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Kaspersky reported operational overlap between GreyEnergy and Zebrocy, linking the GreyEnergy/BlackEnergy activity cluster with a subset of Sofacy. Investigators found that both groups used the same command-and-control servers in mid-2018 and targeted the same industrial organization in Kazakhstan within days of each other, strengthening evidence that the operations were connected rather than coincidental.
The report said GreyEnergy spearphishing documents, including Seminar.rtf, exploited CVE-2017-0199 and CVE-2017-11882 to deliver follow-on payloads from infrastructure also used by Zebrocy. GreyEnergy was described as a successor to BlackEnergy with a focus on industrial and ICS targets, primarily in Ukraine, and the shared infrastructure, malware delivery chain, and victim overlap were cited as key indicators of a relationship between the two threat groups.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
8 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
ESET published a report in October 2018 describing activity it called GreyEnergy. The reporting helped establish GreyEnergy as a distinct cluster and successor to BlackEnergy.
Around June 28, 2018, a Zebrocy spearphishing document titled "(28.06.18) Izmeneniya v prikaz PK.doc" was sent to the same Kazakhstan industrial company targeted by GreyEnergy days earlier. The lure title translates to "Changes to order, Republic of Kazakhstan."
Around June 21, 2018, a GreyEnergy spearphishing document titled "Seminar.rtf" was sent to the Kazakhstan industrial organization. The lure exploited CVE-2017-0199 and led to a second-stage document exploiting CVE-2017-11882.
In June 2018, both GreyEnergy and Zebrocy used the server 193.23.181[.]151. The shared infrastructure was a key indicator highlighted in the overlap analysis.
One industrial company in Kazakhstan was attacked in June 2018 by both GreyEnergy and Zebrocy. The victim overlap was cited as evidence of a relationship between the two operations.
GreyEnergy used the server 185.217.0[.]124 between May and June 2018, including for a spearphishing document named "Seminar.rtf" that downloaded a GreyEnergy sample from an SMB path on that host. Kaspersky later identified the same server as also used by Zebrocy.
The Sofacy group began using Zebrocy malware for post-exploitation in mid-November 2015. The later overlap analysis links GreyEnergy infrastructure and targeting to this Sofacy subset.
BlackEnergy, also known as Sandworm, was involved in attacks against Ukrainian energy facilities that led to power outages. The report presents GreyEnergy as a successor to this group.
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A Sofacy-linked **Zebrocy** campaign targeted government, diplomatic, and related organizations across Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia with spearphishing emails carrying layered malware attachments. Reported targets included entities in **Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan**, with lures using shortcut files, archives, decoy documents, PowerShell scripts, and base64-encoded payloads to begin the infection chain. The operation introduced a new downloader written in **Go** that gathered detailed system information, sent it to a hardcoded command-and-control server, then retrieved additional **Zebrocy AutoIT/Delphi** payloads, established persistence, and deleted itself. Researchers said the activity showed both rising campaign volume and continued malware development within the Zebrocy cluster, even as more traditional Sofacy **SPLM/XAgent** activity appeared to be declining.
Aug 14, 2026
SentinelLabs reported that a **Zebrocy** campaign linked to **Sofacy/APT28** targeted organizations in Kazakhstan with malicious Microsoft Word documents masquerading as materials from **Kazchrome**. The lure files carried the same VBA macro, which decoded a base64-encoded Delphi payload named `wininition.exe`; once executed, the malware acted as a keylogger by installing a low-level keyboard hook. Two of the six analyzed documents were likely uploaded to VirusTotal from Kazakhstan by victims, indicating the lures were opened in the intended geography. The investigation identified two likely compromised domains used as command-and-control infrastructure and tied the activity to Zebrocy’s established tradecraft. SentinelLabs also documented methods for reversing the password-protected VBA macros and analyzing the Delphi malware with tools including **IDR** and **Ghidra**, and published hashes, URLs, and **YARA** rules to support detection and threat hunting for related intrusions.
Jun 29, 2026
ESET reported that the **BlackEnergy** malware family was used in targeted intrusions against organizations in **Ukraine and Poland**, linking the activity to a broader campaign focused on compromising selected victims in the region. The reporting described BlackEnergy as an established threat platform adapted for espionage and follow-on malicious activity, with attackers using it to gain footholds inside targeted networks. The campaign highlighted BlackEnergy’s continued evolution from earlier criminal use into a tool deployed in politically sensitive operations. The incidents underscored the risk to regional government and private-sector entities, showing that attackers were leveraging a known malware framework in focused attacks rather than indiscriminate mass infections.
Jun 29, 2026