SmokeLoader Campaigns Exposed Through Remus Plugin and Shared C2 Infrastructure
Threat Actor Intelligence · 3 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Apr 25, 2026

Researchers traced multiple SmokeLoader operations to live command-and-control infrastructure that supported credential theft, screenshot capture, clipboard theft, host profiling, and data exfiltration. One March 2026 campaign used a ClickFix social-engineering lure, an MSI installer, and a Go-based loader to deploy the Remus plugin, with exfiltration sent to baxe[.]pics:48261; investigators extracted configuration data including the C2 URL, campaign ID, plugin markers, and a ChaCha20 key that allowed captured traffic to be decrypted. Cross-sample analysis linked the same builder output to SmokeLoader deliveries via Amadey, Phorpiex, and the ClickFix/GOLoader chain, pointing to a shared malware-as-a-service or affiliate ecosystem.
Separate analysis tied SmokeLoader to a broader dual-family operation involving Fuery, likely run by an operator using the alias "ingermany", who used a Flask-based panel disguised as "InsureFlow Pro" and a second "Monkey" panel for Fuery management. Investigators documented repeated OPSEC failures across the infrastructure, including reused certificates, exposed registration data, same-day domain registrations, and a C2 domain that shared a VPS with a legitimate Arabic-language learning platform, qimmaedu[.]com, while malware traffic beaconed to coox[.]live and baxe[.]pics. The reports also highlighted unusual technical overlaps, including Go 1.20.1 builds, Raft protocol type-name obfuscation, split C2 services on high ports, and hosting links to providers and subnets previously associated with Phorpiex, reinforcing the assessment that financially motivated operators were reusing infrastructure across malware families and legitimate services.


