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Researchers detailed ATMii (Backdoor.Win32.ATMii), an ATM malware family designed to make infected machines dispense cash on command. The malware was shared by a financial-sector partner and consists of two components: an injector executable and an injected DLL that targets the proprietary atmapp.exe process and hooks XFS functionality through msxfs.dll. Once running, ATMii can scan for the cash dispenser service, collect cassette information, dispense a specified amount in a chosen currency, and delete its command file after execution.
The malware requires direct access to the target ATM, either over the network or through physical access such as a USB device, underscoring the continued risk of local and internal compromise in ATM environments. Researchers described the code as relatively unsophisticated and noted signs such as a likely fake 2013 compilation timestamp and lack of support for Windows XP, despite that operating system remaining common in ATMs at the time. Recommended defenses included application whitelisting and device control to block unauthorized binaries and removable media used in cash-out attacks.
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Researchers first received samples of the ATMii ATM malware family from a financial-industry partner. The malware was designed to enable cash dispensing from infected ATMs.
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Investigators tied a targeted ATM cash-out intrusion at a Russian bank to **ATMitch**, a malware family designed to remotely administer ATMs from inside a bank network. In the incident, attackers gained access to the bank environment, reached ATMs over **RDP**, and deployed the malware as `tv.dll`, later removing it to hinder recovery. Although the original executables were not preserved, forensic analysis of ATM hard drives recovered log files and deleted filenames that allowed researchers to identify the tool and reconstruct its operation. ATMitch uses the **XFS** library to send dispenser instructions to cash machines through a one-character instruction file named `command.txt`, giving operators a simple way to trigger cash withdrawals on compatible devices. The case aligns with broader reporting on ATM cash-out malware, including material associated with **Operation Fast Cash** and **Hidden Cobra**, underscoring how attackers have used specialized malware to manipulate ATM infrastructure and dispense cash directly from compromised banking environments.
Aug 14, 2026
Researchers identified **ATMJaDi**, a targeted Java-based ATM malware used to cash out machines in Latin America after samples were uploaded from **Mexico** and later **Colombia**. Unlike most ATM malware, it does not rely on standard ATM middleware such as `XFS`, `JXFS`, or `CSC`; instead, it abuses **proprietary Java classes** embedded in a victim bank’s ATM software, making it effective only in a narrow set of environments. The malware was observed packaged as `INJX_PURE.jar` and was designed to interact directly with the ATM control process. Once installed, ATMJaDi injects into the ATM application and starts an **HTTP server** that can trigger cash dispensing, execute JavaScript, load additional JAR files, enumerate JVM classes, and run Windows shell commands through `cmd.exe`. Researchers said the malware requires prior installation and network access to the targeted ATM, indicating the operators likely first compromised the bank’s internal infrastructure to reach ATM-connected networks. The code’s multilingual terminal messages included awkward Russian phrasing assessed as a likely **false flag**, while the malware’s use of custom bank-specific classes suggested the attackers had detailed knowledge of the victim ATM environment and possibly access to source code or a similarly configured test system.
Aug 15, 2026
Kaspersky Lab reported that the **Tyupkin** malware infected more than 50 ATMs, primarily **Microsoft Windows 32-bit** machines from a major manufacturer, and enabled criminals with physical access to authenticate to the terminal, inspect how much cash was loaded in each cassette, and force the machine to dispense **40 notes** from a selected cassette. Investigators said the malware was installed using a **bootable CD**, persisted through a Windows **Run** registry key, and interacted with the dispenser through the standard ATM library `MSXFS.dll`. The campaign was concentrated in Eastern Europe, but telemetry suggested the malware had also surfaced in the **United States, India, and China**. Kaspersky said Tyupkin operated only during specific nighttime windows and used per-session keys to restrict unauthorized use, while later variants added **anti-debugging**, **anti-emulation**, and the ability to disable **McAfee Solidcore**. The findings highlighted a shift from card skimming toward direct attacks on banks through ATM cash-out operations, prompting recommendations for stronger physical ATM security, non-default locks and keys, functioning alarms, and dedicated security software.
Jun 29, 2026