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Windows Evasion Research Highlights ETW, Handle, and Entry-Point Hijacking Gaps

Attack Tradecraft · 7 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen May 13, 2026

Windows Evasion Research Highlights ETW, Handle, and Entry-Point Hijacking Gaps

Multiple public research reports detailed how attackers can evade Windows security monitoring by abusing native APIs, loader behavior, and application logging. White Knight Labs and XPN documented techniques to suppress or bypass Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) visibility in .NET and Windows processes, while separate research showed that access-mask-based detections can be defeated with DuplicateHandle by first requesting only PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE and then cloning a more privileged handle to targets such as LSASS or winlogon. Microsoft documentation for CreateProcessA also appeared in the reference set because process creation remains central to many payload chains, including shellcode that ultimately launches command shells or follow-on tooling.

Additional reports showed how attackers can blend execution into legitimate Windows behavior and trusted software. iPurple described EntryPoint Hijacking, in which a loaded DLL's entry point is overwritten so malicious code runs during normal thread creation or loader activity, reducing obvious injection signals and complicating EDR detection. NVISO separately analyzed Metasploit reverse-shell shellcode that walks the PEB and resolves APIs such as LoadLibraryA, networking functions, and CreateProcessA, while Hunt & Hackett showed that ConnectWise Control/ScreenConnect can be used for intrusion activity and that its own event logging can be disabled by patching ScreenConnect.Core.dll. Together, the reports underscore that defenders must validate loader integrity, monitor low-visibility handle requests and memory writes, and avoid relying on a single telemetry source such as ETW or application-generated event logs.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

8 events · 2017 – May 13, 2026
  1. May 13, 20266mo ago

    iPurple publishes EntryPoint Hijacking analysis and detection PoC

    iPurple published an analysis of EntryPoint Hijacking, explaining how DLL EntryPoint overwrites can evade EDR by executing through normal loader behavior or thread-pool activity. The article also described LdrShuffleDetect, which reportedly detected all tested hijacking attempts from LdrShuffle, EPI, and a private implementation.

    EntryPoint Hijacking - Purple Team
  2. 2025

    Hugo Valette presents and releases LdrShuffle PoCs

    The iPurple article says Hugo Valette presented EntryPoint Hijacking at x33fcon 2025 and released proof-of-concepts named LdrShuffle. The PoCs demonstrated both same-process and remote-process variants and restored modified loader fields to reduce crashes and evade memory scans.

    EntryPoint Hijacking - Purple Team
  3. 2023

    Kurosh Dabbagh Escalante releases EPI proof of concept

    The iPurple article states that Kurosh Dabbagh Escalante released the EPI proof of concept in 2023, documenting abuse of a loaded DLL's EntryPoint to execute attacker-controlled code. EPI patched kernelbase.dll's EntryPoint and used thread-pool execution to run the payload.

    EntryPoint Hijacking - Purple Team
  4. Apr 5, 20225y ago

    Jonathan Johnson publishes DuplicateHandle auditing bypass research

    Jonathan Johnson published research showing that attackers can request PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE access and then duplicate that handle into one with PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, bypassing access-mask-based detections and SACL auditing. The article also reported testing that confirmed Cobalt Strike Beacon's default getsystem behavior used this strategy.

    Bypassing Access Mask Auditing Strategies | by Jonathan Johnson | Medium
  5. Dec 11, 20215y ago

    White Knight Labs publishes ETW bypass research

    White Knight Labs published "Bypassing ETW For Fun and Profit," documenting ETW bypass tradecraft on Windows.

    Bypassing ETW For Fun and Profit | White Knight Labs
  6. Sep 2, 20215y ago

    NVISO publishes Metasploit shellcode analysis

    NVISO Labs published an analysis of Metasploit's windows/shell_reverse_tcp shellcode, detailing its import resolution, reverse-shell behavior, and weaknesses in its hashing and module-walking logic. The article also described a proof of concept using a fake DLL export to hijack LoadLibraryA resolution for detection and process termination.

    Anatomy and Disruption of Metasploit Shellcode - NVISO Labs
  7. Jun 10, 20215y ago

    Hunt & Hackett analyzes malicious use of ScreenConnect

    Hunt & Hackett published research on forensic traces and detection opportunities for ConnectWise Control/ScreenConnect, including its use in an incident to upload Mimikatz, Advanced IP Scanner, and ransomware. The article also showed that patching ScreenConnect.Core.dll could suppress ScreenConnect-generated event logs.

    REvil: the usage of legitimate remote admin tooling
  8. 2017

    James Forshaw documents LSASS SACL auditing bypass

    The Medium article cites James Forshaw's 2017 blog post "Bypassing SACL Auditing on LSASS" as prior research demonstrating that DuplicateHandle can be used to evade LSASS SACL auditing.

    Bypassing Access Mask Auditing Strategies | by Jonathan Johnson | Medium
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Affected products

1 linked
Windows

Organizations

1 linked
Connectwise

Observables

1 linked

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