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The popular GitHub Action tj-actions/changed-files was compromised in a software supply-chain attack that redirected multiple release tags to a malicious commit, 0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67, causing affected workflows to dump CI secrets into GitHub Actions logs. Early reporting indicated that all versions might be affected because tags in the repository had been moved to the attacker-controlled commit, prompting maintainers and defenders to urge organizations to immediately stop using the action, review workflow runs, and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed. GitHub later tracked the incident as CVE-2025-30066, and the project retagged releases and published v46.0.1 with guidance to pin only to a known-safe immutable commit.
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7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
During an internal response described by Semgrep, the company rescanned publicly invocable GitHub Actions, found at least one exploitable action in its own environment, and patched it. The effort was part of a broader review prompted by compromises affecting peer security vendors.
A malicious commit, 0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67, was present in the tj-actions/changed-files repository and later identified as the commit to which compromised tags pointed.
Following the compromise, tj-actions retagged releases and published version 46.0.1, with guidance to pin to a known-safe immutable commit. This was the maintainer's remediation step for affected users.
Semgrep later reported that GitHub published an advisory for CVE-2025-30066 covering the tj-actions/changed-files compromise. This formalized public vulnerability tracking for the incident.
A later update in Semgrep's coverage stated that the malicious gist used in the tj-actions/changed-files attack chain had been removed. This disrupted part of the attacker infrastructure involved in the compromise.
On March 14, 2025, Semgrep published an alert stating that all versions were believed compromised because repository tags pointed to the malicious commit 0e58ed8. The post warned that the action attempted to dump CI secrets to workflow logs and urged organizations to stop using it, audit runs, and rotate secrets.
On March 14, 2025, a GitHub issue was opened reporting that multiple tags in tj-actions/changed-files were compromised. This publicly documented the tag compromise in the action's repository.
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The widely used GitHub Action **`tj-actions/changed-files`** was compromised after an attacker gained write access to the repository and retargeted release tags to a malicious orphaned commit, causing workflows pinned to tags rather than immutable SHAs to run attacker-controlled code. The backdoor downloaded and executed a remote payload that scraped decrypted GitHub Actions secrets from process memory and printed them into workflow logs, exposing repositories that executed the action and creating acute risk for public projects where logs were openly accessible. The incident was detected after anomalous outbound network activity was observed, and the maintainer removed the malicious changes soon afterward. Follow-on analysis found the blast radius was substantial because the action was referenced across roughly **23,000 repositories** and many workflows were not pinned to a full commit hash. GitGuardian reported that among workflows executed during the compromise window, hundreds showed signs of exploitation and **603 secrets** were exposed in logs, including temporary GitHub tokens, DockerHub credentials, AWS keys, GitHub personal access tokens, Jira tokens, and cloud.gov credentials. Organizations using the action were urged to review workflow runs from March 14 onward, delete affected logs, rotate any exposed credentials, audit dependencies and commits, and pin third-party GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs to reduce future supply-chain risk.
Jun 29, 2026
Threat actors compromised the popular GitHub Actions repositories `actions-cool/issues-helper` and `actions-cool/maintain-one-comment` by moving version tags to imposter commits outside the normal commit history, causing workflows that referenced those tags to fetch and run malicious code. Researchers said the payload downloaded the **Bun** JavaScript runtime, read memory from the GitHub Actions `Runner.Worker` process to recover decrypted secrets, and exfiltrated the data over HTTPS to the attacker-controlled domain `t.m-kosche[.]com`; workflows pinned to a known-good full commit SHA were not affected. GitHub later disabled access to the repository for a terms-of-service violation, while StepSecurity added the action to its Compromised Actions Policy and blocked the exfiltration domain through Harden-Runner. The incident highlights a broader GitHub Actions supply-chain risk in which CI/CD trust can be subverted through mutable references and weak integrity controls. Separate research showed that a modified Maven wrapper in a pull request could achieve code execution on GitHub-hosted runners and, if merged, later expose release secrets such as Maven publishing credentials and GPG material, underscoring the need for checksum validation on wrapper scripts and immutable pinning to trusted commit SHAs for third-party actions. StepSecurity also linked the same exfiltration infrastructure to the recent **Mini Shai-Hulud** activity targeting npm packages in the `@antv` ecosystem, suggesting the GitHub Actions compromise may be part of a wider supply-chain campaign.
Jun 29, 2026
A critical flaw in **Gitea `act_runner`** and a separate compromise of popular **GitHub Actions** highlighted how CI/CD platforms can be turned into high-impact attack paths. In Gitea, **`CVE-2026-58053`** allows a user with workflow execution privileges to escape a Docker-backed job container and gain **root access on the host** by abusing unsafe Docker options merged from `container.options`, including `--pid=host`, `--cap-add`, and `--security-opt`. The issue affects Docker-backed `act_runner` deployments through version `0.262.0`, putting source code, build systems, and deployment credentials at risk. In the GitHub ecosystem, attackers compromised tags for **`tj-actions/changed-files`** and several **reviewdog** actions in a supply-chain campaign tracked as **`CVE-2025-30066`** and **`CVE-2025-30154`**, causing CI/CD secrets to be written into workflow logs and potentially exposed, especially in public repositories. Reporting tied the activity to an intrusion that likely began with Coinbase-related targets before expanding more broadly. Defenders were urged to upgrade vulnerable Gitea runners, restrict workflow container options, audit workflows and logs, remove affected actions, rotate exposed secrets, preserve and then delete compromised logs, and pin GitHub Actions to full commit hashes.
Jul 7, 2026