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China’s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded Chinese technology across the Western Balkans, particularly in telecommunications and surveillance infrastructure, prompting national security and privacy concerns as governments and operators reassess supplier risk. In Serbia, Telekom Srbija Group has moved away from Huawei and toward Ericsson and Nokia for 5G deployment under pressure tied to Western financing and broader integration goals, reflecting a wider push to reduce reliance on Chinese vendors in critical networks.
The shift aligns with U.S.-backed efforts such as the Clean Network initiative, which sought to exclude what Washington described as untrusted Chinese technology from sensitive digital infrastructure. At the same time, the regional contest over telecom infrastructure has been compounded by cyber threats: Telekom Srbija Group was reportedly hit by a cyberattack earlier in the year that the company attributed to Russian hackers, underscoring how Chinese investment, Russian cyber activity, and Western security policy are converging in the Balkans’ communications sector.
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The reference states that Telekom Srbija Group was targeted by a cyberattack earlier in the year and attributes it to Russian hackers motivated by opposition to NATO expansion and Serbia's alignment with Western partners. The source does not provide a specific calendar date for the attack.
According to the reference, pressure from Western lenders and Serbia's integration goals pushed Telekom Srbija Group away from Huawei and toward Ericsson and Nokia for 5G deployment. No specific event date is explicitly provided in the source content.
The U.S. Department of State published its Clean Network initiative, describing a program to protect telecommunications, cloud, apps, and undersea cables from what it characterized as untrusted Chinese technology providers.
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The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) warned that fragmented European policies on technology suppliers leave critical infrastructure exposed to security and economic dependency risks, particularly from Chinese vendors such as Huawei and ZTE. Only **10 of 27 EU member states** have fully implemented the voluntary EU Toolbox for 5G Security, and Germany and Spain retain substantial Chinese equipment in their 5G radio-access networks. RUSI said Chinese legal requirements enabling state access to company data and vulnerability information could give intelligence services privileged early access to exploitable flaws. RUSI urged the EU to establish a harmonized, clearly defined framework for assessing high-risk vendors while preserving national-security autonomy and accounting for sector-specific risks. Proposed Cybersecurity Act amendments would identify untrusted vendors across **18 critical sectors** and could require operators to remove their equipment within **36 months**. The institute called for security-led procurement, but cautioned that blanket country or vendor bans do not eliminate product vulnerabilities and that dependency and surveillance risks can also apply to US suppliers.
Oct 2, 2026
The European Commission is pursuing revisions to the EU Cybersecurity Act to strengthen **union-level supply-chain risk management** for critical IT and telecom infrastructure, including the ability to impose targeted mitigations such as restrictions or bans on components from **“high-risk suppliers.”** Reporting indicates the proposal could effectively force member states to remove non-compliant equipment within a relatively short window—potentially **as little as three years**—as part of a broader effort to counter increasingly sophisticated hybrid threats to European infrastructure. The initiative is widely viewed as an attempt to harmonize and accelerate national actions that have been uneven across the bloc, amid long-running concerns about reliance on vendors such as **Huawei** and **ZTE** in 5G and other network deployments. The Commission’s approach emphasizes coordinated risk assessments and common rules for supplier trust decisions, reflecting ongoing debate over whether certain third-country suppliers could be compelled—via domestic legal obligations—to support state espionage or disruption operations, despite vendor denials of wrongdoing.
Jun 29, 2026
Policymakers and industry leaders are intensifying calls to reduce dependence on foreign technology infrastructure, framing **digital sovereignty** as a strategic issue tied to democratic resilience, data protection, and long-term economic security. In Europe, speakers at a Brussels summit argued that reliance on major U.S. cloud, browser, and platform providers creates governance and concentration risks, and they pushed for stronger alignment across AI, semiconductor, and cybersecurity policy, along with greater use of **open source**, interoperability, and transparent standards. A parallel debate is unfolding in Indonesia, where officials and telecom leaders warned of **"digital colonization"** while trying to expand domestic AI capacity without simply shifting dependence from Western vendors to Chinese platforms. Indonesian efforts emphasize building local capabilities in AI, semiconductors, and talent, even as foreign open-source offerings are presented as cheaper and more customizable options. The material is **not fluff** because it addresses substantive policy and security implications of technology dependence, but only the Europe and Indonesia items are relevant to the same broad sovereignty theme; the telecom AI roadmap and MWC product-announcement roundup are separate topics.
Jun 29, 2026