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SentinelLABS and QGroup GmbH identified a previously untracked threat cluster, Sandman, targeting telecommunications providers in the Middle East, Western Europe, and the South Asian subcontinent. The intrusion set used a modular backdoor called LuaDream, an unusual malware framework built on LuaJIT, and showed activity consistent with espionage-focused operations. Investigators said the actor stole administrative credentials, used pass-the-hash over NTLM to reach selected workstations, and moved laterally in a restrained manner designed to reduce the chance of detection.
The attackers deployed LuaDream through DLL hijacking, planting a malicious ualapi.dll that was loaded by the Windows Spooler or Fax service. Researchers described LuaDream as a large, actively developed platform with dozens of components, plugin-based extensibility, and support for multiple command-and-control channels including TCP, HTTPS, WebSocket, and QUIC. SentinelLABS said it could not confidently tie Sandman to a known threat actor, but assessed that the combination of sophisticated tooling, infrastructure overlap across victims, and uneven operational tradecraft may point to a private contractor or mercenary-style group.
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In August 2023, the threat cluster dubbed Sandman was observed targeting telecommunications providers in the Middle East, Western Europe, and the South Asian subcontinent in an espionage-focused campaign.
On publication of the report, SentinelLABS and QGroup GmbH publicly identified the Sandman cluster, detailed the LuaJIT-based LuaDream malware framework, and said they could not confidently attribute the activity to a known threat actor.
During the intrusions, Sandman stole administrative credentials, used pass-the-hash over NTLM to move laterally to selected workstations, and deployed the LuaDream backdoor through DLL hijacking using a malicious ualapi.dll loaded by the Windows Spooler or Fax service.
SentinelLABS assessed that development activity related to the LuaDream malware framework may date back to the first half of 2022, indicating the toolkit was likely under construction well before observed intrusions.
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SentinelOne reported that the **Sandman** APT targeted telecommunications providers with a rare **LuaJIT-based** malware platform dubbed **DreamLand**, expanding on earlier reporting that linked the toolkit to an intrusion against a government entity in Pakistan. Researchers described DreamLand as a modular Windows malware family that relies on compiled Lua scripts rather than conventional native implants, an uncommon design choice that complicates reverse engineering and gives operators flexible post-compromise control. Technical analysis shows the infection chain using `libcurl.dll` to load `UpdateCheck.dll`, which then decrypts and decompresses an embedded LuaJIT orchestrator and executes additional compiled scripts stored in `updater.ver`. The malware includes anti-debugging features and uses Lua FFI to access Windows APIs directly, while configuration data points to HTTPS command-and-control over port `443` via `ssl.explorecell.com`. Researchers also identified a related loader, `Comx64.dll`, believed to come from the same developer and built to load shellcode from an encrypted local file, suggesting the toolkit remains under active development and may support future intrusions.
Aug 15, 2026
SentinelLABS, Microsoft, and PwC reported that the **Sandman APT** is likely connected to suspected China-based threat clusters tied to the **KEYPLUG** backdoor, especially `STORM-0866` and `Red Dev 40`. The assessment is based on multiple overlaps, including the presence of Sandman’s **LuaDream** malware alongside KEYPLUG in the same victim environments, shared targeting patterns in the **Middle East and South Asia**, and similar infrastructure practices such as hosting provider selection, reverse-proxy use, and domain naming conventions. Researchers said **LuaDream** and **KEYPLUG** remain distinct malware families, but they share notable design traits, including modular architecture, multi-protocol command-and-control support, comparable execution flow, and overlapping data-handling structures. The findings point to either operational cooperation or shared tooling within the broader China-linked espionage ecosystem, and also indicate that **Lua-based malware development** is no longer limited to Western or Western-aligned operators but is increasingly being adopted by China-linked adversaries.
Jun 29, 2026
The North Korea-linked **Lazarus Group** expanded its long-running **Operation DreamJob** espionage campaign by using recruiter-themed lures, impersonation sites, and trojanized PDF software to compromise defense, aerospace, aviation, and UAV-related organizations in Europe, India, and other regions. Researchers said victims were sent tailored job descriptions through email, messaging platforms, and password-protected archives, then tricked into opening decoy documents with modified PDF readers that delivered malware including **ScoringMathTea**, **MISTPEN**, **ForestTiger**, and related loaders. ESET and Mandiant linked the activity to cyberespionage and theft of proprietary technology, with particular interest in drone manufacturing know-how and other sensitive defense-sector information. Check Point reported that the campaign escalated access by exploiting **`CVE-2026-68820`**, a zero-day local privilege escalation flaw in Microsoft **AFD.sys**, to deploy the **FudModule** rootkit with **SYSTEM** privileges and reduce endpoint detection visibility; Microsoft patched the issue on August 11, 2026. The operation also abused vulnerable **Roundcube** servers via **`CVE-2025-49113`** and installed the **RelayShell** PHP webshell to convert compromised web servers into command-and-control relay nodes, while compromised organizations were reused to spear-phish additional targets. Across the reporting, Lazarus showed a consistent pattern of evolving DreamJob tradecraft through trojanized open-source software, encrypted payload staging, DLL proxying, and use of trusted third-party infrastructure to improve stealth and credibility.
Aug 15, 2026