net parent domains and at least 156 subdomains to trick victims into pasting a PowerShell command from fake Google verification pages. The infection chain deployed SectopRAT through a five-stage loader with layered encryption and Donut shellcode, and the infrastructure showed signs of bulk automation and links to the broader ACRStealer/Arechclient2 ecosystem.
Breakglass observed that certificates tied to the canalmodup.com infrastructure were issued before the campaign became active, indicating preparation in advance of operations.
Breakglass reported that the domain canalmodup.com, later used in a ClickFix-style Grandoreiro campaign, was registered in December 2025 as part of pre-staged attacker infrastructure.
Netskope said the ClickFix technique was first seen in late 2024, using fake verification prompts to trick users into manually pasting malicious commands into Terminal or Windows Run dialogs.
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Security researchers reported multiple active campaigns using **ClickFix** social engineering—fake error dialogs or verification prompts that trick users into manually running attacker-supplied commands—to bypass browser and download protections and establish an initial foothold. In one enterprise case investigated by **CERT Polska (cert.pl)**, victims were lured via compromised websites showing a fake CAPTCHA/“fix” prompt that instructed them to paste and run a **PowerShell** command via `Win+R`; the script then downloaded a dropper and enabled rapid follow-on activity that can scale to **enterprise-wide compromise**, including deployment of secondary malware such as **Latrodectus** and **Supper** for data theft, lateral movement, and potential ransomware staging. A separate ClickFix operation targeted **macOS developers** by cloning the *Homebrew* site on typosquatted infrastructure; the “install” command was subtly altered to fetch content from `raw.homabrews.org` instead of `raw.githubusercontent.com`, leading to **Cuckoo Stealer** deployment and credential harvesting via repeated password prompts using macOS Directory Services, with related domains tied to shared hosting at **`5.255.123.244`**. ClickFix was also observed as the initial execution mechanism for the resurfaced **Matanbuchus 3.0** MaaS loader, which uses deceptive copy/paste prompts and **silent MSI** execution (via `msiexec`) to deliver a new payload, **AstarionRAT**, enabling capabilities including credential theft and **SOCKS5** proxying; operators were reported to move laterally quickly (including toward domain controllers), consistent with ransomware or data-exfiltration objectives.
Jul 2, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple **ClickFix** campaigns that compromise endpoints by tricking users into manually executing attacker-provided commands rather than exploiting a software vulnerability. CERT Polska documented an incident response at a large Polish organization where a **fake CAPTCHA** prompt led a user to run a malicious snippet via *Win+R*, resulting in malware execution and suspected **DLL side-loading** from `%APPDATA%\Intel` (legitimate `igfxSDK.exe`/`version.dll` alongside a suspicious `wtsapi32.dll`). Investigators also identified additional suspicious DLLs in the user’s local AppData and recovered an execution trail consistent with a one-liner that fetched remote content and piped it into PowerShell (e.g., `cmd /c curl ... | powershell`). Separately, threat hunting research described a macOS-focused ClickFix operation using **typosquatted Homebrew** lookalike sites to present a “copy/paste” install command that runs in Terminal. The first-stage script repeatedly prompted for a password and validated it using `dscl authonly` to harvest working credentials before deploying a second-stage infostealer dubbed **Cuckoo Stealer**, which was reported to establish **LaunchAgent** persistence, remove quarantine attributes, and communicate over encrypted HTTPS C2 while targeting browser credentials/session tokens, Keychain data, notes/messaging artifacts, VPN/FTP configs, and cryptocurrency wallets. Both reports highlight ClickFix as an increasingly common, opportunistic initial access technique that scales by abusing trusted user workflows on Windows and macOS.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported that **ClickFix** has expanded into an industrialized malware-delivery ecosystem that relies on social engineering rather than software exploits. Attackers use fake CAPTCHA checks, browser updates, meeting errors, and verification prompts to trick users into manually running attacker-supplied commands through trusted tools such as PowerShell, `mshta`, `curl`, Windows Run, or macOS Terminal. ReversingLabs said the ecosystem now supports a wide range of payloads, including **Lumma Stealer**, **DarkGate**, **XWorm**, **AsyncRAT**, **NetSupport**, and **SectopRAT**, while related variants such as **CrashFix**, **FileFix**, **PromptFix**, and **ConsentFix** continue to emerge. The activity is being amplified through large-scale web compromise campaigns. Reports linked the **DriveSurge** actor to active **ClickFix** and **FakeUpdates** operations abusing thousands of compromised websites to distribute malware, while a separate SlowMist investigation documented a Google Sites-hosted phishing campaign targeting Web3 users on macOS with a fake community application flow that pushed victims to download a `.scpt` file or run a Base64-encoded Terminal command. That infection chain delivered a Mach-O stealer resembling **AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer)**, which harvested browser credentials, cookies, Keychain data, Apple Notes, Telegram Desktop data, and cryptocurrency wallet files before archiving data to `/tmp/lksopo.zip` and exfiltrating it to `86.54.25.213`. Researchers said structural **YARA** detection of lure pages is currently one of the most effective ways to identify these campaigns, which often evade traditional AV and EDR controls because they depend on legitimate tools and user-approved execution.
Jul 18, 2026