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President Donald Trump declared a national emergency and signed an executive order to protect the U.S. bulk-power system from cyber, operational, and national-security threats posed by certain foreign-produced equipment, software, and digital capabilities. The order allows the Department of Energy (DOE) to prohibit or condition the acquisition, importation, transfer, and installation of covered equipment when a foreign entity and an unacceptable security risk are identified, citing concerns that Chinese-made infrastructure could contain exploitable flaws or remotely accessible digital backdoors.
The order also authorizes the Energy Secretary to require utilities to identify, isolate, monitor, secure, disconnect, replace, or remove already deployed foreign-manufactured or foreign-operated grid equipment. DOE must develop implementing regulations within 120 days in coordination with other federal agencies and, within 180 days, recommend procurement changes intended to favor U.S.-manufactured energy infrastructure.
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Then-FBI Director Christopher Wray told Congress that Chinese hackers prepositioned in small-office and home routers could target the U.S. electricity grid during a conflict between China and the United States.
Near the end of his first term, President Trump issued a 2020 executive order seeking to limit purchases of foreign-made bulk-power equipment. Utilities later reported difficulty complying with that order.
President Trump signed an executive order declaring a national emergency over cyber, operational, and national-security risks from certain foreign-produced U.S. bulk-power equipment. It authorizes DOE to restrict covered transactions and, where an unacceptable risk is found, require deployed foreign equipment to be identified, secured, isolated, disconnected, replaced, or removed.
The Biden administration suspended the prior bulk-power executive order for a scope review and revoked and replaced a related Department of Energy order.
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The Federal Communications Commission has added foreign-made advanced robotic devices and connected power inverters to its **Covered List**, blocking new models in those categories from receiving the equipment authorization required for import, marketing, or sale in the United States. The action followed national security findings from a White House-convened interagency process that concluded the products pose unacceptable cybersecurity and supply-chain risks, particularly because their remote connectivity could enable surveillance, data exfiltration, remote access, shutdowns, or broader operational disruption. Federal officials warned that connected inverters could potentially be switched off or exploited against the U.S. electric grid, while networked robots—including humanoids, quadrupeds, and other mobile systems—could have both their collected data and physical operations manipulated. The restriction applies to **new product models** and does not affect devices already owned by consumers or products previously authorized by the FCC, though manufacturers may seek case-by-case conditional approval through review by the Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security if specific devices are found not to present national security concerns.
Aug 4, 2026
President Donald Trump signed an executive order directing the Department of War to impose stricter supply-chain security requirements on defense contractors, including end-to-end mapping of software, services, technology, raw materials, and components used in national security systems. The order prioritizes domestic and allied sourcing of critical materials, sharply limits waivers under `10 U.S.C. 4872` starting Jan. 1, 2027, and requires contractors seeking exceptions to submit mitigation plans. It also calls for supplier vetting for foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI), supply concentration, and manufacturing risk, while requiring significant supply-chain risks to be reported to the government; fraudulent or noncompliant contractors could face contractual remedies and possible referral to the Attorney General. The new mandate lands alongside a proposed DFARS rule that could expand FOCI-related compliance across unclassified Department of Defense contracts and subcontracts above $5 million by making National Industrial Security System (NISS) eligibility a condition for awards, modifications, and option exercises. Contractors and subcontractors may need to submit `SF 328`, maintain eligible NISS status, and strengthen supplier oversight to avoid delays or blocked performance, especially where sensitive data or systems are involved. Reporting indicates the government also plans to use AI to analyze contractor-submitted supply-chain data for vulnerabilities, bottlenecks, and single points of failure, raising the stakes for both compliance programs and protection of the resulting supply-chain maps as high-value cyber targets.
Jul 23, 2026
European officials and industry reporting have highlighted a widening threat to critical infrastructure as cyber risks to electricity networks grow alongside military monitoring of subsea assets. An International Energy Agency assessment cited in Spanish reporting said cyberattacks on critical energy infrastructure rose 30% in 2023 to **420 million** globally, while attacks on energy service companies have quadrupled since 2020. Recent incidents include the 2022 satellite communications disruption that knocked **5,800 wind turbines** offline in Germany and breaches affecting more than 20 Danish energy companies. Authorities have also warned that compromised smart meters, solar inverters, and battery systems could be used to destabilize grid frequency or trigger broader outages. The concern extends beyond direct hacking to supply-chain and geopolitical exposure tied to digitally connected clean-energy equipment and other strategic infrastructure. European and U.S. authorities reviewed communications modules in imported solar and battery systems, while Lithuania moved to block remote access by Chinese suppliers to solar, wind, and storage control platforms. Separately, the UK said British and Norwegian forces carried out a month-long operation to track a Russian attack submarine and two GUGI-linked spy submarines near North Atlantic cables and pipelines, underscoring fears that hostile states could target the seabed networks that carry **99% of international telecommunications traffic** and support a major share of regional energy supplies.
Jun 29, 2026