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APT Campaigns Abused Microsoft-Signed DLLs to Load Cobalt Strike and Other Payloads

Attack Tradecraft · 4 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen May 21, 2021

APT Campaigns Abused Microsoft-Signed DLLs to Load Cobalt Strike and Other Payloads

Targeted intrusion campaigns used tampered Microsoft-signed DLLs to evade trust checks and launch malware through DLL side-loading and service hijacking. LAC researchers documented the SigLoader malware family modifying data in a file's certificate or overlay area while preserving Windows signature validation, allowing the DLL to still appear legitimately signed. The loader then decrypted and executed additional stages in memory using layered routines including XOR, custom DES, AES, and later RC4, with observed payloads including DelfsCake, GreetCake, and shellcode associated with Metasploit Framework or Cobalt Strike. In one case, the intrusion began with exploitation of an SSL-VPN vulnerability before the loader was deployed on a compromised endpoint.

A related campaign assessed as likely tied to APT41 used the same signed-DLL abuse technique to deliver Cobalt Strike Beacon, including a tampered KBDTAM131.DLL derived from UXLibRes.dll and malicious loading via the Windows IKEEXT service and wlbsctrl.dll. Researchers said the loader stored encrypted configuration data, API strings, offsets, and payload content with ChaCha20, then decrypted a Beacon linked to a leaked or cracked Cobalt Strike 4.x build using watermark 0x12345678 and C2 over HTTPS, with other samples using HTTP or DNS. The activity was also tied to a malicious shortcut file masquerading as a PDF, campaign infrastructure including 119.45.238[.]189 and 192.109.98[.]187, and detection guidance using Sigcheck, Autoruns, Windows event logs, YARA rules, and stricter Authenticode verification.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

9 events · Jul 2020 – May 21, 2021
  1. May 21, 20215y ago

    LAC assesses signed-DLL Cobalt Strike loader as likely APT41

    LAC published analysis of a separate malware family that abused Microsoft-signed DLL files to decrypt and execute embedded Cobalt Strike Beacon payloads. The report assessed the activity as highly likely associated with APT41 based on similarities with FireEye's March 2020 reporting and overlapping tradecraft.

    Microsoft社のデジタル署名を悪用した「Cobalt Strike loader」による標的型攻撃〜攻撃者グループAPT41 | LAC WATCH
  2. 2021

    LAC reports continued SigLoader attacks in 2021

    LAC said it continued to observe attacks using SigLoader, also known as DESLoader or Ecipekac, in 2021. This established that the malware family remained active beyond the initial 2020 observations.

    Microsoft社のデジタル署名を悪用した「Cobalt Strike loader」による標的型攻撃〜攻撃者グループAPT41 | LAC WATCH
  3. Dec 1, 20206y ago

    LAC publishes SigLoader technical analysis

    LAC released an emergency report detailing SigLoader's abuse of Microsoft-signed DLL files, certificate table tampering, multi-stage decryption, and in-memory execution. The report also documented one intrusion path involving exploitation of an SSL-VPN vulnerability before SigLoader deployment.

    【緊急レポート】Microsoft社のデジタル署名ファイルを悪用する「SigLoader」による標的型攻撃を確認 | LAC WATCH
  4. Dec 1, 20206y ago

    Public speculation links SigLoader activity to APT10

    On December 1, 2020, a Twitter user publicly suggested that the actor using SigLoader might be APT10. LAC noted the speculation but did not confirm the attribution in its report.

    【緊急レポート】Microsoft社のデジタル署名ファイルを悪用する「SigLoader」による標的型攻撃を確認 | LAC WATCH
  5. Nov 20, 20206y ago

    Researchers confirm three SigLoader final payload types

    As of November 20, 2020, researchers had confirmed three types of final payloads delivered by SigLoader. These included DelfsCake, GreetCake, and shellcode generated with Metasploit Framework or Cobalt Strike.

    【緊急レポート】Microsoft社のデジタル署名ファイルを悪用する「SigLoader」による標的型攻撃を確認 | LAC WATCH
  6. Nov 2020

    APT41-linked campaign infrastructure active in late November 2020

    Passive DNS data cited by LAC indicated infrastructure at 119.45.238[.]189 was used as a C2 server or tool repository in late November 2020. This activity was tied to the same Cobalt Strike loader campaign abusing Microsoft-signed DLLs.

    Microsoft社のデジタル署名を悪用した「Cobalt Strike loader」による標的型攻撃〜攻撃者グループAPT41 | LAC WATCH
  7. Oct 22, 20206y ago

    Malicious LNK downloader dated for nomination lure

    LAC identified a malicious shortcut file named "Top-up Scheme_Member List as of 20201022v1_for Nomination.pdf.lnk" that acted as a downloader for a Cobalt Strike Beacon named const.exe. The filename itself anchors the lure to October 22, 2020.

    Microsoft社のデジタル署名を悪用した「Cobalt Strike loader」による標的型攻撃〜攻撃者グループAPT41 | LAC WATCH
  8. Oct 2020

    APT41-linked campaign infrastructure active in late October 2020

    Passive DNS data cited by LAC showed infrastructure at 192.109.98[.]187 was used in related campaign activity in late October 2020. The infrastructure was associated with the Microsoft-signed DLL-abusing Cobalt Strike loader campaign later assessed as likely tied to APT41.

    Microsoft社のデジタル署名を悪用した「Cobalt Strike loader」による標的型攻撃〜攻撃者グループAPT41 | LAC WATCH
  9. Jul 2020

    Targeted attacks using SigLoader begin

    LAC reported observing targeted attacks using the SigLoader malware loader from around July 2020. The loader abused Microsoft-signed DLL files and DLL side-loading to evade detection and execute payloads in memory.

    【緊急レポート】Microsoft社のデジタル署名ファイルを悪用する「SigLoader」による標的型攻撃を確認 | LAC WATCH
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Threat actors

1 linked

Affected products

1 linked
Cobalt Strike

Organizations

1 linked
Microsoft Corporation

Observables

35 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 35 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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