Windows Evasion Research Highlights ETW, Handle, and Entry-Point Hijacking Gaps
Attack Tradecraft · 7 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen May 13, 2026

Multiple public research reports detailed how attackers can evade Windows security monitoring by abusing native APIs, loader behavior, and application logging. White Knight Labs and XPN documented techniques to suppress or bypass Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) visibility in .NET and Windows processes, while separate research showed that access-mask-based detections can be defeated with DuplicateHandle by first requesting only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE and then cloning a more privileged handle to targets such as LSASS or winlogon. Microsoft documentation for CreateProcessA also appeared in the reference set because process creation remains central to many payload chains, including shellcode that ultimately launches command shells or follow-on tooling.
Additional reports showed how attackers can blend execution into legitimate Windows behavior and trusted software. iPurple described EntryPoint Hijacking, in which a loaded DLL's entry point is overwritten so malicious code runs during normal thread creation or loader activity, reducing obvious injection signals and complicating EDR detection. NVISO separately analyzed Metasploit reverse-shell shellcode that walks the PEB and resolves APIs such as LoadLibraryA, networking functions, and CreateProcessA, while Hunt & Hackett showed that ConnectWise Control/ScreenConnect can be used for intrusion activity and that its own event logging can be disabled by patching ScreenConnect.Core.dll. Together, the reports underscore that defenders must validate loader integrity, monitor low-visibility handle requests and memory writes, and avoid relying on a single telemetry source such as ETW or application-generated event logs.


