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Researchers found a previously dormant command-and-control server tied to Flokibot distributing a new point-of-sale malware family dubbed LockPoS, which targeted PoS environments in Brazil and was designed to steal payment card data from memory. The malware uses a multi-stage loader chain that extracts embedded resources, decrypts them with AES-256-CBC, decompresses payloads, injects code into explorer.exe, and then loads the final LockPoS DLL.
LockPoS persists through a Windows Registry Run key, stores its initial configuration and C2 address in a resource, and communicates with its server over HTTP using structured data chunks. Researchers said the malware supports configuration updates, download-and-execute, self-update, and process injection, while its main function is scraping card track data and exfiltrating it to infrastructure associated with the host treasurehunter[.]at, linking the operation to earlier Flokibot activity and underscoring the continued risk PoS malware poses to retail, restaurant, and hotel organizations.
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4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The analyzed initial LockPoS sample had a compilation date of 2017-06-24. Researchers later identified it as a new point-of-sale malware family distributed through infrastructure tied to Flokibot.
FireEye published a description of the TREASUREHUNT point-of-sale malware family. NETSCOUT later noted a naming overlap between TREASUREHUNT and the LockPoS C2 host but assessed they were separate malware families.
Researchers identified a new PoS malware family they named LockPoS and documented its multi-stage loader, persistence, HTTP C2 communications, and card-track scraping behavior. Based on shared infrastructure and other indicators, they assessed that the same threat actor likely controlled both Flokibot and LockPoS, while distinguishing it from TREASUREHUNT.
Researchers revisiting a Flokibot campaign that had targeted point-of-sale systems in Brazil found that a previously dormant command-and-control server had resumed activity and begun distributing LockPoS. They observed LockPoS being distributed via the Flokibot botnet and sharing the host treasurehunter[.]at.
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Palo Alto Networks disclosed **FindPOS**, a Windows point-of-sale malware family built to steal payment card data from POS systems by scraping process memory for track data and sending the results to attacker-controlled servers over HTTP `POST`. Researchers identified at least nine variants compiled as early as late 2014, showing continued development across versions `2.1` through `6.04`. The malware persists with generated eight-character filenames, `Run` registry keys, and a mutex, and it filters processes by owner before scanning memory to improve the quality of stolen card data. Later FindPOS builds added broader intrusion capabilities, including **keylogging** in version `5.90` and the ability to download additional payloads, indicating operators were extending the malware beyond simple card scraping. Palo Alto also linked related samples to theft of **LogMeIn** credentials, suggesting support for gaining or maintaining access to retail environments. Trustwave’s reference to **Alina**, another POS malware strain, underscores the broader criminal focus on Windows-based payment systems as attackers continued refining malware aimed at harvesting cardholder data from retailers.
Aug 14, 2026
Visa detailed two 2020 intrusions at North American hospitality merchants in which attackers compromised user and administrator accounts, moved into cardholder data environments, and deployed point-of-sale malware to steal payment card data. In one case, the attackers used phishing, administrative tools, **PowerShell** loaders, and image files with appended shellcode to install **TinyPOS**; in another, they deployed a mix of **RtPOS**, **MMon/Kaptoxa**, and **PwnPOS** after using remote access tools and credential dumpers. The malware scraped **Track 1** and **Track 2** data from process memory, validated card numbers with the **Luhn** algorithm, and stored harvested data in local log files before exfiltration. Separate malware analysis found strong code and workflow overlaps between **TinyPOS** and the **ProLocker** ransomware family, suggesting the same threat actor may have developed and operated both. Researchers identified shared traits including PowerShell-based delivery, image-appended shellcode, similar staging conventions, and a distinctive shellcode decoding mechanism that appeared almost exclusively in samples tied to the two families. Additional similarities, such as six-character partial process-name lists and low-volume campaign patterns, reinforced the assessment that payment-card theft operations and ProLocker ransomware activity were likely connected, although shared infrastructure was not established.
Aug 15, 2026
Proofpoint disclosed a new point-of-sale malware family, **AbaddonPOS**, that steals payment card data by scraping track information from process memory on infected systems. The malware establishes persistence, uses basic obfuscation and process blacklisting to hinder analysis, and exfiltrates stolen card data to hardcoded command-and-control servers over a custom binary protocol. Researchers observed AbaddonPOS delivered through multi-stage infection chains involving **Vawtrak** and **TinyLoader**, with distribution tied to the **Angler exploit kit**, **Bedep**, and weaponized Microsoft Office documents. Proofpoint reported strong code-level similarities between TinyLoader and AbaddonPOS, indicating they are likely closely related and may have been developed by the same threat actor, while later findings also pointed to earlier variants and infrastructure overlaps with malware including **Fleercivet/Bagsu** and **ReactorBot/Rovnix**.
Aug 14, 2026