APT Campaigns Abused Microsoft-Signed DLLs to Load Cobalt Strike and Other Payloads
Attack Tradecraft · 4 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen May 21, 2021

Targeted intrusion campaigns used tampered Microsoft-signed DLLs to evade trust checks and launch malware through DLL side-loading and service hijacking. LAC researchers documented the SigLoader malware family modifying data in a file's certificate or overlay area while preserving Windows signature validation, allowing the DLL to still appear legitimately signed. The loader then decrypted and executed additional stages in memory using layered routines including XOR, custom DES, AES, and later RC4, with observed payloads including DelfsCake, GreetCake, and shellcode associated with Metasploit Framework or Cobalt Strike. In one case, the intrusion began with exploitation of an SSL-VPN vulnerability before the loader was deployed on a compromised endpoint.
A related campaign assessed as likely tied to APT41 used the same signed-DLL abuse technique to deliver Cobalt Strike Beacon, including a tampered KBDTAM131.DLL derived from UXLibRes.dll and malicious loading via the Windows IKEEXT service and wlbsctrl.dll. Researchers said the loader stored encrypted configuration data, API strings, offsets, and payload content with ChaCha20, then decrypted a Beacon linked to a leaked or cracked Cobalt Strike 4.x build using watermark 0x12345678 and C2 over HTTPS, with other samples using HTTP or DNS. The activity was also tied to a malicious shortcut file masquerading as a PDF, campaign infrastructure including 119.45.238[.]189 and 192.109.98[.]187, and detection guidance using Sigcheck, Autoruns, Windows event logs, YARA rules, and stricter Authenticode verification.


