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Remus Infostealer Uses Ethereum Smart Contracts to Rotate Live C2 Infrastructure

Attack Tradecraft · 4 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Apr 28, 2026

Remus Infostealer Uses Ethereum Smart Contracts to Rotate Live C2 Infrastructure

Researchers linked the Remus infostealer to an evolving command-and-control architecture that stores live resolver data in Ethereum smart contracts, extending the malware’s use of EtherHiding beyond earlier Telegram and Steam dead-drop methods. Analysis of contract 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF and its 0xc2fb26a6 function exposed a live C2 domain, fightwa[.]biz:5902, which had not appeared in prior public indicators; historical activity showed the infrastructure rotating from a test domain to chalx[.]live:5902 and then to fightwa[.]biz:5902. The domain resolved to 185.53.179.128, an IP already associated with Remus infrastructure, and researchers said monitoring blockchain DomainUpdated events could provide durable visibility into future C2 changes.

Separate infrastructure mapping found the campaign spread across more than 15 ASNs but concentrated at Hostinger International Limited (AS47583) and Team Internet AG (AS206834), with 185.53.179.128 standing out as a likely convergence or exfiltration node. Investigators identified five Ethereum contracts used to hold live C2 data, showing a progression from simple DomainStorage designs to more controlled and stealthier DataStore variants, while malware analysis described Remus as a likely Lumma-derived 64-bit stealer that steals browser credentials, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets. The malware also inherits Lumma’s browser-memory technique for bypassing Chromium Application-Bound Encryption, while adding compact shellcode, randomized hidden-browser desktop names, anti-analysis checks, and blockchain-backed C2 resilience.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

8 events · Sep 1, 2025 – Jul 2, 2026
  1. Jul 2, 20265mo ago

    Remus begins underground sales as a MaaS offering

    Flashpoint reported that Remus had been offered in underground communities since March 2026 as a Malware-as-a-Service platform with three subscription tiers. The report described this as the malware's commercial emergence in the cybercrime ecosystem.

    Remus Stealer: A New, Not-So-New Infostealer | Flashpoint
  2. May 6, 20267mo ago

    Researchers publish technical analysis of Remus and Lumma overlap

    Researchers reported that Remus uses Lumma-style browser key theft and Chromium Application-Bound Encryption bypass, while adding a compact shellcode payload, randomized hidden-browser desktop names, EtherHiding-based C2 resolution, and anti-analysis checks. They assessed Remus as an evolutionary branch linked to the Lumma ecosystem rather than a direct replacement.

    Remus Infostealer Uses Lumma-Style Browser Key Theft and Application-Bound Encryption Bypass
  3. May 6, 20267mo ago

    Remus campaign emerges in early 2026

    Researchers identified Remus as a new infostealer that emerged in early 2026 and assessed it as a new 64-bit variant closely derived from Lumma Stealer.

    Remus Infostealer Uses Lumma-Style Browser Key Theft and Application-Bound Encryption Bypass
  4. Apr 30, 20267mo ago

    Research maps Remus infrastructure and finds four more contracts

    Infrastructure analysis found Remus spread across more than 15 ASNs, with concentration at Hostinger International Limited and Team Internet AG, and highlighted 185.53.179.128 as a likely central convergence or exfiltration server. Additional Ethereum pivots uncovered four new smart contracts beyond the previously identified one, bringing the total used to store live C2 information to five.

    Mapping Remus Infostealer - by Vasilis Orlof
  5. Apr 30, 20267mo ago

    Remus infrastructure registers many .biz domains in early March

    The Remus campaign registered many .biz domains around the same time in early March through Dynadot, with shared certificate and hosting traits suggesting an automated operation.

    Mapping Remus Infostealer - by Vasilis Orlof
  6. Apr 28, 20267mo ago

    Research identifies live Remus C2 via Ethereum smart contract

    By querying Ethereum contract 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF through a public RPC endpoint, a researcher identified live C2 domain fightwa[.]biz:5902 that had not appeared in the previously published IoC list. The hosting IP 185.53.179.128 matched infrastructure previously associated with Remus, supporting attribution to the same campaign.

    C2 in the Ether - by Vasilis Orlof
  7. Apr 25, 20267mo ago

    Remus rotates Ethereum-backed C2 to fightwa[.]biz:5902

    Historical smart-contract activity showed the Remus cluster progressing from a test domain to chalx[.]live:5902 and then to fightwa[.]biz:5902, demonstrating active command-and-control rotation. The latest observed update was anchored as recently as 2026-04-25.

    C2 in the Ether - by Vasilis Orlof
  8. Sep 1, 20251y ago

    Remus test builds labeled Tenzor traced to September 2025

    Gen Threat Labs traced Remus infostealer development back to test builds labeled Tenzor in September 2025, indicating the malware's development predates its public identification by several months.

    Remus Infostealer Uses Lumma-Style Browser Key Theft and Application-Bound Encryption Bypass
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