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Researchers tied Lyposit, Lucky Locker, and Bomba Locker to a closely related lockscreen ransomware operation that used geographically tailored ransom pages, affiliate-style distribution, and command-and-control infrastructure to lock Windows systems. Analysis linked the malware families through shared panel behavior, similar country-specific screen designs, and overlapping technical traits, while reporting that the operation targeted victims in the United States and multiple European countries and was distributed through exploit-kit traffic including ProPack, BH EK/q.php, and Darkleech.
Technical reviews showed a multi-stage infection chain involving a Visual Basic dropper, an intermediate loader, RC2-based decryption, and a final DLL payload that installed persistence and fetched HTML ransom content from remote servers using BITS, WinINet, and encrypted communications. The malware reportedly supported Safe Mode persistence, command processor modification, process injection, memory-only loading, antivirus evasion, and a Windows Vista/7 UAC bypass, while some ransom screens even mimicked a Mac OS interface despite infecting Windows hosts.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
10 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
On May 7, researchers received a suspicious malware sample initially identified as Carberp based on its URL pattern. Internal similarity clustering then linked it with families including Zbot, Dofoil, Gamarue, Viknok, and Win32:Lyposit.
The domain contacted by the suspicious sample analyzed by Avast was registered on April 9. This domain registration was one of the explicit infrastructure anchors in the infection chain investigation.
A suspicious sample later examined by Avast had a PE header TimeDateStamp of 2013-02-27 12:19:29 PM EST. Researchers noted this predated the arrests of Carberp Banking Trojan operators and tied the sample to a broader botnet distribution process.
The revised Lyposit.B variant appeared in November 2012 with new U.S. and U.K. lock-screen designs and reused an Epubb design for France, Portugal, and Germany. Its infrastructure included domains such as neufbem9jefnike.com and kiribati91.org.
Three days after the post about U.S. bot monetization, ProPack was pushing Lyposit with a new design. This redesign was reportedly named Adneukine by Microsoft and later referred to in the analysis as Lyposit.B.
The Lyposit ransomware, also referred to as Lucky LOCKER, appeared in the wild in the second week of September 2012. It was described as an affiliate-operated locker product with region-tailored lock screens and persistence mechanisms.
The same analysis reproduced an underground advertisement for Bomba Locker as a crimeware affiliate service and showed a screenshot of an admin panel identified as version 0.6. The ad claimed features including a Windows Vista/7 UAC bypass, memory-only loading, encrypted bot-server communications, antivirus evasion, and support for 20 countries.
A later analysis connected Bomba Locker with Lyposit, Lucky Locker, and Nymaim based on similarities in user-agent behavior, command-and-control responses, locker designs, and panel structure. It also stated that the Lucky Locker advertisement had disappeared and suggested Bomba Locker was its replacement or continuation.
The U.S. lock-screen design later associated with Bomba Locker had previously been seen in a Uremtoo variant in February. The same design was also noted as appearing in Nymaim.
A later post cited in the analysis claimed testing with 2,970 U.S. bots generated $12,300 via MoneyPak. The operators then shifted their main operational focus to the United States and sought affiliates able to deliver at least 5,000 U.S. bots per day.
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