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Huntress researchers reported a malspam campaign that abuses Google’s DoubleClick domain to make phishing traffic appear legitimate and deliver the DesckVB RAT. The attack begins with a phishing email containing an HTML attachment that uses a meta-refresh redirect through a DoubleClick tracking URL and other redirectors before sending victims to a personalized landing page. That page incorporates the target’s email address, company branding, and location details, then prompts them to click a fake “Download PDF” button that retrieves a ZIP archive.
Opening the archive triggers a JavaScript-based infection chain that leads to PowerShell activity and a .NET loader, which performs anti-analysis checks, weakens security controls, establishes persistence, and injects the RAT into legitimate Microsoft-signed processes using process hollowing. Once installed, DesckVB communicates over command-and-control channels, patches AMSI and ETW, adds Microsoft Defender exclusions, conducts reconnaissance, steals data, executes commands, and can deploy additional payloads. Researchers said organizations should harden email defenses with DMARC, DKIM, and SPF, use sandboxing-capable email gateways, and consider Group Policy changes that force risky script file types to open in Notepad.
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SC Media reports that the DesckVB RAT has been active since February 2026. The malware supports persistence, defense evasion, command execution, data theft, and delivery of additional payloads.
Huntress researchers identified a malspam campaign that abuses Google DoubleClick redirect URLs to make phishing traffic appear more legitimate and deliver the DesckVB RAT. The infection chain uses an HTML attachment, redirectors, a personalized fake document page, and a ZIP/JavaScript/.NET loader sequence ending in process hollowing into Microsoft-signed processes.
On June 3, 2026, Huntress published analysis of the malspam campaign and said its earlier attribution to DesckVB RAT was incorrect. The firm assessed the intrusion chain as delivering an unidentified in-memory .NET loader with anti-analysis, persistence, Defender tampering, and additional payload delivery capabilities.
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A phishing campaign is delivering **DarkCrystal RAT (DCRat)** through weaponized SVG attachments that use **HTML smuggling** to drop a password-protected `7z` archive onto Windows systems. Researchers said the lure impersonates a Colombian legal notice, **“Resolución Denuncia Jurídica,”** and presents a fake citizen consultation portal that instructs victims to open the downloaded archive with the password `1601`, making the staged delivery appear legitimate while shifting malicious assembly into the victim’s browser to evade email inspection. The attack chain uses double-Base64-encoded JavaScript embedded in the SVG, followed by DLL sideloading with files disguised as Brotli components, persistence through a Windows Registry **Run** entry, and process hollowing into `AddInProcess32.exe`. The final payload installs DCRat, a remote access trojan that supports encrypted command-and-control communications, anti-analysis checks, and repeated beaconing to `158[.]94[.]208[.]109`, giving attackers sustained access to compromised hosts.
Aug 17, 2026
Trellix reported a phishing campaign that abuses the Windows `search-ms` and `search` URI protocol handlers to push victims from emails, HTML attachments, PDFs, or compromised websites into Windows Explorer views populated with attacker-controlled remote files. The activity relies on JavaScript or script-based redirects to remote WebDAV searches, where malicious `.lnk` files are presented as familiar local search results, lowering suspicion and increasing the likelihood of execution. Researchers observed multiple delivery and execution chains involving HTML, PowerShell, ISO, ZIP, DLL, VBS, and EXE files, with payloads ultimately deploying **AsyncRAT** and **Remcos RAT**. The campaign used SSL-encrypted traffic, rapidly rotated infrastructure and files, and disguised artifacts with deceptive filenames and icons; in some cases, execution was triggered through `regsvr32.exe` or PowerShell. Trellix said the technique can provide initial access from a simple URL visit and recommended mitigating the threat by disabling the vulnerable URI handlers through registry removal.
Aug 1, 2026
Researchers detailed a phishing campaign that used an **SVG attachment** to launch JavaScript in the victim’s browser, drop an HTM file, and abuse the Windows `search-ms` handler with a **WebDAV** path to fetch additional stages. The infection chain pulled a VBScript, an obfuscated batch file, and Python-based payloads protected with **Pyarmor 9**, which analysts reverse engineered by unpacking the runtime’s AES-GCM and marshal customizations. The unpacked Python code decrypted **RC4-protected shellcode**, allocated executable memory, and launched a multi-stage sequence that included a **laZzzy-generated injector** targeting `notepad.exe`, more shellcode, and final **.NET malware** delivering **DcRat, AsyncRAT, XWorm RAT, and PureHVNC**. The tradecraft closely matches activity previously attributed to **DDGroup**, a long-running cybercrime actor tied to phishing campaigns that weaponize `search-ms` and WebDAV to present attacker-hosted files as local search results. Prior reporting linked the group to commodity malware including **XWorm, AsyncRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRat, Remcos, NetWire, Warzone RAT/AveMaria RAT, and ModiLoader/DBatLoader**, along with dynamic DNS infrastructure, open-source tooling such as **Freeze.rs** and **dufs**, and repeated process injection into `notepad.exe`. Researchers said the actor’s infrastructure spans more than 110 dynamic DNS domains and 94 IP addresses since 2019, and that observed domains and URLs from the newer campaign were reported to **URLhaus** to speed blocking.
Aug 15, 2026