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Researchers reported that a HelloXD ransomware variant used a previously uncommon technique to delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies (VSCs) by interacting directly with the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) Coordinator through COM objects. Unlike common approaches that invoke native tools such as vssadmin or wmic, or use WMI and PowerShell scripts, the sample abused Windows COM libraries in a way that resembles legitimate backup software, allowing it to remove all shadow copies and block restoration of prior file versions.
VMware said the sample also used SeBackupPrivilege and COM CLSIDs tied to the VSS Coordinator, and noted that the method had little or no vendor detection at the time because it overlaps with normal backup activity. The company linked similar shadow-copy deletion behavior to multiple ransomware families, including Conti, DarkGate, Diavol, Five Hands, BlackSun, Anchor, Somhoveran, MSILZilla, and Wana Decrypt0r 2.0, while separate reporting tied the activity to a newer HelloXD variant that differed from earlier versions by lacking exfiltration features and a MicroBackdoor component. Researchers warned that organizations should not rely on VSCs alone for recovery and should maintain offline backups because deleted shadow copies are generally not recoverable.
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VMware published a broader threat report categorizing ransomware Volume Shadow Copy deletion methods into native Windows binaries, scripting-based approaches, and direct COM object interaction. The report highlighted Hello ransomware's use of SeBackupPrivilege and the VssCoordinator COM interface to delete shadow copies and noted no vendor detections for that COM method at the time of writing.
VMware Threat Analysis Unit disclosed a newer HelloXD-like ransomware sample that deletes all Volume Shadow Copies through Windows COM libraries, a technique it said may be among the first seen in the wild. VMware also noted the sample differed from known HelloXD versions by lacking exfiltration functionality and a MicroBackdoor component.
Unit 42 reported in early June 2022 that HelloXD ransomware was likely developed by a Russian-speaking threat actor using the alias x4k.
VMware reported that Hello ransomware samples using direct COM interaction with the VSS Coordinator to delete all shadow copies had been circulating since at least mid-2021.
Microsoft introduced the Volume Shadow Copy Service with Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP, establishing the Windows backup snapshot feature later targeted by ransomware.
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Attackers are abusing Microsoft Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) to impair recovery ahead of ransomware deployment and to access copied `NTDS.dIT` data containing Active Directory credentials. In a Huntress investigation, PsExec-launched SYSTEM shells on a domain controller were followed by RDP-session enumeration, creation of VSS shadow copies, and an attempted deletion of the newly created copies; endpoint antivirus blocked the deletion attempt. The activity also included DNS enumeration and reconnaissance against another host, supporting an assessment of lateral movement and credential-access operations. VSS creation or deletion alone is not a reliable alert because backup, RMM, and administrative products commonly use the service; defenders should correlate VSS events with process lineage, privileged remote execution, reconnaissance, credential harvesting, and event timing.
Sep 14, 2026
Researchers documented **RegretLocker**, a ransomware family that targets Windows systems and stands out for mounting Hyper-V virtual hard disks such as `VHD` and `VHDX` through the Windows Virtual Storage API, then encrypting the files inside those disks instead of encrypting the container files directly. Victim files are renamed with the `.mouse` extension, and the malware drops a ransom note named `HOW TO RESTORE FILES.TXT`. The approach can accelerate encryption and improve impact in virtualized environments, while the malware also attempts to encrypt ordinary files, large files, USB-attached storage, and SMB-accessible network shares. Technical analysis found that RegretLocker uses **AES** for file encryption and retrieves an **RSA** public key from a Tor-based command-and-control server, with a hard-coded fallback key available when offline. It also deletes shadow copies and backups, disables recovery options, establishes persistence through the Windows `Run` registry key and a scheduled task, and uses the Windows Restart Manager API and `taskkill` to terminate processes or services that keep files open, while avoiding some remote-access and core system processes. Researchers said the code used to mount virtual disks appeared to draw on recently published security research, and they published hashes, network indicators, and a YARA rule to aid detection.
Aug 15, 2026
Researchers analyzed **HildaCrypt**, a Windows ransomware family written in C# that was distributed as a fake XAMPP installer named `xamp.exe` and obfuscated with **ConfuserEx**. Once launched, it created a GUID-named folder under `%AppData%\Roaming%`, ran a batch script, deleted shadow copies, and attempted to stop SQL, backup, and anti-malware services before encrypting files. The malware used **AES-256-CBC** for file encryption, appended the `.HCY!` extension, and stored the AES key and IV in each file after encrypting them with an embedded **RSA-2048** public key; it then dropped an HTML ransom note, `HILDACRYPTReadMe.html`, directing victims to contact the operator by email. A separate development reduced the threat to victims after the ransomware’s developer released HildaCrypt’s master private decryption keys. Researcher **GrujaRS** had initially classified a sample as a STOP ransomware variant, but the author later said it was a HildaCrypt variant, and **Michael Gillespie** confirmed the keys were valid and published a working decryptor. The developer claimed the malware was created for “fun” and educational purposes, said it had not been used against anyone, and indicated development was likely ending as they moved toward legitimate cybersecurity work.
Aug 15, 2026