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Researchers disclosed three attack paths—Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key, and Golden Pass-ta-key—that let malware on a compromised Windows endpoint take over accounts protected by Google’s synced passkeys and Google Cloud Authenticator in Chrome. The attacks do not break passkey cryptography; instead, they abuse weaknesses in device trust, onboarding, recovery, and user-verification workflows. Unit 42 reported that even unprivileged malware can enumerate synced passkeys from Chrome’s local sync database, impersonate device identity to obtain valid authentication assertions without user interaction, and in some scenarios bypass or defeat user-verification protections.
The researchers also described more severe escalation paths: an attacker can register an attacker-controlled user-verification key during re-onboarding, and in the highest-impact case, exposure of the security domain secret (SDS) through logs or memory can allow decryption of all synced passkeys. The findings further showed that some relying parties did not properly validate the WebAuthn UV flag, creating an MFA-bypass condition; eBay fixed such an issue after disclosure. The report recommends strict validation of WebAuthn user verification, attestation checks for device-key registration, stronger recovery and re-registration controls, better protection of local passkey data, and preventing client exposure of sensitive key material.
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After Unit 42 reported that Chrome exposed the Google Password Manager security domain secret in plaintext through internal FIDO logs, Google removed the secret from those logs. Unit 42 said the secret was still temporarily accessible in Chrome process memory afterward.
After receiving the researchers’ report, eBay fixed the issue that had allowed passkey login acceptance without proper validation of the WebAuthn UV flag. The fix closed the demonstrated MFA-bypass condition described in the research.
The researchers reported the user-verification validation issue to affected relying parties after identifying the weakness. This disclosure specifically included the issue demonstrated against eBay’s passkey login flow.
The research found that some relying parties accepted passkey authentication without properly validating the WebAuthn User Verified flag, even when user verification was configured as required. GitHub rejected the demonstrated attack when UV was required, while eBay accepted a login before remediation.
Unit 42 researchers documented three attack classes—Pass-ta-key, Silver Pass-ta-key, and Golden Pass-ta-key—targeting Google’s synced passkey ecosystem and Google Cloud Authenticator on Chrome for Windows with TPM. The attacks enable account takeover or passkey extraction from malware-compromised endpoints without breaking passkey cryptography itself.
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Google has made **Device Bound Session Credentials (DBSC)** generally available in Chrome, rolling it out for Google Workspace customers, Workspace Individual subscribers, and personal Google accounts to blunt account takeovers driven by stolen session cookies. The feature cryptographically binds a session cookie to the device where authentication occurred, using hardware-backed protections such as the **Trusted Platform Module** on Windows and **Secure Enclave** support on macOS, so exfiltrated cookies cannot be replayed on another machine to bypass MFA. Google said DBSC is enabled by default for Workspace customers, integrates with **Context-Aware Access** for device-aware policy decisions, and exposes binding events in audit logs to help administrators monitor session integrity. The move follows sustained abuse of stolen Google authentication artifacts by infostealers and adversaries leveraging mechanisms such as the undocumented OAuth **MultiLogin** API, with operators tied to **Lumma** and **Rhadamanthys** claiming they could restore expired cookies. At the same time, researchers at Phishu disclosed **VaultJacking**, a phishing technique that can steal an entire Google Password Manager vault after capturing a victim’s 6-digit PIN, then registering an attacker-controlled device to sync passwords and passkeys without malware or prior device compromise. Phishu said the attack sidesteps DBSC because it does not rely on replaying stolen cookies, underscoring that Google’s new protection sharply reduces pass-the-cookie risk but does not stop credential- and PIN-based phishing against synced account data.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported a surge in **malicious Chrome extensions** abusing high-privilege browser permissions to steal credentials and hijack authenticated sessions. LayerX identified at least **16 ChatGPT-related extensions** that mimic legitimate productivity tools and brands, then inject scripts into `chatgpt.com` to monitor outbound web requests and **exfiltrate authorization details and session tokens** to attacker-controlled infrastructure. With stolen tokens, attackers can impersonate victims’ ChatGPT sessions and potentially access connected data sources (e.g., integrations with *Slack* and *GitHub*), expanding impact beyond the AI service itself. Separately, Varonis documented a **malware-as-a-service** browser-extension toolkit dubbed **Stanley** being sold on Russian-language cybercrime forums, marketed to enable large-scale credential theft by **showing a phishing site while the URL bar continues to display the legitimate domain**. The toolkit uses a web-based control panel to configure per-victim “source” (legitimate) and “target” (phishing) URLs, then overlays a full-screen iframe to spoof the destination site; the seller also claims “guaranteed” placement in the **Chrome Web Store**, increasing the likelihood of user installation and enterprise exposure.
Jun 29, 2026
Google has introduced new layered security defenses in Chrome to address the growing risks of indirect prompt injection attacks and account takeovers, particularly as the browser integrates more agentic AI capabilities. Key features include the User Alignment Critic, which independently evaluates and vetoes potentially malicious actions by Chrome's AI agent, and Agent Origin Sets, which restrict the agent's data access to only relevant or user-approved sources. These measures are designed to prevent attackers from exploiting untrusted web content to hijack user sessions or exfiltrate sensitive data, and to mitigate site isolation bypasses that could compromise user privacy and security. In parallel, Google has acknowledged a surge in account takeover incidents targeting Chrome users, where attackers steal credentials, authentication codes, and session cookies to access synchronized data stored in the cloud. The company is urging users to strengthen their authentication methods and reconsider the use of browser-based password managers, as a single compromised account can expose a wide range of personal information. Google is also rolling out additional protections for Workspace accounts to counteract these threats and safeguard user data across its ecosystem.
Jun 29, 2026