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QakBot Intrusions Drove Domain Compromise and Ransomware Delivery

Malware Intelligence · 9 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 14, 2026

QakBot Intrusions Drove Domain Compromise and Ransomware Delivery

Threat actors used QakBot (also tracked as QBot/QuackBot) as an initial access and post-compromise platform in corporate intrusions, delivering the malware through phishing campaigns that evolved from malicious Office documents to password-protected ZIP archives, MSI installers, OneNote files, LNK/XLL payloads, and script-based chains. Across these campaigns, QakBot established persistence, injected into legitimate processes, conducted host and domain reconnaissance, stole credentials and other data, and communicated with command-and-control servers over encrypted HTTP/HTTPS channels before staging additional payloads.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

16 events · 2007 – Jan 2025
  1. Jan 2025

    Morphisec documented QakBot maldoc campaign using CDR and process-evasion tricks

    Morphisec Labs reported a large QakBot phishing campaign that began earlier in January 2025 using ZIP archives containing malicious Word documents with AutoOpen and AutoClose macros. The campaign used two notable evasion techniques: placing the document in a ZIP file to bypass content disarm and reconstruction controls, and launching VBS execution through explorer.exe to evade child-parent process detection before downloading the QakBot payload from multiple URLs.

    QakBot (QBot) Maldoc Campaign Introduces Two New Techniques into Its Arsenal
  2. Reported Oct 5, 20233y ago

    Talos assessed Qakbot affiliates remained active post-takedown

    Cisco Talos reported that Qakbot-affiliated actors remained active after the late-August 2023 takedown, continuing phishing activity that delivered Ransom Knight and Remcos. Talos said it had not observed the actors distributing Qakbot malware itself after the infrastructure seizure.

    Qakbot-affiliated actors distribute Ransom Knight malware despite infrastructure takedown
  3. Reported Oct 5, 20233y ago

    Qakbot actors wiped LNK metadata after Talos tracking research

    After Talos published research on tracking Qakbot campaigns through LNK metadata, actors associated with the 'AA,' 'BB,' and 'Obama' campaigns began wiping metadata from LNK files. Talos nevertheless identified August 2023 LNK files created on a machine previously tied to Qakbot activity.

    Qakbot-affiliated actors distribute Ransom Knight malware despite infrastructure takedown
  4. Aug 2023

    FBI-led operation seized Qakbot infrastructure and assets

    In late August 2023, the FBI and international partners seized Qakbot infrastructure and cryptocurrency assets. Talos assessed the operation significantly damaged Qakbot operations, particularly command-and-control infrastructure.

    Qakbot-affiliated actors distribute Ransom Knight malware despite infrastructure takedown
  5. Aug 2023

    Qakbot affiliates launched phishing campaign with Ransom Knight

    Threat actors linked by Cisco Talos to Qakbot affiliates began a phishing campaign in early August 2023 distributing ZIP archives containing LNK and XLL files. The campaign delivered a Ransom Knight ransomware variant and the Remcos backdoor, with some lures themed around invoices and bank transfers, including Italian-language filenames.

    Qakbot-affiliated actors distribute Ransom Knight malware despite infrastructure takedown
  6. May 2023

    Ransom Knight ransomware-as-a-service variant announced

    The actor behind the Cyclops ransomware service announced Ransom Knight, described as an updated variant rewritten from scratch. Later reporting assessed that Qakbot-affiliated actors likely used the service as customers rather than operators.

    Qakbot-affiliated actors distribute Ransom Knight malware despite infrastructure takedown
  7. Reported Feb 17, 20234y ago

    Qakbot campaigns adopted OneNote and script-based delivery

    Cyble documented Qakbot distribution through spam emails carrying malicious OneNote attachments and ZIP archives with WSF files. The infection chains used BAT, JSE, JScript, PowerShell, and rundll32.exe to download and execute DLL payloads masquerading as benign files.

    Qakbot Malware: Exploring Its Diverse Distribution Methods
  8. Reported Oct 12, 20224y ago

    Black Basta intrusion chains used QAKBOT for access

    Trend Micro documented intrusion chains in which QAKBOT was used for initial access, execution, persistence, discovery, and command-and-control, while Cobalt Strike supported lateral movement and Black Basta delivered ransomware impact. The phishing lures used password-protected ZIP or HTML attachments leading to ISO files and malicious links.

    Black Basta Ransomware Gang Infiltrates Networks via QAKBOT, Brute Ratel, and Cobalt Strike | Trend Micro (DE)
  9. Reported Apr 11, 20225y ago

    Qbot switched to MSI installers in phishing ZIPs

    Qbot operators began distributing malware through phishing emails carrying password-protected ZIP archives containing malicious MSI installer files. Reporting described this as the first observed use of MSI packages by Qbot operators and a departure from their prior reliance on malicious Office documents with macros.

    Qbot malware switches to new Windows Installer infection vector
  10. Apr 2022

    Microsoft began rolling out VBA macro autoblock

    Microsoft started rolling out the VBA macro autoblock feature to Office for Windows users in early April 2022, beginning with Office Version 2203 in the Current Channel (Preview). This rollout was cited as context for Qbot's shift away from macro-heavy delivery chains.

    Qbot malware switches to new Windows Installer infection vector
  11. Feb 7, 20225y ago

    DFIR Report published Qbot intrusion and Zerologon case study

    DFIR Report published an incident analysis describing a November 2021 Qbot intrusion that escalated to domain compromise via Zerologon, with Cobalt Strike deployment, lateral movement, and data exfiltration. The report publicly revealed technical details of the attack chain and defender observations.

    Qbot Likes to Move It, Move It
  12. Feb 2022

    Microsoft announced plans to curb VBA macro abuse

    Microsoft announced plans to reduce malware delivery through VBA Office macros. Later reporting cited this announcement as a likely driver behind Qbot operators changing delivery tactics.

    Qbot malware switches to new Windows Installer infection vector
  13. Jan 2022

    Microsoft disabled Excel 4.0 macros by default

    Microsoft disabled Excel 4.0 (XLM) macros by default, a change noted in reporting because Qakbot campaigns had commonly abused malicious macros in Office documents. Researchers later linked Qbot delivery changes to Microsoft's macro-hardening efforts.

    Qbot malware switches to new Windows Installer infection vector
  14. Nov 2021

    Qbot intrusion led to full domain compromise via Zerologon

    In November 2021, attackers gained initial access through execution of a malicious Qbot DLL on a Windows workstation, then exploited Zerologon about 30 minutes later to compromise a domain controller and obtain domain administrator access. They deployed Cobalt Strike, moved laterally, enabled RDP-related settings, and exfiltrated sensitive documents before defenders evicted them.

    Qbot and Zerologon Lead To Full Domain Compromise
  15. 2020

    QakBot used macro-based infection chains in 2020–2021

    Technical analysis described QakBot campaigns in 2020–2021 using phishing-delivered Office documents with macros, stagers, and in-memory loaders to establish infection and contact command-and-control servers. After C2 was established, operators could push additional payloads including ransomware such as ProLock.

    QakBot technical analysis
  16. 2007

    QakBot first observed in the wild

    QakBot, also known as QBot/QuakBot/Pinkslipbot/Pinkslip, was first observed as a banking trojan targeting Windows systems. The malware was described as stealing banking credentials and evolving into a modular platform over time.

    QakBot technical analysis
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Observables

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