Remus Infostealer Uses Ethereum Smart Contracts to Rotate Live C2 Infrastructure
Attack Tradecraft · 4 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Apr 28, 2026

Researchers linked the Remus infostealer to an evolving command-and-control architecture that stores live resolver data in Ethereum smart contracts, extending the malware’s use of EtherHiding beyond earlier Telegram and Steam dead-drop methods. Analysis of contract 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF and its 0xc2fb26a6 function exposed a live C2 domain, fightwa[.]biz:5902, which had not appeared in prior public indicators; historical activity showed the infrastructure rotating from a test domain to chalx[.]live:5902 and then to fightwa[.]biz:5902. The domain resolved to 185.53.179.128, an IP already associated with Remus infrastructure, and researchers said monitoring blockchain DomainUpdated events could provide durable visibility into future C2 changes.
Separate infrastructure mapping found the campaign spread across more than 15 ASNs but concentrated at Hostinger International Limited (AS47583) and Team Internet AG (AS206834), with 185.53.179.128 standing out as a likely convergence or exfiltration node. Investigators identified five Ethereum contracts used to hold live C2 data, showing a progression from simple DomainStorage designs to more controlled and stealthier DataStore variants, while malware analysis described Remus as a likely Lumma-derived 64-bit stealer that steals browser credentials, cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets. The malware also inherits Lumma’s browser-memory technique for bypassing Chromium Application-Bound Encryption, while adding compact shellcode, randomized hidden-browser desktop names, anti-analysis checks, and blockchain-backed C2 resilience.


