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ESET reported that the Win32/Redyms trojan, tracked from January 2013, operated as a search-result hijacker that primarily infected users in the United States and Canada and monetized traffic by redirecting victims to malicious advertisements and links. The malware altered browser search results by routing requests through its command-and-control infrastructure and changing the URLs presented to users, turning ordinary web searches into a revenue stream for the operators.
Researchers said Redyms shared notable code and behavior with Win32/Agent.TJO and the TDL4 malware family, indicating a technical lineage or reuse of components. The trojan used RC4-encrypted communications, a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to produce command-and-control domains, code injection into active processes and browsers, and API hooking in mswsock.dll to manipulate browser traffic and maintain control over redirected search activity.
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Researchers started tracking the Win32/Redyms trojan family at the beginning of January 2013. The malware was described as a search-result hijacking trojan spreading mainly in the United States and Canada.
Based on the timing of domain registrations, the analysis indicates Win32/Redyms was likely already being distributed at the end of December 2012.
The first domains generated by the Win32/Redyms domain generation algorithm were registered in mid-December 2012 or early January 2013, indicating the infrastructure for the malware was being set up.
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Trellix reported a phishing campaign that abuses the Windows `search-ms` and `search` URI protocol handlers to push victims from emails, HTML attachments, PDFs, or compromised websites into Windows Explorer views populated with attacker-controlled remote files. The activity relies on JavaScript or script-based redirects to remote WebDAV searches, where malicious `.lnk` files are presented as familiar local search results, lowering suspicion and increasing the likelihood of execution. Researchers observed multiple delivery and execution chains involving HTML, PowerShell, ISO, ZIP, DLL, VBS, and EXE files, with payloads ultimately deploying **AsyncRAT** and **Remcos RAT**. The campaign used SSL-encrypted traffic, rapidly rotated infrastructure and files, and disguised artifacts with deceptive filenames and icons; in some cases, execution was triggered through `regsvr32.exe` or PowerShell. Trellix said the technique can provide initial access from a simple URL visit and recommended mitigating the threat by disabling the vulnerable URI handlers through registry removal.
Aug 1, 2026
Kaspersky reported that the **Reductor** Trojan, a malware family linked by code similarities to **COMpfun** and tentatively associated with **Turla**, compromised victims by patching browser and system pseudo-random number generator functions in memory. That let the malware insert encrypted, victim-specific identifiers into the TLS `client_random` field without altering packets directly, enabling operators to recognize encrypted sessions and potentially support interception workflows. The campaign primarily targeted users in **Russia** and **Belarus**, and Reductor also installed root certificates, supported remote certificate updates, and maintained persistence through an **LSA notification package** while communicating with command-and-control servers over **HTTP POST** using **AES-128**-encrypted host identifiers. Investigators said victims were infected through trojanized software installers downloaded over **HTTP** from warez sites or through secondary delivery from systems already compromised by COMpfun. Kaspersky assessed that the attackers likely controlled victims’ network channels and replaced legitimate installers on the fly before delivery. The activity highlighted a stealthy persistence and traffic-marking approach consistent with techniques such as **COM object hijacking** and other low-visibility Windows persistence methods, underscoring how the operators combined installer tampering, certificate abuse, and in-memory browser manipulation to track and compromise protected web traffic.
Aug 15, 2026
Researchers detailed a phishing campaign that used an **SVG attachment** to launch JavaScript in the victim’s browser, drop an HTM file, and abuse the Windows `search-ms` handler with a **WebDAV** path to fetch additional stages. The infection chain pulled a VBScript, an obfuscated batch file, and Python-based payloads protected with **Pyarmor 9**, which analysts reverse engineered by unpacking the runtime’s AES-GCM and marshal customizations. The unpacked Python code decrypted **RC4-protected shellcode**, allocated executable memory, and launched a multi-stage sequence that included a **laZzzy-generated injector** targeting `notepad.exe`, more shellcode, and final **.NET malware** delivering **DcRat, AsyncRAT, XWorm RAT, and PureHVNC**. The tradecraft closely matches activity previously attributed to **DDGroup**, a long-running cybercrime actor tied to phishing campaigns that weaponize `search-ms` and WebDAV to present attacker-hosted files as local search results. Prior reporting linked the group to commodity malware including **XWorm, AsyncRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRat, Remcos, NetWire, Warzone RAT/AveMaria RAT, and ModiLoader/DBatLoader**, along with dynamic DNS infrastructure, open-source tooling such as **Freeze.rs** and **dufs**, and repeated process injection into `notepad.exe`. Researchers said the actor’s infrastructure spans more than 110 dynamic DNS domains and 94 IP addresses since 2019, and that observed domains and URLs from the newer campaign were reported to **URLhaus** to speed blocking.
Aug 15, 2026