Loading story…
Investigations by GitHub Security Lab and npm documented two significant open source supply-chain compromises in which attackers poisoned trusted developer workflows and downstream software artifacts. GitHub traced the Octopus Scanner malware to infected NetBeans projects that altered nbproject/build-impl.xml, dropped a malicious cache.dat, and spread by backdooring both build outputs and existing JAR dependencies, allowing cloned repositories and compiled artifacts to carry the infection forward. GitHub identified 26 open source repositories serving infected code and observed variants that added persistence on Linux and Windows and, in some cases, deployed a remote-access trojan through command-and-control infrastructure.
npm separately disclosed that the widely used event-stream package was compromised after a social-engineering takeover of package maintainership introduced the malicious dependency flatmap-stream@0.1.1 into event-stream@3.3.6. The payload was designed to tamper with Copay release builds, decrypt hidden JavaScript in memory, and steal wallet data and private keys from high-value cryptocurrency accounts, with exfiltration sent to 111.90.151.134. npm removed the malicious packages and seized control of event-stream, while Copay confirmed that versions 5.0.2 through 5.1.0 had shipped with the malicious code.
Trace attribution and downstream blast radius.
7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
GitHub received a report from researcher JJ about GitHub-hosted repositories actively serving malware-infected open source projects. This triggered an investigation by GitHub's Security Incident Response Team into the malware later named Octopus Scanner.
npm's security team was notified that a malicious package had been introduced into the popular event-stream module. The malicious code was described as highly targeted at Copay developers and their release environment.
A new maintainer added flatmap-stream 0.1.1 as a direct dependency of event-stream version 3.3.6, marking the key supply-chain compromise step in the npm incident. npm described the broader intrusion as beginning with a social-engineering takeover of event-stream maintainership.
GitHub assessed that an earlier Octopus Scanner variant likely dated to 2018 infected local systems directly rather than modifying classes in built JAR files. That variant reportedly downloaded a RAT-like tool from ecc.freeddns.org and san.strangled.net.
During its investigation, GitHub found 26 open source projects that had been backdoored and were actively serving malicious code. GitHub also identified multiple malware variants, including one analyzed as version 3.2.01, and noted inactive command-and-control servers at the time of analysis.
Copay later confirmed that the malicious code had been deployed in versions 5.0.2 through 5.1.0, reversing its earlier statement that no public builds were affected. BitPay advised users not to run or open those Copay versions.
After triaging the malware, npm removed flatmap-stream and event-stream@3.3.6 from the registry and took ownership of the event-stream package to prevent further abuse. npm also advised users to audit dependencies and update away from the impacted version.
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.
Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 17 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.
See attribution and downstream blast radius, and whether this package or vendor reaches your builds.
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
Open-source software supply chain risk continued to escalate, with reporting citing **454,600+** newly identified malicious packages across major repositories (including **PyPI, npm, Maven Central, NuGet, and Hugging Face**) and tactics ranging from **credential theft** to **multi-stage attacks** and even early **self-replicating** package malware. The activity reportedly concentrated heavily in **npm**, including high-volume “ecosystem flooding” (e.g., single accounts publishing **150,000+** malicious packages in days) and **hijacking of trusted projects**, exploiting developer reliance on superficial trust signals such as package names, READMEs, and download counts. Separately, researchers disclosed **“PackageGate”** vulnerabilities in JavaScript package managers (**npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun**) that can bypass common post-incident defenses—namely `--ignore-scripts` and lockfile integrity—enabling malicious code execution via compromised dependencies. Koi Security reported six issues; **pnpm, vlt, and Bun** shipped fixes, while **npm** reportedly treated the behavior as expected. In parallel, threat actors abused **GitHub’s fork architecture** to distribute a spoofed *GitHub Desktop* installer promoted via search ads; execution deployed **HijackLoader** and established persistence via a **scheduled task**, underscoring that supply chain threats extend beyond package registries into developer tooling distribution channels.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported two distinct software supply-chain abuse paths that can make malicious code appear to originate from trusted sources. GMO Cybersecurity by Ierae described an active campaign dubbed **“repo squatting”** that abuses how GitHub renders and links commits from forks: a commit made in an attacker-controlled fork can be viewed under the upstream project’s URL structure, enabling convincing links like `github.com/<official-org>/<repo>/commit/<hash>` that appear to belong to the official repository. The campaign targeted the *GitHub Desktop* project by distributing a trojanized installer carrying **HijackLoader**, with the malicious download link presented in a way that could mislead users and some security tooling into believing it came from the official repo. Separately, Koi researchers disclosed **PackageGate** weaknesses in JavaScript dependency tooling that allow bypassing npm’s post–**Shai-Hulud** mitigations when installing **Git-based dependencies**. They reported that a malicious `.npmrc` in a Git dependency can override the `git` binary path, enabling **code execution even when lifecycle scripts are disabled** (e.g., `--ignore-scripts=true`), affecting multiple tools (including *pnpm*, *vlt*, *Bun*, and *npm*). Vendors reportedly addressed the issue in the non-npm tools, while npm closed the report as “works as expected,” and researchers cited evidence of prior proof-of-concept abuse (e.g., reverse shell) indicating practical exploitation risk for organizations relying on Git dependencies in CI/CD and developer environments.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple **software supply chain** threats targeting developers via public package ecosystems. Tenable analyzed a malicious npm package, **`ambar-src`**, that reached roughly **50,000 downloads** in days before removal; it executed during installation via **malicious `preinstall` behavior**, used evasion techniques, and dropped OS-specific payloads for Windows, Linux, and macOS, with typosquatting assessed as the likely lure (mimicking *`ember-source`*). Separate reporting described a campaign using **malicious NuGet packages** (e.g., **NCryptYo**, **DOMOAuth2_**, **IRAOAuth2.0**, **SimpleWriter_**) that impersonated legitimate .NET libraries, executed code on assembly load, and established local proxying/backdoor behavior to facilitate credential theft and persistence in ASP.NET environments. Additional coverage warned of an npm “worm-like” propagation pattern impacting **CI pipelines and AI coding tools**, reinforcing that developer tooling and build systems are high-risk choke points where a single poisoned dependency can spread quickly across environments. While the broader set of articles also included unrelated breach, ransomware, and policy items, the developer-focused supply chain reporting consistently emphasized that **installation-time execution** and **typosquatting/impersonation** enable compromise even when developers never directly call the malicious code, and that traditional detection can lag (e.g., low initial antivirus detection rates for obfuscated .NET payloads).
Jun 29, 2026