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Researchers linked a cluster of hacktivist activity with medium confidence to 4BID and associated groups including Hakerskii Kit, C.A.S., and Goffee, reporting that operations have expanded beyond Russia and Belarus into Kazakhstan, the UAE, Syria, and Egypt. The attackers primarily obtained initial access by exploiting ProxyShell on vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers, then installed the fd.aspx web shell and used custom scripts alongside legitimate remote management and monitoring tools to deepen access and persistence.
Post-compromise activity included deployment of BlackReaperRAT, Warp RAT, Sliver, Havoc, Mythic Apollo, AdaptixC2, and a newly documented BlackSalt backdoor, as well as utilities such as AnyDesk, Panorama9, Dev Tunnels, Tactical RMM, and Nezha Monitoring. Investigators also observed EDR killers, ClearWater ransomware, and an updated Blackout Locker variant, indicating that the campaigns have evolved from primarily politically motivated disruption into broader operations with a stronger financially motivated component.
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Securelist reported a cluster of interconnected campaigns linked with medium confidence to 4BID and associated groups including Hakerskii Kit, C.A.S., and Goffee expanding activity into Kazakhstan, the UAE, Syria, and Egypt. The campaigns used ProxyShell exploitation against vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers, fd.aspx web shells, multiple post-exploitation frameworks, and ransomware, reflecting a broader and increasingly financially motivated scope.
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Kaspersky reported that several interconnected pro-Ukrainian hacktivist groups, including **4BID**, **Hacker kiт**, **C.A.S**, and **Goffee**, expanded attacks beyond Russia and Belarus to targets in **Kazakhstan, the UAE, Syria, and Egypt**. Victims included government entities, healthcare organizations, and the aviation sector. Researchers said the intrusions commonly began with exploitation of Microsoft Exchange **ProxyShell** vulnerabilities, followed by deployment of the `fd.aspx` ASP.NET web shell, execution of PowerShell or `cmd.exe`, reconnaissance, and installation of remote-management tools such as AnyDesk, Dev Tunnels, Panorama9, Tactical RMM, and Nezha Monitoring. The campaigns used a broad post-compromise toolkit that mixed public C2 frameworks and custom malware, including **Sliver**, **Havoc**, **Mythic Apollo**, **AdaptixC2**, **BlackSalt** backdoor, **Warp RAT**, **BlackReaperRAT**, **ClearWater** ransomware, and an updated **Blackout Locker**. Investigators also observed BYOVD-based EDR killers, including modified EDRKiller variants and GhostDriver, along with signs that some delivery scripts may have been AI-generated. ClearWater was seen encrypting files with **ChaCha20** and **RSA-2048**, dropping ransom notes, changing wallpapers, and deleting recovery artifacts, while Blackout Locker added a persistent screen-locking feature, reinforcing researchers' assessment that the actors are shifting from politically branded hacktivism toward financially motivated operations.
Jun 29, 2026
Reporting across multiple research teams described a surge of distinct, ongoing intrusion campaigns rather than a single unified incident. **Check Point** reported on **Silver Dragon**, a Chinese-aligned activity cluster assessed as operating under the broader **APT41** umbrella, targeting organizations in **Southeast Asia and Europe** (notably government) via exploitation of public-facing servers and phishing, then deploying **Cobalt Strike**, **DNS tunneling**, and a new Google Drive–based backdoor (**GearDoor**) alongside custom tools (**SSHcmd** and **SliverScreen**) for remote access and screen capture. **Microsoft** detailed separate February 2026 phishing campaigns by an unknown actor that used meeting/invoice-style lures and **EV code-signed** malware (certificate issued to **TrustConnect Software PTY LTD**) masquerading as common workplace apps (e.g., `msteams.exe`, `adobereader.exe`, `zoomworkspace.clientsetup.exe`) to install legitimate **RMM** tooling (**ScreenConnect**, **Tactical RMM**, **Mesh Agent**) for persistent access and lateral movement. Other reporting highlighted additional, unrelated campaigns and tradecraft: **ClearSky** described a Russian-aligned operation targeting **Ukraine** using a phishing-delivered ZIP/HTA chain that drops a .NET loader (**BadPaw**) and backdoor (**MeowMeow**) with **.NET Reactor** obfuscation, parameter-gated execution, and sandbox/tooling checks (with low-confidence linkage to **APT28**). **Cofense**-reported activity (via SC Media) showed phishing that weaponizes **Windows File Explorer + WebDAV** using URL/LNK shortcuts to pull payloads (notably **AsyncRAT**, **XWorm**, **DcRAT**) and infrastructure including **Cloudflare Tunnel** domains hosting WebDAV servers. **Cisco Talos**-reported **Dohdoor** activity (UAT-10027) targeted US **education and healthcare**, using PowerShell→batch→DLL sideloading via legitimate executables (e.g., `Fondue.exe`, `mblctr.exe`, `ScreenClippingHost.exe`) and **DNS-over-HTTPS** to Cloudflare for C2 discovery and tunneling. Separately, **Zscaler** reported **ScarCruft**’s *Ruby Jumper* campaign using **Zoho WorkDrive** for C2 and removable media components to reach air-gapped systems, while another Zscaler report analyzed **Dust Specter** targeting Iraqi government officials with password-protected RAR delivery and modular implants. **Qianxin XLab** assessed sanctioned infrastructure provider **Funnull** resurfacing to support scam/criminal supply chains and potential **MacCMS**-related supply-chain activity, and **F5 Labs** summarized **APT42**’s **TAMECAT** PowerShell backdoor focused on Edge/Chrome credential theft with C2 over Telegram/Discord/HTTPS and specific file/hash indicators. (A separate Help Net Security item on a Microsoft Defender onboarding tool is product/administrative news and not part of the threat-campaign reporting.)
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers linked the GitHub operator **`evilgrou-tech`** to the **WaterHydra/DarkCasino** lineage and uncovered an active malware operation using **DarkMe RAT**, **QuasarRAT v1.4.1**, and a modified **"Sentinel"** QuasarRAT variant against forex traders and cryptocurrency users. The attribution rests on a reused developer artifact — **`C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\vaeeva\shellrundll.tlb`** — along with dozens of overlapping indicators spanning code, infrastructure, targeting, and tradecraft. The campaign used GitHub-hosted encrypted payloads, multi-stage loaders, AMSI bypasses, fileless .NET execution, registry and startup persistence, and live command-and-control nodes including **`91.124.98.29:2626`** and **`192.109.200[.]147`**. Investigators recovered five AES payload key schemes, an XOR loader key, and QuasarRAT PBKDF2-derived cryptographic material, enabling offline decryption of staged payloads and configuration data. The infrastructure mapped the operation across hosting providers and networks in Ukraine, Russia, and the United States, with ties to **ThinkHuge**, **PrefixBroker**, **PFCLOUD**, and upstream infrastructure associated with **CountLoader** and an **Amadey** staging server linked to more than 23 malware families. The **Sentinel** variant added **Hidden VNC**, keylogging, and browser credential theft under a crypto-focused **"Pumpfun"** campaign, while the parallel **"Office04"** activity remained focused on financial trading targets. Separate analysis of the live QuasarRAT server showed its encryption key matched the SHA1 hash of the server TLS certificate, but a protocol-accurate fake client was still rejected, indicating application-layer IP allowlisting on the C2. Breakglass also identified a second, distinct malware distribution operation tied to a Brazilian Portuguese-speaking actor that used fake gaming cheat sites, GitHub, Discord, and MediaFire to spread **AgentTesla**, underscoring broader criminal use of the same malware delivery ecosystem.
Jun 29, 2026