Loading story…
Trend Micro reported that the Mimic ransomware family uses the Windows search tool Everything and its APIs to accelerate file discovery and encryption on compromised systems. By abusing legitimate search functionality, the malware can quickly enumerate files and target data for encryption more efficiently than conventional ransomware that relies on slower recursive scanning.
The technique highlights how ransomware operators are increasingly blending malicious activity with trusted software components to improve speed and evade detection. Mimic’s use of Everything APIs shows a shift toward living-off-the-land-style tradecraft in ransomware operations, where legitimate tools and interfaces are repurposed to streamline attacks and complicate defensive monitoring.
Pull IOCs and campaign context straight into your stack.
1 event from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Trend Micro published research describing a new Mimic ransomware variant that abuses Everything search APIs as part of its encryption process. The reference provides no earlier dated incident details beyond the publication of the technical findings.
Pull the IOCs, campaigns, and victimology behind this family, ready to push into your SIEM and EDR.
1 reference tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Ransomware operators have been observed using **bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD)** techniques and custom anti-security tools to shut down endpoint protections before encrypting enterprise networks. Kaspersky documented a MedusaLocker intrusion in Brazil in which attackers accessed an SMTP server over RDP with valid administrative credentials, used **Mimikatz** to extract NTLM hashes, and moved laterally with pass-the-hash via PowerShell-based WMI and SMB execution before deploying a new AV-killer tool, `All.exe`. That tool loaded a renamed **TechPowerUp `ThrottleStop.sys`** driver (`ThrottleBlood.sys`), exploited vulnerable IOCTLs for physical memory read/write, hijacked kernel execution through `NtAddAtom`, and repeatedly terminated products from Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Sophos, Symantec, Bitdefender, ESET, Avast, AVG, McAfee, Panda, Quick Heal, and Kaspersky; the driver issue was assigned **`CVE-2025-7771`**. A separate report on **The Gentlemen** ransomware described a similar pattern in enterprise attacks across the Asia-Pacific region, where the group likely gained entry through an exposed FortiGate device or stolen credentials, then conducted Active Directory reconnaissance, used **PsExec** for lateral movement, established persistence with **AnyDesk**, abused **GPO** and **NETLOGON** for domain-wide deployment, and exfiltrated data with **WinSCP** for double extortion. TrendAI said the group evolved from generic anti-AV tooling to customized variants tailored to the security products installed in each victim environment, while also disabling Windows Defender and recovery mechanisms before dropping `README-GENTLEMEN.txt` and encrypting files with the `.7mtzhh` extension. Together, the incidents show ransomware crews increasingly pairing credential abuse and lateral movement with vulnerable-driver abuse and bespoke defense evasion to maximize encryption success.
Aug 21, 2026
Reporting and research published in mid-January 2026 highlights continued **high ransomware activity** and rapid evolution in initial-access and evasion tradecraft. A Symantec/Carbon Black Threat Hunter Team study cited by *Help Net Security* reports ransomware actors claimed **4,737 attacks in 2025**, with only brief slowdowns after major disruptions; the abrupt April 2025 shutdown of **RansomHub** was followed by affiliates quickly shifting to other operations, while **LockBit** failed to recover after late-2024 law-enforcement action. The same reporting notes a broader shift toward **extortion models that don’t rely on encryption**, emphasizing data theft and coercion as groups diversify pressure tactics. Multiple technical reports describe how attackers are improving delivery and resilience. *BleepingComputer* says **Gootloader** now uses heavily malformed ZIP files—concatenating **500–1,000** ZIP archives and manipulating ZIP structures (e.g., truncated `EOCD`)—to crash or defeat common analysis tools while still extracting via Windows’ default utility, supporting its role as an initial-access vector often preceding ransomware. *The Register* reports **DeadLock** ransomware uses **Polygon smart contracts** to frequently rotate proxy infrastructure for victim communications (via an HTML wrapper pointing victims to the *Session* messenger), complicating blocking and takedown efforts; Group-IB notes DeadLock also departs from typical double-extortion by lacking a public data-leak site and instead threatening underground data sales. Separately, Microsoft-observed phishing described by *KnowBe4* shows threat actors exploiting **email routing/spoofing misconfigurations** to make phishing appear internal (often leveraging **Tycoon2FA**), while ReliaQuest’s trend report and a separate write-up on **CastleLoader** describe human-driven initial access (spearphishing/drive-by) and social-engineering lures such as **ClickFix** being used to stage loaders and follow-on payloads—underscoring that access-broker and loader ecosystems continue to feed ransomware and broader intrusion activity.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers reported that **Exmatter**, a custom ransomware data-exfiltration tool first tied to **BlackMatter**, has evolved into a more capable pre-encryption theft utility and has appeared in intrusions linked to other ransomware operators, including a **LockBit** affiliate. Earlier analyses described Exmatter as an obfuscated `.NET` tool that scans logical drives, filters files by extension, size, and location, and steals high-value business data such as documents, source code, and CAD/GIS files. It primarily exfiltrates data over **SFTP**, with later versions adding **WebDAV** support, reinforcing the role of data theft and double extortion in modern ransomware operations. A newer variant observed by S-RM added features that make Exmatter more autonomous during intrusions, including enumeration of mapped network drives from the Windows registry, lateral movement over network shares, remote self-execution using **TinyIPC**, and the ability to take ownership of restricted files when run with administrator privileges. The sample also embedded a Base64-encoded WebDAV client for command-and-control and used **HTTP PUT** over port `80` for exfiltration; in one case, attackers reportedly stole up to **1 TB** of data before deploying ransomware. The activity aligns with Microsoft’s broader assessment that ransomware affiliates increasingly swap payloads and tooling while relying on hands-on intrusion, credential abuse, persistence, and pre-ransomware data theft as core elements of the extortion model.
Aug 15, 2026