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Samsung said it is banning Smart TV apps that contain residential proxy software after researchers found several apps could route third-party internet traffic through users’ home connections. Security firm Mnemonic reported that some apps passed review with dormant proxy functionality and later fetched remote configuration at launch, allowing the behavior to be activated after approval. Researchers said at least one Samsung-endorsed Pac-Man app included Bright Data proxy code, raising concerns that large numbers of TVs could be turned into a botnet-like proxy network.
The findings highlighted a weakness in Smart TV app review, where thin-shell apps can load remote content that differs from the code originally inspected. Samsung said it has begun removing existing apps containing residential proxy SDKs, blocking new submissions with that functionality, and tightening restrictions after the disclosures. The case also underscored broader risks from third-party SDKs, remote feature toggles, and marketplace trust signals that can give unsafe apps added legitimacy.
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After being contacted about the findings, Samsung said it had begun banning apps that share users' internet connections through residential proxy software. The company also said it had restricted new app registrations with proxy functionality, would remove existing apps containing such code, and was implementing platform-wide policies explicitly banning residential proxy SDKs.
Mnemonic published research describing how Samsung Smart TV apps could be turned into residential proxy nodes and warning that remote code or configuration changes could potentially activate large numbers of TVs into a botnet-like proxy network. The report also said some affected apps claimed installation counts in the hundreds of millions, according to their developers.
Mnemonic researcher Harrison Sand identified at least one Samsung-endorsed Pac-Man app containing Bright Data residential proxy code. Sand found the code loaded when the app opened and could remain dormant until a user accepted a consent screen, after which it could run in the background until the app was deleted.
Security researchers at Mnemonic found that several Samsung Smart TV apps contained residential proxy functionality or SDKs that could share users' internet connections with third parties. Their analysis showed some apps could retrieve remote configuration at launch, allowing proxy behavior to be enabled after app-store review.
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Researchers at Spur Intelligence found residential proxy SDKs embedded in **2,058 of 6,038** smart TV applications scanned across **LG webOS** and **Samsung Tizen**, indicating that more than a third of the apps analyzed could route third-party internet traffic through users’ home connections. The apps were often presented as benign utilities or ambient entertainment, including clocks, solitaire, fish tank displays, and puppy-themed apps, while some explicitly offered users a tradeoff between ads and joining a proxy network. Spur said smart TVs are especially attractive as proxy hosts because they are typically always on, rarely monitored like PCs, and can continue proxy activity even after an app is closed.
Jul 28, 2026
Researchers at Include Security reported that free apps across **Samsung, LG, and Roku** smart TV ecosystems, as well as some mobile apps, embedded a Bright Data SDK that allegedly converts consumer devices into residential proxy exit nodes for web-scraping traffic, including AI data collection. The researchers said the SDK fetches an unauthenticated configuration, opens a persistent WebSocket peer tunnel, and relays third-party HTTP requests through users’ home internet connections, with consent disclosures allegedly buried in hard-to-find interface dialogs. Publicly exposed configuration data indicated a default Wi‑Fi relay cap of **200 GB per device per month**, and partner associations reportedly included **PlayWorks Digital, CloudTV, Viber Media, Moonfrog Labs, and Hola Networks**. The report said smart TVs are especially attractive proxy nodes because they are typically always on, connected to Wi‑Fi, and rarely monitored, while technical design choices reduced visibility by binding traffic directly to physical interfaces and using lower-level iOS networking primitives that can bypass VPN routing and evade common instrumentation. Independent reporting said the main risk is misuse of consumers’ residential IP addresses and bandwidth rather than direct account takeover, and noted that major platforms including **Google, Amazon, and Roku** have restricted background proxy SDK behavior. Include Security said it reverse-engineered the iOS framework, monitored runtime traffic for 30 days, and notified Bright Data on **May 11, 2026**, but had not received a response before publication.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers reported that malicious Android applications, including VPN-themed apps and software built with the **LumiApps** SDK, secretly enrolled users’ devices into a proxy network and routed third-party traffic through them without informed consent. HUMAN’s Satori team said the operation, tracked as **PROXYLIB**, used a Golang-based native library, `libgojni.so`, to contact command-and-control servers, register infected phones, and maintain persistent proxy connections through Android services and boot receivers. The activity was linked to earlier infections found in **Oko VPN** and 28 related Google Play apps, as well as a later variant that could be embedded during app development or injected into APKs without source-code access. Investigators said the infrastructure and monetization appeared tied to **Asocks**, a residential proxy service, indicating the compromised devices were likely being sold as proxy exit nodes for cybercriminal use. Google removed the identified apps from Google Play, and **Google Play Protect** now detects or blocks known PROXYLIB-related applications, while researchers warned the operators are likely to keep shifting to third-party app stores and modified APK distribution.
Jun 29, 2026