Loading story…
Researchers disclosed CosmicStrand, a sophisticated UEFI firmware rootkit embedded in motherboard firmware that can survive operating system reinstalls and maintain control early in the boot process. The malware was found in the firmware image of consumer hardware and abuses the UEFI chain to deploy malicious code before the operating system loads, giving attackers a stealthy and persistent foothold that is difficult to detect or remove.
The report said the rootkit appears tied to modified firmware based on boards using older chipset designs and enables attackers to launch payloads from firmware into Windows during startup. By operating below the OS, CosmicStrand demonstrates how compromises at the firmware layer can bypass traditional defenses, persist across disk replacement or reinstallation, and significantly raise the complexity of incident response and remediation.
Get the actors, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind it.
2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Securelist published Kaspersky's analysis of CosmicStrand, revealing technical details about the rootkit's operation, persistence mechanism, and suspected links to compromised UEFI firmware based on modified motherboard images. The disclosure highlighted infections observed in the wild and raised awareness of firmware-level threats.
Kaspersky researchers identified CosmicStrand, a sophisticated UEFI firmware rootkit found in the firmware images of certain motherboards. The malware was notable for persisting at the firmware level and loading malicious code during the boot process.
Get the adversaries, campaigns, and ATT&CK mapping behind this technique, with detections ready to deploy.
1 reference tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Researchers from Eclypsium discovered that nearly 200,000 Linux-based Framework laptops and desktops were shipped with signed UEFI shell components containing a powerful 'memory modify' (mm) command, which can be exploited to bypass Secure Boot protections. The mm command, intended for low-level diagnostics and firmware debugging, provides direct read and write access to system memory, including critical security variables such as gSecurity2. By abusing this command, an attacker can overwrite the gSecurity2 variable with NULL, effectively disabling signature verification for all subsequent UEFI module loads and breaking the Secure Boot trust chain. This vulnerability allows attackers to load bootkits such as BlackLotus, HybridPetya, and Bootkitty, which can evade operating system-level security controls and persist even after OS reinstallation. The attack can be automated using startup scripts, ensuring persistence across reboots. The issue is not the result of a supply chain compromise or malicious intent, but rather an oversight in the inclusion of diagnostic tools signed with trusted certificates. Eclypsium's research highlights that these signed UEFI shells, while legitimate, function as backdoors that undermine the security model of Secure Boot. The presence of such tools in production devices exposes users to significant risk, as attackers can leverage them for pre-OS infections, espionage, sabotage, or ransomware attacks. The gaming industry has already seen commercial cheat providers exploiting similar UEFI-level bypasses, and the same techniques could be adopted by nation-state actors or advanced persistent threats. Framework has acknowledged the issue and is working on remediation, with fixes planned for affected models such as the Framework 13 (11th and 12th Gen Intel). The discovery underscores the broader risk of trusted, signed components containing powerful functionality that can be misused, and the need for rigorous review of firmware-level tools included in shipping devices. The vulnerability demonstrates that even systems marketed as secure and repairable can harbor critical flaws if diagnostic utilities are not properly restricted. The incident serves as a warning to hardware manufacturers and the security community about the dangers of trusted but overly permissive firmware components. Eclypsium's findings have prompted a reassessment of trust models in firmware security, emphasizing the importance of minimizing attack surfaces in pre-boot environments. The case also illustrates how attackers are increasingly targeting lower layers of the computing stack to achieve persistence and evade detection. Framework's response and the ongoing remediation efforts will be closely watched by the industry as a test case for responsible disclosure and mitigation of firmware-level threats.
Jul 23, 2026
Researchers uncovered compromised **UEFI firmware** images carrying a malicious implant that persisted in SPI flash and deployed a previously unseen malware family dubbed **MosaicRegressor**. The rogue firmware reused and modified components from Hacking Team’s leaked **VectorEDK** UEFI bootkit to drop `IntelUpdate.exe` into the Windows Startup folder and restore it if deleted, giving attackers durable access below the operating system. The finding followed earlier public reporting on **LoJax**, the first UEFI rootkit observed in the wild, underscoring that firmware-level persistence had moved from theory to active operations. The malware framework was used in targeted espionage campaigns from 2017 to 2019 against diplomats and NGO members in Africa, Asia, and Europe, with identified victims linked to North Korea. MosaicRegressor operated as a modular, multi-stage platform using multiple downloaders over HTTP/HTTPS, **BITS**, **WinHTTP**, and even `mail.ru` email accounts to retrieve payloads. Attribution remained low confidence, but researchers cited Chinese-language artifacts, a **Royal Road** weaponized document, and infrastructure overlap with activity associated with the **Winnti umbrella**, suggesting possible ties to a Chinese-speaking threat actor.
Aug 14, 2026
Researchers previously disclosed **LogoFAIL**, a broad set of UEFI image-parsing flaws that can let attackers execute code during the DXE boot phase by abusing OEM logo customization paths. The vulnerabilities affect parsers for formats including BMP, GIF, PNG, JPEG, PCX, and TGA, and can be triggered from attacker-controlled sources such as the EFI System Partition, firmware update volumes, or NVRAM. Binarly reported 29 root causes, including 15 likely exploitable issues, and demonstrated arbitrary code execution on a Lenovo ThinkCentre M70s Gen 2 via an AMI PNG parser flaw. The weaknesses can bypass protections such as **Secure Boot**, Intel Boot Guard, AMD hardware-validated boot, and ARM TrustZone-based verification, with impact spanning firmware from major BIOS and device vendors. Subsequent reporting said the **BootKitty** malware family exploited LogoFAIL to infect **Linux** systems, marking a notable evolution from a theoretical firmware weakness into active bootkit tradecraft. Coverage described the attack path as exceptionally difficult to detect or remove because it operates in UEFI before the operating system loads, allowing persistence below traditional endpoint defenses. The case also undercut assumptions that Linux systems are insulated from modern UEFI bootkits, showing that firmware-level compromise can survive OS reinstallations and evade both software- and hardware-based security controls.
Jun 29, 2026