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Mandiant reported that a pro-PRC influence campaign broadened its operations across dozens of social media platforms, websites, and online forums, publishing content in at least seven languages to reach audiences well beyond a single region. The activity reflects a coordinated information operation designed to amplify narratives favorable to the People's Republic of China while increasing resilience through a wide, multi-platform presence.
Researchers said the network went beyond online messaging and attempted to physically mobilize protesters in the United States, marking an escalation from digital influence into real-world action. The campaign's multilingual reach and cross-platform distribution indicate a sustained effort to shape public discourse, extend audience penetration, and translate online propaganda into offline political activity.
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Mandiant published research describing a pro-PRC influence campaign operating across dozens of social media platforms, websites, and forums in at least seven languages, including attempts to physically mobilize protesters in the United States. The reference does not provide a more specific event date, so the publication date is used as the estimate.
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OpenAI reported a likely China-origin covert influence operation, dubbed **“Sponsored Discontent,”** that used ChatGPT to generate short English-language comments and long-form Spanish-language articles critical of the United States. The activity reportedly followed mainland China business-hour patterns, used Chinese-language prompts, and in some cases was tied through article bylines to **Jilin Yousen Culture Communication Co., Ltd.** The operation also produced social media posts attacking Chinese dissident **Cai Xia**, behavior OpenAI said was partly consistent with **Spamouflage** tactics. The campaign’s most significant outcome was the successful placement of translated and expanded anti-U.S. narratives from publicly available Chinese-language sources into mainstream Latin American news outlets, particularly in **Peru**, and also in **Mexico** and **Ecuador**, at times apparently as sponsored content. OpenAI assessed the activity as a **Breakout Scale Category 4** influence operation because it penetrated widely read media sites rather than remaining confined to social platforms.
Jul 31, 2026
OpenAI said two likely China-linked influence operations used ChatGPT to generate images and social media posts aimed at divisive U.S. debates over AI infrastructure and trade policy. The clusters, dubbed **"Data Center Bandwagon"** and **"Tech and Tariffs,"** produced English- and Chinese-language content that portrayed data center expansion as driving up electricity prices, straining power grids, consuming water, and harming the environment, while separate posts framed U.S. tariffs as a covert tool for controlling the global technology landscape. OpenAI said the operators likely originated in China, used VPNs, prompted ChatGPT in simplified Chinese, and posed as Americans on platforms including **X** and **YouTube**. OpenAI assessed that neither campaign achieved meaningful engagement and found no evidence the operators created the underlying controversies or materially shaped them, but the activity showed how AI tools can be used to amplify existing domestic disputes. The company also found the actors used ChatGPT for operational support, including editing work reports containing OPSEC details and discussing ways to exploit Facebook’s ecosystem and evade Meta’s coordinated inauthentic behavior detection. A separate analysis said the activity appeared tied to a private Chinese technology contractor serving provincial government clients, reflecting a deniable, scalable model aligned with broader Chinese propaganda patterns and strategic competition over U.S. AI and data center buildout.
Jul 31, 2026
Mandiant reported that the pro-PRC influence operation **DRAGONBRIDGE** targeted rare earths mining companies in an effort to weaken competitors to the PRC’s dominance in the global rare earths market. The campaign focused on shaping public perception around mining projects and companies involved in developing alternative supply chains outside China, using coordinated online narratives intended to erode support for those operations. The activity reflects a broader use of information operations to advance strategic economic interests, with rare earths remaining critical to technology, defense, and industrial manufacturing. By aiming messaging at firms and projects that could expand non-PRC production, the campaign sought to hinder market rivalry and preserve the PRC’s leverage over a sector central to global supply chains.
Jul 12, 2026