A review of a FlappyPig-operated CTF platform found that it used Apache Shiro 1.2.4's CookieRememberMeManager with a hard-coded AES key. The key allowed an authorized researcher to decrypt and forge serialized RememberMe cookies, triggering unsafe Java deserialization on the server.
Standard CommonsCollections gadget chains were impeded by Shiro's custom class-loading behavior, but a URLDNS payload confirmed deserialization. The researcher then used a JRMPClient gadget chain with a malicious JRMP listener to achieve remote command execution; the issue was disclosed to FlappyPig before the write-up was published.

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An authorized review of FlappyPig's CTF platform identified a hard-coded Apache Shiro RememberMe AES key that enabled forged serialized cookies. The researcher used a JRMPClient payload and malicious JRMP listener to obtain shell access, and reported the vulnerability to FlappyPig before publication.
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