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Hauri reported a multi-stage MoonPeak intrusion targeting the gaming industry that began with a malicious Windows shortcut (.LNK) file disguised as a game character design document. When opened, the file launched a PowerShell-based infection chain that checked for analysis environments, gathered host information, and created aes.js at runtime to steal browser cookies, which were then used in command-and-control communications. The campaign used social engineering tailored to game-development workflows, indicating deliberate targeting of gaming-sector personnel.
The malware established persistence through Windows Task Scheduler, downloaded additional payloads, and restored a later-stage component from GZIP data masquerading as an RTF file. Hauri identified the final payload as MoonPeak, a variant based on XenoRAT, citing its asynchronous socket communications with its C2 server and reuse of a mutex string previously observed in MoonPeak cases. A related social media post amplified the report and highlighted the same core elements: MoonPeak, XenoRAT, and malicious LNK delivery.
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Hauri released a report describing a multi-stage intrusion chain targeting the gaming industry, beginning with a malicious LNK file and culminating in deployment of MoonPeak, a XenoRAT-based payload. The analysis links the activity to the MoonPeak family through asynchronous C2 socket communication and reuse of a mutex seen in prior MoonPeak cases.
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Threat actors are increasingly relying on *living-off-the-land* techniques and trusted tooling to establish persistent access on Windows endpoints. One campaign used weaponized Windows shortcut (`.LNK`) files disguised as investment-related PDFs to deliver **MoonPeak**, a remote access trojan assessed as a **XenoRAT** variant and linked to North Korea–aligned activity targeting South Korean investors and cryptocurrency traders. Opening the `.LNK` launches an obfuscated PowerShell-driven, multi-stage infection chain while displaying a decoy PDF; analysis also tied payload hosting to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories, reflecting “Living Off Trusted Sites (LOTS)” tradecraft. A separate dual-wave intrusion chain used phishing emails masquerading as *Greenvelope* invitations to steal webmail credentials (e.g., Outlook, Yahoo, AOL), then used the compromised accounts to register for and silently deploy **LogMeIn Resolve** (formerly *GoTo Resolve*) for persistent remote access. The installer (`GreenVelopeCard.exe`) was described as signed and configured to connect to attacker-controlled infrastructure, with follow-on actions including modifying service settings for elevated access and creating hidden scheduled tasks for resilience. Related threat intelligence reporting also highlighted broader “rogue RMM” abuse trends, including **Remcos** and **NetSupport Manager** delivery via paste-and-run lures and PowerShell/`cmd` execution chains (including use of the `finger` utility to fetch remote payloads), underscoring that adversaries are operationalizing legitimate remote administration software as a stealthy backdoor mechanism.
Jun 29, 2026
Multiple recent intrusion reports describe **phishing-led Windows compromises** that rely on **weaponized `.LNK` shortcuts** to trigger **obfuscated PowerShell** execution, display decoy documents, and then fetch additional payloads from public cloud/code platforms. In South Korea, attackers distributed an LNK disguised as financial trading guidance that opens a decoy PDF while running PowerShell; subsequent stages perform anti-analysis/virtualization checks, establish persistence, and retrieve a masked executable from **GitHub** that decrypts code at runtime to run **MoonPeak** malware. Researchers assessed the activity as likely **North Korea–linked** based on GitHub commit metadata and naming patterns. A separate Russia-targeted campaign used business-themed archives containing decoy documents and a malicious LNK to pull a PowerShell loader that establishes persistence and then weakens defenses (including **Microsoft Defender exclusion changes** and use of **`defendnot`**), performs reconnaissance, and tampers with system tooling and file associations before deploying **Amnesia RAT** (fetched from **Dropbox**) and a **Hakuna Matata–derived ransomware** payload for encryption. By contrast, reporting on **KazakRAT** describes a different espionage operation in Kazakhstan/Afghanistan delivered via malicious **MSI** installers and using simple, unencrypted HTTP C2; it is not part of the LNK/PowerShell delivery chains described in the other incidents.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers documented two separate but related **LNK-driven intrusion chains** that used shortcut files as the initial lure to fetch additional malware from attacker-controlled infrastructure. In one campaign targeting organizations in the **Arabian Gulf region**, a China-nexus threat actor used a Middle East conflict-themed ZIP archive containing an LNK file that downloaded a malicious CHM file and ultimately deployed a **PlugX** backdoor. The infection chain progressed through a second LNK, a TAR archive, DLL sideloading, and a shellcode loader before installing PlugX with persistence under a fake Microsoft Display Broker path and service name. The malware used RC4-encrypted components, API hooking, reflective DLL loading, corrupted PE headers, and support for **TCP, HTTPS, UDP, and DoH** communications, with a decrypted command-and-control endpoint at `91.193.17[.]117:443` and plugins for keylogging, shell access, screen capture, registry, service, and network operations. A second investigation exposed a live **LNK-to-DLL-to-.NET RAT** operation staged from an open Apache directory on `wildishadventure[.]com/secure9/` and `171.22.182[.]231/secure9/`, where researchers recovered weaponized LNK files, custom DLL downloaders, backup files, and a final payload named `RemoteMgmt.Agent.exe`. That chain abused the legacy `ActiveXObject('htmlfile')` technique to force Windows to retrieve DLLs over UNC paths, then delivered a custom .NET 4.8 remote access trojan that supported command execution, token-based authentication, JSON-over-raw-TCP C2 over port 443, reconnect-based persistence, and logging to `%TEMP%\rmgmt_agent.log`. Operational security failures including exposed directory indexing, `.old` backups, test builds, and unstripped internal names allowed investigators to reconstruct the malware’s development workflow and identify infrastructure spanning **BlueVPS**, **Namecheap**, and **Cloudflare**.
Jun 29, 2026