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Researchers Detail New Windows Driver Signature Enforcement Bypass Techniques

Attack Tradecraft · 4 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 12, 2022

Researchers Detail New Windows Driver Signature Enforcement Bypass Techniques

Fortinet disclosed two techniques that can let attackers load unsigned kernel drivers on Windows systems by tampering with Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) at runtime, despite protections such as Code Integrity, PatchGuard, Virtualization-based Security, and Microsoft’s recommended vulnerable-driver block rules. The methods, dubbed Page Swapping and Callback Swapping, abuse kernel write access—often obtained through vulnerable third-party drivers—to redirect protected Code Integrity policy data or replace validation callbacks in ntoskrnl.exe, causing malicious drivers to be accepted as trusted.

The report says Microsoft’s Kernel Data Protection (KDP) and driver blocklists raise the bar but do not fully stop runtime DSE tampering when Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) is not enabled, because driver validation can still be manipulated in the normal kernel. The findings build on a long history of DSE bypass tradecraft, including Turla-linked tooling such as TDL, a loader that mapped specially crafted unsigned drivers into kernel memory without modifying standard Code Integrity variables, underscoring how kernel-level access and vulnerable drivers remain a practical path to stealthy persistence and defense evasion on Windows.

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Event timeline

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Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

2 events · Jul 8, 2020 – Aug 12, 2022
  1. Aug 12, 20224y ago

    Fortinet publishes new DSE tampering techniques

    Fortinet published research describing two new Driver Signature Enforcement tampering methods, "Page Swapping" and "Callback Swapping," for loading unsigned kernel drivers despite Microsoft protections. The post also explains why HVCI remains the strongest mitigation and outlines defender detection ideas.

    The Swan Song for Driver Signature Enforcement Tampering | Fortinet Blog
  2. Jul 8, 20206y ago

    Microsoft introduces Kernel Data Protection

    Microsoft introduced Kernel Data Protection as a platform security technology to prevent kernel data corruption. The Fortinet analysis later cites it as a mitigation relevant to Driver Signature Enforcement tampering.

    Introducing Kernel Data Protection, a new platform security technology for preventing data corruption | Microsoft Security Blog
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Affected products

1 linked
Windows

Organizations

1 linked
Microsoft Corporation
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