Researchers Detail New Windows Driver Signature Enforcement Bypass Techniques
Attack Tradecraft · 4 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Aug 12, 2022

Fortinet disclosed two techniques that can let attackers load unsigned kernel drivers on Windows systems by tampering with Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) at runtime, despite protections such as Code Integrity, PatchGuard, Virtualization-based Security, and Microsoft’s recommended vulnerable-driver block rules. The methods, dubbed Page Swapping and Callback Swapping, abuse kernel write access—often obtained through vulnerable third-party drivers—to redirect protected Code Integrity policy data or replace validation callbacks in ntoskrnl.exe, causing malicious drivers to be accepted as trusted.
The report says Microsoft’s Kernel Data Protection (KDP) and driver blocklists raise the bar but do not fully stop runtime DSE tampering when Hypervisor-protected Code Integrity (HVCI) is not enabled, because driver validation can still be manipulated in the normal kernel. The findings build on a long history of DSE bypass tradecraft, including Turla-linked tooling such as TDL, a loader that mapped specially crafted unsigned drivers into kernel memory without modifying standard Code Integrity variables, underscoring how kernel-level access and vulnerable drivers remain a practical path to stealthy persistence and defense evasion on Windows.


