A distributed cryptominer worm targeting Active Directory environments spread by chaining multiple post-exploitation techniques, including abuse of unconstrained Kerberos delegation on domain controllers running print services, credential theft with Mimikatz, and persistence through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriptions. The intrusion pattern aligns with known tradecraft for extracting Kerberos tickets and privileged credentials from compromised systems, then using those artifacts to move laterally and expand control across the domain.
Incident handling guidance tied to the worm emphasized containing infected hosts, identifying compromised domain controllers and print servers, and hunting for WMI filters, consumers, and MOF-based persistence that can relaunch miner payloads. The references also point to the need to review exposure to delegation misconfigurations, monitor for LSASS access and DCSync-style activity associated with Mimikatz, and remove malicious WMI subscriptions to stop reinfection and prevent the cryptomining operation from re-establishing itself in the forest.

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3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The archived Mimikatz reference states that Benjamin Delpy wrote Mimikatz in 2007 as a Windows x32/x64 proof-of-concept program to study Windows credentials. The tool later evolved into a widely used credential theft and post-exploitation framework.
MITRE ATT&CK reports that during the SolarWinds compromise, APT29 used a WMI event filter to invoke a command-line event consumer at system boot and launch a backdoor with rundll32.exe. This reflects WMI-based persistence in that campaign.
MITRE ATT&CK states that during Operation Ghost, APT29 used WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence for malware. This documents WMI event subscription abuse as part of that intrusion set's tradecraft.
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