Loading story…
Researchers detailed Linux-focused cryptojacking operations that compromise internet-exposed systems through SSH brute-force attacks and then deploy XMRig to mine Monero. One campaign, tracked as Krane, was first observed through honeypot activity and used Bash scripts, Python tooling, and ELF binaries to establish persistence, erase and recreate logs, kill rival miners and botnets, and move laterally across additional hosts. Krane operators also used subnet and SYN scanning, SSH banner grabbing, and credential attacks to identify new victims, while infected systems reported discovered targets back to command-and-control infrastructure every 15 seconds.
The reporting aligns with broader findings on long-running Linux cryptojacking activity, including the WatchDog campaign, which similarly maintained large-scale miner deployments over an extended period. In Krane, analysts linked delivery infrastructure to multiple download servers and network space associated with AS53667/PONYNET, observed package variants including krax and ssh, and tied mining activity to Hashvault pools and three Monero wallets. At one point, researchers saw more than 200 active miners and estimated proceeds of roughly 2434.26 EUR, underscoring how opportunistic SSH compromise and aggressive competitor removal can sustain profitable, persistent cryptomining operations.
Mallory correlates global threat intelligence with your attack surface — know if you’re exposed before adversaries strike.
2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
CUJO AI reported a previously unseen IoT/Linux malware family named Krane after capturing it in a honeypot. The analysis described SSH brute-force access, Monero mining via XMRig, persistence, log wiping, and lateral propagation tooling.
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published research exposing the WatchDog cryptojacking campaign and stated it had been operating for two years. The reference provides no explicit anchored start date for the campaign itself beyond that characterization.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
AhnLab Security intelligence Center (ASEC) reported an ongoing campaign targeting poorly managed Linux servers, where attackers gain access through SSH brute-force attempts or stolen credentials and then deploy propagation malware to install **XMRig**-based coin miners. Observed through multiple honeypots, the activity uses a multi-stage toolset that includes Go-based downloaders and SSH spreaders, along with malware families such as **ShellBot/PerlBot**, **MIG LogCleaner**, and **XHide** to move laterally, fetch payloads, hide activity, and maintain control of compromised hosts. The miners are disguised as legitimate processes and are installed with multiple persistence mechanisms, including `systemd` services, cron jobs, hidden binary paths, and watchdog functions that restore deleted payloads. ASEC said the propagation malware scans for exposed SSH services, authenticates with credential lists, installs miners on newly compromised systems, and reports results back to attacker infrastructure, assessing that the same threat actor has likely been conducting Linux-focused cryptomining attacks since at least 2023.
Jul 15, 2026
A Linux cloud cryptojacking campaign deployed the **CHAOS RAT** alongside an **XMRig** Monero miner, expanding a typical resource-theft intrusion into a broader remote-access compromise. The infection chain retained common miner tradecraft, including killing competing malware and resource-intensive processes, establishing persistence through `/etc/crontab`, and using Pastebin plus multiple hosting locations to fetch payloads. Researchers said the operators also separated payload delivery infrastructure from command-and-control, with the payload server appearing to be in Russia and the RAT C2 likely geolocated in Hong Kong. The Go-based CHAOS RAT gave attackers capabilities beyond mining, including reverse shell access, file transfer, screenshot capture, system reconnaissance, and host reboot or shutdown. The malware authenticated to its C2 with a hardcoded JSON Web Token supplied at compile time, illustrating a more structured command channel than is typical in basic cryptomining infections. The combination of persistence, miner deployment, and full-featured remote administration showed how Linux cloud-focused threats were evolving from opportunistic cryptojacking into multi-purpose post-compromise operations.
Aug 14, 2026
Attackers exploited multiple publicly disclosed **pre-authentication vulnerabilities** in internet-exposed enterprise products to install **Monero-mining malware** on both Windows and Linux systems. Observed targets included **Apache HTTP Server**, **Atlassian Confluence**, **F5 BIG-IP**, **VMware vCenter**, and **Oracle WebLogic Server**, with exploitation attempts seen in the wild through honeypots. The operation abused trusted cloud platforms **GitHub** and **Netlify** to host delivery scripts and miner payloads, helping the malware blend into normal HTTPS traffic before the hosted content was removed. On Windows, the malware used batch scripts to profile infected hosts, download **XMRig** and supporting components, establish persistence, and run the miner as a background service. On Linux, shell scripts killed high-CPU processes, removed competing miners, fetched multiple binaries and configuration files, and launched mining with `nohup`. The campaign highlighted how public proof-of-concept exploits, unpatched exposed servers, and the use of legitimate hosting services combined to sustain large-scale cryptojacking activity.
Aug 14, 2026