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A cyberattack disrupted Iran’s railway system and defaced station displays with taunting messages that told stranded passengers to call the office number of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Researchers later reconstructed the operation, dubbed MeteorExpress, and found it used a previously unseen wiper malware family named Meteor to cripple systems across the rail environment. The disruption was followed by reported attacks on the website and computer systems of Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development.
SentinelOne said the attackers deployed the malware through Group Policy and a chain of CAB and RAR archives, batch scripts, and multiple payloads designed to wipe files, lock users out, disable recovery options, clear logs, and likely corrupt the MBR. The tooling combined destructive capabilities with configurable components that suggested the malware was built for reuse, while the operation itself indicated the actor likely had prior knowledge of the victim environment and conducted reconnaissance before launch. Researchers did not attribute the campaign to a known threat group, describing the operators as an apparently new actor with mixed signs of clumsy execution and notable sophistication.
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The day after the rail disruption, the attackers reportedly also targeted the website and computer systems of Iran's Ministry of Roads and Urban Development. This indicated the operation extended beyond the railway network.
On July 9, 2021, a destructive cyberattack paralyzed Iran's train system and displayed taunting messages on station schedule systems directing passengers to call the office number of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Researchers later named the campaign MeteorExpress and identified a previously unseen wiper malware called Meteor as a core component.
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Jul 12, 2026