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Researchers detailed multiple destructive malware families used against Ukrainian targets, linking AcidRain, AcidPour, and CaddyWiper to attacks designed to disable systems and erase data during Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trellix reported that AcidRain was used to disrupt Viasat KA-SAT satellite modems, while the newer Linux wiper AcidPour adds features including self-overwrite, a configurable execution delay, and recursive wiping of /boot. The firm assessed with medium confidence that AcidPour was derived from or closely modeled on AcidRain, and said the activity broadly aligns with a pro-Russian actor, though it did not attribute the attacks to a specific group.
On the Windows side, Morphisec said CaddyWiper struck several dozen systems in a limited number of Ukrainian organizations and was likely deployed through Group Policy Object, indicating prior compromise of an Active Directory server. The malware was built to destroy user files and attached drives, and when executed with administrative privileges it also corrupts physical drive partition information, leaving the operating system unusable. Researchers noted that CaddyWiper selectively avoids damaging non-domain-controller systems and dynamically resolves Windows APIs through the PEB to hinder detection, placing it among a broader run of wipers including WhisperGate, HermeticWiper, and IsaacWiper.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Trellix published an analysis comparing the Linux wipers AcidRain and AcidPour, concluding with medium confidence that AcidPour is based on AcidRain's source code or closely replicates it. The report also notes broader use of wipers in the conflicts in Ukraine and Israel and attributes the related attacks at a broad level to a pro-Russian actor.
A sample of the Linux wiper AcidPour was first submitted to VirusTotal. Trellix identifies the sample as SHA-256 6a8824048417abe156a16455b8e29170f8347312894fde2aabe644c4995d7728.
A sample of the Linux wiper AcidRain was first submitted to VirusTotal. Trellix identifies the sample as SHA-256 9b4dfaca873961174ba935fddaf696145afe7bbf5734509f95feb54f3584fd9a.
CaddyWiper was first detected attacking Ukrainian infrastructure and was observed on several dozen systems across a limited number of organizations. The malware was reportedly deployed via Group Policy Object, implying prior compromise of an Active Directory server.
AcidRain was used to brick Viasat KA-SAT satellite modems, disrupting satellite communications at the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Trellix broadly attributes the attack activity to a pro-Russian actor targeting Ukrainian entities.
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Multiple destructive malware campaigns struck Ukraine around the start of Russia’s invasion, with **HermeticWiper**, **IsaacWiper**, **CaddyWiper**, **WhisperGate**, and **DoubleZero** used against government, financial, and other organizations. Researchers reported that HermeticWiper corrupted boot records and partition data by abusing a legitimate EaseUS driver, while CaddyWiper and DoubleZero erased user data, partition information, and critical registry or boot components, often while deliberately sparing domain controllers to preserve attacker access. Several incidents appeared to follow prior compromise of victim networks, including abuse of **Active Directory**, scheduled execution, and in some cases worm-like spread via **HermeticWizard**; HermeticRansom was also deployed as a likely decoy alongside destructive activity. The destructive operations extended beyond enterprise Windows environments. **AcidRain** was used in the attack on Viasat’s **KA-SAT** network, wiping satellite modems in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe by recursively destroying filesystems and storage devices, while the **Industroyer2** operation targeted a Ukrainian energy provider with malware built to communicate over **IEC-104** and cut power, paired with Windows, Linux, and Solaris wipers including **CaddyWiper**, **ORCSHRED**, **SOLOSHRED**, and **AWFULSHRED**. Across the reporting, defenders were urged to watch for mass file overwrites, shadow copy and event log deletion, MBR or partition changes, suspicious use of administrative tooling and group policy, and to maintain tested, isolated backups to recover from destructive attacks.
Aug 15, 2026
Destructive malware operations against organizations in Ukraine included **CaddyWiper** and a separate pseudo-ransomware campaign that posed as extortion but was built to permanently destroy data. Researchers said CaddyWiper shared no code with earlier payloads such as **HermeticWiper**, but it similarly targeted user files, mapped drives, and disk partitions while avoiding execution on primary domain controllers through a domain-controller kill switch. U.S. authorities warned that multiple malware families were being used in coordinated attacks on Ukrainian networks, underscoring the risk of disruptive and irreversible data loss. Technical analysis showed the attacks relied on enterprise compromise and staged payload delivery rather than simple smash-and-grab deployment. CaddyWiper checked domain-controller status via the `DsRolePrimaryDomainInformation` API and wiped disks using low-level Windows functions, while defenders observed destructive payloads being pushed at scale through compromised **Group Policy Objects** after attackers obtained domain administrator access. In the pseudo-ransomware case, the intrusion chain used an MBR wiper, a downloader retrieving payloads from Discord CDN, a .NET loader that disabled Microsoft Defender and used process hollowing, and a final C-based wiper that overwrote files across 191 extensions before shutting systems down, leaving victims with no practical recovery path despite the ransom note.
Aug 15, 2026
Ukraine said Russia-linked threat groups intensified cyberattacks against its critical infrastructure, government, communications, energy, and humanitarian logistics networks, using phishing and multiple destructive malware families including **HermeticWiper**, **IsaacWiper**, **CaddyWiper**, and **DoubleZero**. CERT-UA attributed activity during the period to several tracked clusters such as `UAC-0056`, `UAC-0051/UNC1151`, `UAC-0028/APT28`, and `UAC-0033/XDSpy`, and said the operations were tied to actors affiliated with Russian and Belarusian state structures and proxy entities. Ukrainian officials also reported targeting of organizations documenting war crimes and of European charities supporting refugees, underscoring that the campaign extended beyond domestic wartime targets. Researchers separately documented destructive intrusions in which **HermeticWiper** and **CaddyWiper** were deployed through Windows Group Policy after attackers had already gained broad control of victim networks. HermeticWiper hit finance organizations, government contractors, and other Ukrainian systems while also affecting some machines in Latvia and Lithuania; it corrupted local data and the master boot record, leaving devices unable to boot. In parallel, CERT-UA warned that phishing emails posing as antivirus updates delivered **Cobalt Strike** along with the **GraphSteel** and **GrimPlant** backdoors, a campaign linked with medium confidence to `UAC-0056`, showing that espionage, access operations, and destructive attacks were being conducted in tandem.
Aug 15, 2026