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A disclosed zero-day in HP ThinPro 8 and 9 allows an attacker with physical access to bypass TPM-backed full-disk encryption and recover the LUKS key protecting the root partition on affected HP thin clients. The weakness stems from incomplete TPM boot measurements: the sealed key is reportedly tied to PCRs covering the BIOS, option ROMs, and parts of the boot chain, but not the Linux kernel or initramfs. That gap lets an attacker alter an unencrypted initramfs to capture the legitimate disk-encryption key without changing the PCR values checked before key release.
The issue was confirmed on HP t530 and HP t540 devices running ThinPro 8.1.0 build 22 and ThinPro 9.0.0 build 15. After modifying the boot components, an attacker can reinstall the drive, allow the device to boot normally, and then retrieve the raw key from the unencrypted boot partition for offline decryption, exposing the encrypted root filesystem and data such as device configuration, certificate stores, stored credentials, and password hashes. Researcher Darren McDonald reported the flaw to HP PSIRT, and HP reportedly said a fix was in quality assurance, but no CVE, security bulletin, or patch was available at disclosure time.
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3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
McDonald publicly disclosed the HP ThinPro 8 and 9 vulnerability on August 8 while it was still unpatched. At disclosure time, no CVE, security bulletin, or shipped patch was available.
The researcher reported the boot-chain weakness affecting HP ThinPro full-disk encryption to HP PSIRT. HP later indicated that a fix was undergoing quality assurance.
Security researcher Darren McDonald discovered a vulnerability in HP ThinPro 8 and 9 in early 2026 that allows a physical attacker to recover the LUKS disk-encryption key by modifying the unmeasured initramfs in the boot chain.
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Researchers detailed multiple attack paths that can defeat or weaken Microsoft BitLocker on systems using **TPM-only** unlock, showing that physical access remains enough to recover disk encryption keys or bypass pre-boot protections in common configurations. Neodyme revisited the **Bitpixie** technique tied to `CVE-2023-21563`, describing how attackers can downgrade the Windows Boot Manager, abuse a PXE soft-reboot path, and recover the Volume Master Key from memory without the user’s password. A follow-up analysis said Microsoft has struggled to fully close downgrade paths because Secure Boot revocation capacity is limited, older Microsoft-signed bootloaders remain broadly trusted, and stricter PCR bindings have caused recovery and compatibility problems in the field. Separate research from MDSec showed that Dell UEFI firmware can be modified offline at the SPI flash level to disable pre-boot DMA protections while leaving BIOS settings appearing unchanged, enabling follow-on DMA attacks against Windows 11 devices protected by TPM-only BitLocker and, in some cases, privilege escalation even on TPM+PIN systems when the PIN is known. A public GitHub project compiling BitLocker attack techniques further underscored the breadth of the issue, cataloging hardware and software methods ranging from TPM bus sniffing and fTPM glitching to bootloader, WinRE, and recovery-environment flaws across numerous CVEs. Across the disclosures, the consistent mitigation theme was to avoid relying on TPM-only unlock where possible, apply Microsoft’s Secure Boot certificate updates such as **KB5025885**, and require a **pre-boot PIN** to materially raise the bar for physical attackers.
Jul 24, 2026
Researchers disclosed a hardware attack that can bypass **Microsoft BitLocker** protections by intercepting communications with the **Trusted Platform Module (TPM)** during the boot process. The technique, demonstrated by Guillaume Quéré, targets devices protected with BitLocker and a PIN by probing motherboard traces and using a logic analyzer to capture key material exchanged at startup, including an encrypted intermediate key that can be used to recover the **Volume Master Key** and decrypt the drive. The attack requires **physical access** to the device and the ability to disassemble it, rather than any remote code execution or software exploit. Microsoft documents BitLocker as a data-at-rest protection feature for Windows, but the reported bypass highlights that its security can be undermined when attackers can access hardware signals directly. Reported mitigations focus on operational controls rather than a Windows patch, including strong physical security, secure storage of devices, and proper wiping or destruction of drives and systems at end of life.
Jul 31, 2026
Dell disclosed and researchers detailed **CVE-2026-40639** (`DSA-2026-197`), a BIOS password storage weakness that allows administrator and user passwords to be recovered from SPI flash dumps in milliseconds on affected Dell client platforms. The flaw affects the `SystemPwSmm` SMM driver and stems from storing password records in the DVAR region with a reversible repeating 20-byte XOR scheme over a 32-byte field, while leaving the first password character unencrypted. For passwords of 12 characters or fewer, leaked key material is sufficient for deterministic recovery without brute force; researchers also reported that longer passwords are often recoverable because deleted DVAR records are not securely erased and key derivation is limited by device-specific values. Confirmed vulnerable systems include the **Wyse 5070** thin client and reported examples such as the **Latitude E7250**, **Latitude 7490**, and **XPS 15 9560**, although some newer Dell platforms were found to use stronger protections and were not affected. The attack requires physical access to read SPI flash or the ability to boot an attacker-controlled OS, but recovered BIOS credentials could let an attacker change settings tied to **Secure Boot**, boot order, and pre-boot DMA controls, potentially weakening some full-disk encryption assumptions. Dell validated the report after private disclosure, issued patches for some product lines, and said additional fixes were planned, though some confirmed vulnerable devices remained unpatched at publication time.
Jul 13, 2026