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SmokeLoader Campaigns Exposed Through Remus Plugin and Shared C2 Infrastructure

Threat Actor Intelligence · 3 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Apr 25, 2026

SmokeLoader Campaigns Exposed Through Remus Plugin and Shared C2 Infrastructure

Researchers traced multiple SmokeLoader operations to live command-and-control infrastructure that supported credential theft, screenshot capture, clipboard theft, host profiling, and data exfiltration. One March 2026 campaign used a ClickFix social-engineering lure, an MSI installer, and a Go-based loader to deploy the Remus plugin, with exfiltration sent to baxe[.]pics:48261; investigators extracted configuration data including the C2 URL, campaign ID, plugin markers, and a ChaCha20 key that allowed captured traffic to be decrypted. Cross-sample analysis linked the same builder output to SmokeLoader deliveries via Amadey, Phorpiex, and the ClickFix/GOLoader chain, pointing to a shared malware-as-a-service or affiliate ecosystem.

Separate analysis tied SmokeLoader to a broader dual-family operation involving Fuery, likely run by an operator using the alias "ingermany", who used a Flask-based panel disguised as "InsureFlow Pro" and a second "Monkey" panel for Fuery management. Investigators documented repeated OPSEC failures across the infrastructure, including reused certificates, exposed registration data, same-day domain registrations, and a C2 domain that shared a VPS with a legitimate Arabic-language learning platform, qimmaedu[.]com, while malware traffic beaconed to coox[.]live and baxe[.]pics. The reports also highlighted unusual technical overlaps, including Go 1.20.1 builds, Raft protocol type-name obfuscation, split C2 services on high ports, and hosting links to providers and subnets previously associated with Phorpiex, reinforcing the assessment that financially motivated operators were reusing infrastructure across malware families and legitimate services.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

7 events · Mar 5, 2026 – Mar 12, 2026
  1. Mar 12, 20268mo ago

    Cross-sample analysis links Remus delivery to broader MaaS ecosystem

    Researchers found the same builder output across SmokeLoader samples delivered via Amadey, Phorpiex, and the ClickFix/GOLoader chain, indicating a shared malware-as-a-service or affiliate distribution ecosystem. The activity was assessed as financially motivated cybercrime, with Vietnamese and Eastern European infrastructure indicators but no definitive attribution.

  2. Mar 12, 20268mo ago

    Researchers trace live Remus C2 and decrypt campaign configuration

    Breakglass Intelligence traced the March 2026 campaign to a live command-and-control server at baxe[.]pics:48261 on an OVH Singapore VPS and extracted the Remus plugin configuration, including the C2 URL, campaign ID, plugin markers, and a ChaCha20 key. These findings enabled decryption of captured traffic and exposed multiple operator OPSEC failures, including certificate reuse and same-day domain registrations.

  3. Mar 12, 20268mo ago

    ClickFix lure campaign delivers SmokeLoader and Remus plugin

    In March 2026, researchers analyzed a SmokeLoader campaign that used a ClickFix social-engineering lure, an MSI installer, and a Go-based loader to deploy the Remus plugin. The infection chain included credential theft, wallet targeting, and deployment of a plugin capable of screenshot capture, clipboard theft, and host profiling.

  4. Mar 5, 20269mo ago

    Breakglass links SmokeLoader and Fuery to single operator "ingermany"

    Breakglass Intelligence published findings that linked SmokeLoader and Fuery infrastructure, domains, certificates, and hosting history to a likely single operator distinct from CERT-UA's UAC-0006. The report also highlighted OPSEC failures and overlap with infrastructure associated with Phorpiex-hosting environments.

  5. Mar 5, 20269mo ago

    Researchers expose shared VPS hosting malware C2 and Arabic LMS

    Breakglass Intelligence reported that baxe[.]pics shared infrastructure with qimmaedu[.]com on the same Hetzner VPS, and that a public source map for the LMS leaked developer artifacts linked to the handle sasa4452. The report assessed that the same operator likely reused the VPS for both legitimate projects and SmokeLoader infrastructure.

  6. Mar 5, 20269mo ago

    SmokeLoader sample observed exfiltrating data to baxe[.]pics and coox[.]live

    On March 5, 2026, sandbox analysis of a SmokeLoader sample showed active beaconing to coox[.]live and exfiltration to baxe[.]pics on port 48261, with more than 1 MB of stolen data sent during a single run. Researchers tied baxe[.]pics to a Hetzner VPS that also hosted the legitimate Arabic LMS site qimmaedu[.]com.

  7. Mar 5, 20269mo ago

    Operator deploys dual SmokeLoader and Fuery C2 infrastructure

    A threat actor using the alias "ingermany" stood up a live botnet operation that ran SmokeLoader and Fuery through separate but linked command-and-control panels, including a Flask-based panel disguised as "InsureFlow Pro" and Fuery infrastructure branded as the "Monkey" panel. The infrastructure and malware families shared hosting, build traits, and a Raft-protocol-themed obfuscation method.

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