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Researchers at Lexfo found a publicly accessible Python HTTP server on 185.163.204.7:8080 that exposed the live tooling, configuration files, and operational data of three active adversary-in-the-middle phishing campaigns. The leak was attributed to an operational misconfiguration rather than a software flaw, and the open directory reportedly contained phishing pages, login-relay components, Evilginx forks, Telegram session files, credential logs, combolists, malware droppers, and remote management installers. Investigators linked the infrastructure to operators tracked as codemado, mail-argenta, and saroula01, with artifacts including MaDoO Blaster v4.7.3, the red-queen Evilginx fork, and the black-queen device-code phishing framework.
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7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
In late April 2026, Lexfo discovered an open directory on server 185.163.204.7 that exposed a live phishing and post-compromise platform tied to three active operators. The exposed infrastructure revealed tooling and artifacts associated with codemado, mail-argenta, and saroula01.
Lexfo publicly released its findings in a blog post detailing how one misconfigured server exposed the operational stack of three active AiTM phishing campaigns. The report described phishing kits, login-relay components, credential logs, Telegram session files, RMM installers, malware droppers, and other campaign assets found on the host.
The exposed data showed saroula01's operation was the largest of the three, with 218 confirmed victims across 12 countries over more than a year. The campaign used the black-queen Device Code phishing framework on romnor[.]ca.
Analysis of the exposed server tied the infrastructure and tooling to three operators: codemado, mail-argenta, and saroula01. Lexfo attributed codemado to Egyptian Microsoft 365 AiTM phishing activity, linked mail-argenta to the red-queen Evilginx fork and Kraken-focused MitM tooling, and identified saroula01 as the developer/operator of the black-queen Device Code phishing framework.
Lexfo found a publicly exposed Python HTTP server at 185.163.204.7:8080 on a VPS that revealed live tooling and files linked to three active adversary-in-the-middle phishing operations. The exposure was described as an operational misconfiguration rather than a software vulnerability.
Lexfo reconstructed a deleted configuration file from git history and used internal bot timestamps to date saroula01's OAuth Device Code Flow phishing campaign to June 2025. The finding established that the campaign had been operating for more than a year.
Microsoft published a security blog describing Storm-2372 conducting a device code phishing campaign. This is a distinct earlier disclosure and attribution event related to device code phishing activity not yet reflected in the timeline.
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Researchers uncovered an exposed attacker-controlled server that revealed the full workflow behind a WebDAV phishing operation delivering malware through Windows shortcut and signed-binary execution chains. The infrastructure held **1,048 artifacts** including phishing lures, testing notes, admin-panel files, delivery analytics, and documentation that suggested the operator used generative AI tooling to build content and test matrices at scale. The most active campaign impersonated Mexico’s **CURP** identity-record service through the typosquatted domain `gobf[.]mx`, used a WebDAV share on `onedrive[.]cv`, and abused **`CVE-2025-33053`**, a Windows working-directory hijack flaw previously linked to Stealth Falcon activity, to launch a disguised payload posing as a PDF report. The recovered files showed the actor testing **59** `.url` shortcut variants against multiple signed Windows binaries, likely adapting after the original `iediagcmd.exe` technique became less effective on Windows 11 24H2. One infection chain delivered a fileless in-memory **.NET infostealer** that exfiltrated data to `77.110.127.205`, while a second campaign, tracked as **DlrtyGames**, used a 7-Zip SFX dropper, DLL sideloading via a signed Ubisoft binary, IDAT-carried payloads, process hollowing, and persistence to deploy the modular **PureRAT** malware communicating with `23.94.252.228:57666`. Delivery logs from the exposed Simba Service panel recorded **77,098 requests** from **3,892 unique IPs** across **101 countries** over roughly 5.5 days, with activity heavily concentrated in Mexico.
Jul 30, 2026
Multiple phishing campaigns delivered **SnakeKeylogger**, **VIPKeylogger**, and **Agent Tesla** through layered infection chains that used obfuscated VBScript or PowerShell droppers, steganographic payload staging on Cloudinary, Internet Archive abuse, reflective in-memory .NET loading, and process hollowing into legitimate Windows binaries such as `Caspol.exe`, `Aspnet_compiler.exe`, and `RegAsm.exe`. One DHL-themed operation used a VIPKeylogger variant identified as a SnakeKeylogger rebrand, while a separate GuLoader campaign targeted Italian businesses with NSIS-wrapped stealers and business email compromise-style lures. Across the campaigns, the malware stole browser passwords, email and FTP credentials, Outlook and WinSCP secrets, Discord tokens, Wi-Fi passwords, screenshots, clipboard data, and keystrokes, then exfiltrated data over **SMTP**, **Telegram**, and **FTP**. Investigators found repeated operator OPSEC failures that exposed active criminal infrastructure and victim data. A VIPKeylogger/SnakeKeylogger operator left a stock **XAMPP** dashboard and internet-accessible **WinRM** open on `144.172.105.88`, while sandboxing captured plaintext SMTP credentials tied to `result@miniorangeman.com` on `185.196.9.150`; although that C2 was taken offline shortly after detection, the Cloudinary-hosted payload and SMTP infrastructure reportedly remained live. In a separate GuLoader operation, an open FTP directory on `holzbrenzii[.]com` exposed **52 credential dumps from 27 victim machines** in real time. Another SnakeKeylogger v4.4 campaign linked distinct droppers to the same backend through shared C2 strings, DDNS infrastructure, and staging artifacts, showing that technically capable malware operators repeatedly undermined their own campaigns by exposing panels, credentials, and stolen data.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat activity observed in late 2025 and early 2026 shows **high-volume, automated probing** of emerging and legacy internet-facing attack surfaces, including exposed large language model (LLM) endpoints. GreyNoise reported **91,403 attack sessions** against its *Ollama* honeypot infrastructure, attributing the traffic to two operations systematically enumerating AI deployments across major commercial model ecosystems (including OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, Meta, and others). One operation used two IP addresses to methodically test API formats and identify live endpoints across dozens of LLM targets while relying on innocuous prompts (for example, simple greetings and basic trivia questions) to reduce the likelihood of detection; GreyNoise noted the source IPs had prior associations with exploitation of known vulnerabilities, suggesting reconnaissance intended to feed follow-on exploitation. In parallel, Check Point Research detailed an updated, modular **GoBruteforcer** botnet variant that compromises Linux servers by **brute-forcing weak credentials** across common services (including FTP, MySQL, PostgreSQL, and *phpMyAdmin*), then reuses newly compromised hosts to expand scanning and password-guessing at scale. Check Point assessed that **50,000+ internet-facing servers** may be exposed to this activity, citing two drivers: widespread reuse of **AI-generated deployment/configuration examples** that propagate predictable usernames and weak defaults, and continued exposure of legacy stacks (such as *XAMPP*) with insufficient hardening. The newer GoBruteforcer variant reportedly adds more sophisticated capabilities and obfuscation, and the operators appear financially motivated, with activity linked to data theft, selling initial access, and cryptocurrency theft.
Jun 29, 2026