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TA2541 Sustains Aviation-Focused Phishing With Commodity RATs and Evasive Loaders

Social Engineering & Fraud · 5 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Sep 24, 2016

TA2541 Sustains Aviation-Focused Phishing With Commodity RATs and Evasive Loaders

Researchers linked a long-running cybercrime actor tracked as TA2541 to years of phishing campaigns against aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense organizations. Cisco Talos and Proofpoint assessed the actor as likely operating from Nigeria, using aviation- and travel-themed lures such as fake itineraries, charter details, and regulator impersonation to trick targets into opening malicious documents or cloud-hosted payload links. The campaigns have delivered commodity remote access trojans including AsyncRAT, njRAT, NetWire, WSH RAT, Parallax, AgentTesla, STRRAT, Imminent Monitor, and vjw0rm, with recurring infrastructure and identifiers such as dynamic DNS domains and keywords including "kimjoy," "h0pe," and "grace."

The intrusion chains evolved over time but remained operationally consistent: earlier waves used macro-enabled Word files, while later activity shifted to Google Drive, OneDrive, and Discord links hosting VBS payloads. Talos documented more complex stages involving malicious Publisher macros, mshta, PowerShell, AMSI bypass code, and GitHub-hosted payloads, while Fortinet described a campaign in which a Google Drive-delivered VBS script dropped XML with inline C# code, used MSBuild.exe for execution, and hollowed RegSvcs.exe to inject AsyncRAT, likely with ties to Snip3 Crypter infrastructure. Despite limited technical sophistication, the actor has maintained multi-year access operations that enable credential theft, fraud, and potential access brokerage across aviation-related targets.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

17 events · Feb 7, 2013 – Nov 2021
  1. Reported Feb 15, 20225y ago

    BleepingComputer reports TA2541 linked to years of attacks

    BleepingComputer summarized Proofpoint's findings that TA2541 had targeted aviation and related sectors for years using large-scale phishing and commodity RATs. The report also highlighted overlap with Cisco Talos' earlier attribution of similar activity to a Nigeria-based actor.

    Unskilled hacker linked to years of attacks on aviation, transport sectors
  2. Reported Feb 9, 20225y ago

    Proofpoint publishes TA2541 campaign analysis

    Proofpoint published a report charting TA2541's long-running campaigns since 2017, its sector targeting, and its shift from macro-enabled Word documents to cloud-hosted payload links. The company assessed the actor as a financially motivated cybercriminal using commodity malware and recurring infrastructure patterns.

    TA2541: Threats to Aviation, Aerospace, & Travel | Proofpoint US
  3. Nov 2021

    Proofpoint observes Imminent Monitor persistence activity

    Proofpoint observed TA2541 using Imminent Monitor with scheduled-task and registry-based persistence in November 2021. The activity showed the actor continuing to vary payloads while maintaining similar infection-chain behavior.

    TA2541: Threats to Aviation, Aerospace, & Travel | Proofpoint US
  4. Reported Sep 16, 20215y ago

    Talos publishes Operation Layover findings

    Cisco Talos published research linking aviation-themed malware campaigns to a single Nigeria-based threat actor active for roughly five to six years. Talos connected domains, handles, and malware samples showing long-running use of commodity RATs and crypters against aviation targets.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  5. Reported Jun 27, 20215y ago

    Fortinet reports aviation spear-phishing campaign using MSBuild chain

    FortiGuard Labs described a spear-phishing campaign targeting aviation companies with fake federal aviation authority emails and Google Drive links disguised as PDFs. The infection chain used a VBS script, an XML payload compiled by MSBuild.exe, and a RunPE-style loader to inject AsyncRAT into RegSvcs.exe.

    Spear Phishing Campaign with New Techniques Aimed at Aviation Companies
  6. Jun 2021

    Additional campaign-linked domains first seen

    Talos identified eight additional domains linked to the campaign, most of which were first seen in May or June 2021. This expanded the infrastructure cluster associated with the aviation-targeting actor.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  7. May 2021

    Snip3-linked aviation campaign observed in April and May 2021

    Fortinet said the sender IP 192.145.239.18 used in a later aviation phishing campaign had also been associated with an aviation-themed Snip3 Crypter campaign observed in April and May 2021. The overlap in sender IP, C2 IP, and payload supported a likely link to Snip3 Crypter-as-a-service.

    Spear Phishing Campaign with New Techniques Aimed at Aviation Companies
  8. 2021

    TA2541 uses DiscordApp URLs in late 2021 campaigns

    Proofpoint observed TA2541 using DiscordApp URLs in late 2021 to deliver compressed files that installed AgentTesla or Imminent Monitor. This reflected an evolution in delivery methods beyond macro-enabled documents and cloud-hosted VBS links.

    TA2541: Threats to Aviation, Aerospace, & Travel | Proofpoint US
  9. 2020

    TA2541 briefly uses COVID-19-themed lures

    Proofpoint observed TA2541 using COVID-19-themed phishing lures in spring 2020, including cargo shipments of PPE and COVID-19 testing kits. This represented a temporary thematic shift within the actor's broader transportation-focused social engineering.

    TA2541: Threats to Aviation, Aerospace, & Travel | Proofpoint US
  10. 2019

    C2 IP tied to AsyncRAT and other malware since 2019

    Fortinet reported that IP address 79.134.225.18, later used by the aviation campaign's franco.ddns.net C2, had been linked since 2019 to AsyncRAT/RevengeRAT, NanoCore, and botnet attacks. This provided historical context for the infrastructure used in the campaign.

    Spear Phishing Campaign with New Techniques Aimed at Aviation Companies
  11. Dec 2018

    Evidence shows Aspire crypter purchase by Nassief

    Talos found evidence that a user named Nassief had purchased the Aspire crypter by December 2018. This crypter was later linked to infrastructure and samples associated with the aviation campaign.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  12. Aug 2018

    Aviation-related targeting begins in observed samples

    Talos found samples communicating with akconsult.linkpc.net that showed aviation-related targeting beginning in August 2018. This marked the start of the actor's documented aviation-focused activity in Talos' dataset.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  13. Jan 2017

    Proofpoint dates TA2541 activity to January 2017

    Proofpoint reported that the threat actor it tracks as TA2541 had been conducting persistent malware campaigns since January 2017. The actor targeted aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense organizations with phishing-delivered commodity RATs.

    Unskilled hacker linked to years of attacks on aviation, transport sectors
  14. Sep 24, 201610y ago

    groups.us.to-linked sample first seen

    A sample associated with groups.us.to was first seen using a batch file in a multi-stage malware chain. Talos treated this infrastructure as a lower-confidence but potentially related link to the same actor.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  15. Jul 2, 201511y ago

    akconsult.linkpc.net domain first seen

    The domain akconsult.linkpc.net, later tied to aviation-themed malware campaigns, was first observed. Talos later linked it to recent AsyncRAT activity and broader actor infrastructure.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  16. May 2014

    Additional related malware samples appear

    Talos identified four additional samples using the same malware family and different identifiers, expanding the historical footprint of the actor's activity. These samples were seen between September 2012 and May 2014.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
  17. Feb 7, 201314y ago

    Akconsult-linked CyberGate sample first observed

    A malware sample using CyberGate RAT and the identifier "Akconsult" was first seen, providing one of the earliest artifacts later linked to the TA2541/Operation Layover activity cluster. The sample communicated with the C2 domain opybiddo.zapto.org.

    Operation Layover: How we tracked an attack on the aviation industry to five years of compromise
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