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Attackers used spoofed Government of India GST refund emails to target Indian businesses and taxpayers, luring recipients into opening a malicious RAR attachment that launched a multi-stage .NET infection chain and ultimately deployed Remcos RAT. Seqrite reported that the initial executable unpacked successive in-memory loaders hidden in bitmap resources and DLL stages, including Windows Health Optimizer Plus.dll and perfgurd.dll, while using reflection, XOR-based decryption, and architecture-aware method dispatch to evade analysis and execute the final payload.
The campaign established persistence by copying the executable and launching a PowerShell script through a Run registry key, and it attempted privilege escalation via cmstp.exe. The final Remcos RAT payload enabled remote access, credential theft, surveillance, and delivery of additional malware. Infrastructure tied to the operation included dynamic DNS domains under hath.network and synology.me, with command-and-control activity resolving to 185.242.4.122 on hosting associated with M247 Europe SRL; researchers assessed the activity as likely financially motivated cybercrime but did not attribute it to a known threat actor.
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Seqrite Labs described a phishing campaign using spoofed Government of India GST refund emails to target Indian businesses and taxpayers with a multi-stage .NET infection chain that ultimately deployed Remcos RAT. The report said the operation appeared financially motivated and did not provide sufficient evidence to attribute it to a publicly tracked threat actor.
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Researchers reported an active phishing campaign targeting users in India with archive attachments disguised as **GST debit notes**, including files such as `GST Debit Note Apr_26.com`, to deliver **Remcos RAT**. The infection chain relies on a multi-stage, largely memory-only loader that uses embedded steganographic payloads, multiple .NET stages, in-memory DLL execution, and **process hollowing** to evade traditional defenses. Analysis indicates the operation may be part of a **loader-as-a-service** ecosystem, as related infrastructure has also been linked to payloads including Agent Tesla, RedLine Stealer, Formbook, XWorm, Dark Cloud, Phantom Stealer, MassLogger, and Snake keyloggers. Once installed, Remcos establishes persistence through **Run registry keys** and **Winlogon/Userinit** mechanisms, performs anti-sandbox and anti-VM checks, and attempts **UAC bypass** via `eventviewer.exe`. The malware steals browser credentials and cookies, captures user activity, and can record audio and webcam feeds before storing data in `logs.dat` and exfiltrating it to command-and-control infrastructure including `62.102.148.212:37393`. Filenames referencing **NEFT, RTGS, IMPS, and GST** further indicate the campaign was tailored to Indian financial and business workflows.
Aug 15, 2026
Researchers reported multiple **Remcos RAT** campaigns using phishing emails and trusted infrastructure to infect victims while evading detection. In one intrusion chain, a ZIP attachment named `MV MERKET COOPER SPECIFICATION.zip` delivered an obfuscated JavaScript file that fetched a PowerShell loader from `almacensantangel[.]com`; the loader then reconstructed and decrypted payloads in memory, including `ALTERNATE.dll` and `Cqeqpvzeia.exe`. The malware injected into the legitimate Microsoft .NET utility `aspnet_compiler.exe`, communicated with `192[.]3[.]27[.]141:8087`, and stored captured keystrokes and other data in `C:\ProgramData\remcos\logs.dat`, leaving few disk artifacts. A separate campaign used phishing emails that linked to a fake Google Drive sharing page hosted through **Google Cloud Storage** and the trusted `googleapis.com` domain, helping the attack bypass email and web filtering. After user interaction, the infection chain used staged JavaScript redirects or downloads, followed by VBScript or PowerShell execution to retrieve the final Remcos payload, which was then injected into a legitimate Windows process through **process hollowing**, persisted via Windows Registry entries, and opened encrypted command-and-control channels. The activity underscores how attackers are combining living-off-the-land techniques, trusted cloud services, obfuscated scripting, and legitimate Windows binaries to deploy Remcos for surveillance and data theft.
Jun 29, 2026
Multiple campaigns are using phishing emails and archive-based lures to deliver remote access malware through stealthy, multi-stage infection chains. Point Wild documented **Remcos RAT**, **DesckVB RAT**, and a Rust-based **COVERT RAT** being delivered through ZIP attachments, weaponized `LNK` files, obfuscated JavaScript droppers, and hidden PowerShell execution, often with decoy documents to mask activity. The payloads were loaded filelessly through .NET reflection and in-memory execution, with operators abusing legitimate binaries and services such as `aspnet_compiler.exe`, GitHub, and paste or web-hosting platforms to stage malware while evading detection. Reported command-and-control infrastructure included `192.3.27.141:8087`, `172.245.246.77:8080`, and `181.231.253.69:4444`, while observed artifacts included `C:\ProgramData\remcos\logs.dat`, `C:\ProgramData\colors\logs.dat`, and payload names such as `ALTERNATE.dll`, `ClassLibrary3.dll`, `Keylogger.dll`, and `msedge_proxy.exe`. Separate reporting showed the same tradecraft extending beyond custom RATs to commodity remote-access software and credential theft. A campaign targeting Russian aerospace and aviation organizations used invoice-themed phishing and spoofed domains to install a portable **AnyDesk** instance for unattended access, maintain persistence with a scheduled task, minimize visibility with Tray Minimizer, and exfiltrate configuration data through a command-line SMTP mailer; Seqrite linked the activity to **Rare Werewolf (Librarian Ghouls)**. Securonix research cited by Trojan Killer described **VEIL#DROP** using fake document-style JavaScript files, Blogspot-hosted staging, PowerShell download cradles, XOR decoding, and in-memory .NET loading to deploy **PureLog Stealer**, which targets browser credentials, cookies, session tokens, wallet data, and host information. Across the campaigns, the common pattern is phishing-led initial access followed by LOLBins, PowerShell, staged downloads, persistence, and covert data theft or long-term remote control.
Jul 12, 2026