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Wazuh disclosed CVE-2026-67308, a critical shell injection flaw in its GitHub Actions workflows that allows arbitrary command execution when attackers submit pull requests from public forks with a crafted VERSION.json file. The vulnerability affects workflows prior to commit 44bf114 and stems from attacker-controlled input being written to GITHUB_ENV and later interpolated directly into shell run steps, enabling shell metacharacters to execute through bash.
The issue is classified as CWE-78 and has been rated CVSS 10.0 in public reporting, with the highest risk on self-hosted runners where exposed secrets may include GITHUB_TOKEN and AWS credentials. Wazuh remediated the flaw in commit 44bf114 and added hardening to additional workflows; public reporting said no active exploitation had been observed at publication, but noted the attack is low complexity and reachable through the project's public CI/CD pull request workflow.
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The CVE record states that the new CVE for the Wazuh GitHub Actions shell injection issue was received by disclosure@vulncheck.com. The vulnerability concerns command execution via crafted VERSION.json content in pull requests from public forks.
Wazuh remediated the GitHub Actions shell injection vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-67308 in commit 44bf114, which is identified as unaffected. The fix also included additional workflow hardening beyond the direct remediation.
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Researchers and maintainers disclosed multiple GitHub Actions security issues that could let attackers steal credentials or gain code execution in CI/CD pipelines. Sansec and Packagist warned that older Composer releases could print raw `GITHUB_TOKEN` values into GitHub Actions logs after rejecting GitHub’s newer hyphenated token format, creating a supply-chain risk for PHP projects, especially public repositories and older repositories where the default token still had write access. Composer issued fixes in versions `2.9.8`, `2.2.28`, and `1.10.28`, while GitHub rolled back the token format rollout to reduce immediate exposure. Separate disclosures showed how workflow design and cache handling can turn limited CI access into broader repository compromise. A newly assigned `CVE-2026-42603` affects OWASP BLT before `2.1.2`, where a privileged `pull_request_target` workflow checked out and executed code from an attacker-controlled fork, enabling remote code execution with repository write permissions. Earlier research on GitHub Actions cache poisoning described "Actions Cache Blasting," a technique that abuses client-controlled cache keys, cache eviction, and lingering runtime tokens to replace cached artifacts used by more privileged workflows, potentially leading to secret disclosure, release-signing compromise, and tampered build outputs without visible changes in source code or workflow logs.
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The **GhostAction** supply-chain campaign compromised 327 GitHub users and inserted malicious workflows into 817 repositories, stealing 3,325 CI/CD secrets. Workflows masquerading as “Github Actions Security” sent PyPI, npm, DockerHub, GitHub, AWS, database, and Cloudflare credentials by HTTP POST to attacker infrastructure, including `45.139.104.115`; a later wave added exfiltration domains and hundreds of commits. Although no malicious package releases had been confirmed at disclosure, 24 affected packages—nine npm and 15 PyPI—remained at immediate risk, while some stolen credentials were reportedly already abused. CI/CD workflows are also vulnerable to remote-code-execution exposure from unsafe `pull_request_target` configurations, artifact-token leaks such as **ArtiPACKED**, and attacks including **HackerBot-Claw**. Elastic Security Labs released the open-source `cicd-abuse-detector` to review GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, and Azure DevOps changes before merge or deployment, extracting more than 50 signals from pipeline files and analyzing diffs for secret exfiltration, privileged pull-request triggers, permission escalation, self-hosted-runner targeting, supply-chain manipulation, and timestamp abuse. The tool can issue pull-request, issue, Slack, and Elasticsearch alerts and optionally block risky pull requests.
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