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PwC reported an ongoing attribution effort into a threat actor that allegedly trojanized OpenHardwareMonitor and used the backdoored software to target a poorly covered geographic region. Investigators said they had not established firm ties to any publicly known state-linked or named APT group, but documented a broad intrusion set that included PowerShell, Visual Basic, cmd.exe, BITS jobs, XSL script processing, template injection, host and network discovery, and data theft over the command-and-control channel. The report also published indicators of compromise including file hashes, domains, IP infrastructure, and a ProtonMail address linked to the activity.
The campaign’s use of Visual Basic aligns with a long-established tradecraft pattern tracked in MITRE ATT&CK as T1059.005, which covers execution through VBA, VBScript, and related Visual Basic interpreters. MITRE documents show the technique has been repeatedly used by espionage actors, ransomware operators, and destructive threat groups for payload delivery, persistence, reconnaissance, and command execution, including in operations attributed to Sandworm, Lazarus, and APT29. In this case, the Visual Basic component appears as one element of a wider toolset supporting execution, discovery, and exfiltration in the suspected supply-chain-style intrusion.
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4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The PwC blog states it complements a talk presented at the SANS CTI Summit on 27 January 2021. That presentation concerned the threat activity later discussed as the in-Tur-est actor, including the backdoored OpenHardwareMonitor targeting.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created VBScripts to run on an SSH server. This reflects continued operational use of Visual Basic-based scripting in the follow-on power grid intrusion.
During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a VBA script called vba_macro.exe. The macro dropped FONTCACHE.DAT, identified as the primary BlackEnergy implant, along with rundll32.exe, NTUSER.log, and desktop.ini.
PwC reported that attribution for the in-Tur-est threat actor remained in the technical clustering phase of its 4C model, with no clear links to any well-known government- or organization-attributed APT group. The report also disclosed ATT&CK mappings and indicators of compromise including hashes, domains, IP addresses, and a ProtonMail address tied to the activity.
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Reporting across multiple research teams described a surge of distinct, ongoing intrusion campaigns rather than a single unified incident. **Check Point** reported on **Silver Dragon**, a Chinese-aligned activity cluster assessed as operating under the broader **APT41** umbrella, targeting organizations in **Southeast Asia and Europe** (notably government) via exploitation of public-facing servers and phishing, then deploying **Cobalt Strike**, **DNS tunneling**, and a new Google Drive–based backdoor (**GearDoor**) alongside custom tools (**SSHcmd** and **SliverScreen**) for remote access and screen capture. **Microsoft** detailed separate February 2026 phishing campaigns by an unknown actor that used meeting/invoice-style lures and **EV code-signed** malware (certificate issued to **TrustConnect Software PTY LTD**) masquerading as common workplace apps (e.g., `msteams.exe`, `adobereader.exe`, `zoomworkspace.clientsetup.exe`) to install legitimate **RMM** tooling (**ScreenConnect**, **Tactical RMM**, **Mesh Agent**) for persistent access and lateral movement. Other reporting highlighted additional, unrelated campaigns and tradecraft: **ClearSky** described a Russian-aligned operation targeting **Ukraine** using a phishing-delivered ZIP/HTA chain that drops a .NET loader (**BadPaw**) and backdoor (**MeowMeow**) with **.NET Reactor** obfuscation, parameter-gated execution, and sandbox/tooling checks (with low-confidence linkage to **APT28**). **Cofense**-reported activity (via SC Media) showed phishing that weaponizes **Windows File Explorer + WebDAV** using URL/LNK shortcuts to pull payloads (notably **AsyncRAT**, **XWorm**, **DcRAT**) and infrastructure including **Cloudflare Tunnel** domains hosting WebDAV servers. **Cisco Talos**-reported **Dohdoor** activity (UAT-10027) targeted US **education and healthcare**, using PowerShell→batch→DLL sideloading via legitimate executables (e.g., `Fondue.exe`, `mblctr.exe`, `ScreenClippingHost.exe`) and **DNS-over-HTTPS** to Cloudflare for C2 discovery and tunneling. Separately, **Zscaler** reported **ScarCruft**’s *Ruby Jumper* campaign using **Zoho WorkDrive** for C2 and removable media components to reach air-gapped systems, while another Zscaler report analyzed **Dust Specter** targeting Iraqi government officials with password-protected RAR delivery and modular implants. **Qianxin XLab** assessed sanctioned infrastructure provider **Funnull** resurfacing to support scam/criminal supply chains and potential **MacCMS**-related supply-chain activity, and **F5 Labs** summarized **APT42**’s **TAMECAT** PowerShell backdoor focused on Edge/Chrome credential theft with C2 over Telegram/Discord/HTTPS and specific file/hash indicators. (A separate Help Net Security item on a Microsoft Defender onboarding tool is product/administrative news and not part of the threat-campaign reporting.)
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple campaigns using trojanized versions of **PuTTY** and other legitimate tools to compromise high-value users, including administrators, engineers, and technical support staff. LevelBlue said a recent malvertising operation pushed fake PuTTY installers through **Bing sponsored ads** and typosquatted domains such as `puttyy[.]org` and `puttysystems[.]com`, with a signed malicious executable creating scheduled-task persistence, dropping `twain_96.dll` and `green.dll`, and communicating with infrastructure linked to **Broomstick/Oyster** malware. In affected environments, the intrusions progressed to hands-on-keyboard activity, reconnaissance via `cmd.exe`, and **Kerberoasting** using an in-memory script derived from PowerSploit’s `Invoke-Kerberoast` to obtain RC4-HMAC Kerberos service tickets for offline cracking. Microsoft previously described a related tradecraft pattern in which North Korean state-backed **ZINC**—now tracked as **Diamond Sleet**—used social engineering on LinkedIn and WhatsApp to deliver weaponized open-source software, including **PuTTY**, **KiTTY**, **TightVNC Viewer**, **Sumatra PDF Reader**, and **muPDF**, to targets in media, defense, aerospace, and IT services across several countries. That activity deployed the **ZetaNile** malware family using DLL search-order hijacking, staged payloads, persistence, lateral movement, and data exfiltration, while separate analysis of Lazarus-linked **BLINDINGCAN** showed the group’s broader capability set for encrypted command-and-control, remote command execution, file transfer, and system discovery. Together, the reporting shows attackers repeatedly abusing trusted admin and open-source tools as malware delivery vehicles to gain persistence, steal credentials, and expand access inside victim networks.
Aug 15, 2026
Multiple early-2026 campaigns highlight increasingly **low-noise initial access** and **living-off-the-land** execution on Windows endpoints. CyStack reported activity attributed to **APT-Q-27 (GoldenEyeDog)** targeting financial institutions via a corporate support workflow: a user clicked a malicious link delivered through a **Zendesk ticket**, leading to download of an executable masquerading as an image/`.pif` file (aided by Windows’ hidden-extension defaults). The malware was signed with a **revoked certificate** that still appeared trusted due to a valid timestamp, and its modular backdoor/C2 infrastructure overlapped with prior APT-Q-27 activity, enabling stealthy persistence and control without triggering common endpoint alerts. Separately, Securonix described the **Dead#Vax** multistage campaign using phishing links to **VHD files hosted on IPFS**, where mounting/opening the VHD triggers **Windows Script Files**, obfuscated batch, and **PowerShell** loaders to support encrypted data theft and conceal execution logic, culminating in **AsyncRAT** deployment for credential theft, surveillance, and follow-on intrusion. In another targeted operation, Zscaler ThreatLabz linked **Operation Neusploit** to **APT28**, exploiting **CVE-2026-21509** (Microsoft Office/365 **OLE** bypass) via crafted **RTF** documents to drop payloads including **MiniDoor** (Outlook-focused collection and mailbox manipulation, including exfiltration to attacker-controlled email accounts) and **PixyNetLoader** (reported to use steganography). A separate “ThreatsDay” bulletin is a multi-story roundup and does not provide additional, specific corroboration on these same campaigns beyond mentioning adjacent themes (e.g., AsyncRAT/C2) in a broader news digest.
Jun 29, 2026